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Abstract
Because they are home to more than half of the world population, and because most
of the world economic activity takes place within them, cities are at the forefront of
global environmental issues. Land use planning, urban transport and housing policies
are now recognized as major tools for the reduction of both greenhouse gases emis-
sions and vulnerability to climate change impacts. So far, however, how to use these
tools efficiently remains unclear. At least three main difficulties explain this, and play
a key role in urban climate policies analysis. First, urban climate policies are also not
developed or implemented in a vacuum; they interact with other policy goals, such as
economic competitiveness or social issues, giving rise to both synergies and conflicts.
Second, inertia is a key factor when designing optimal climate policies: structural mod-
ifications in cities occur slowly over a long time horizon. Some immediate actions are
required if cities are to be adapted to a different climate or to help reduce greenhouse
gases emissions within a few decades. Third, the evolution of a city depends on several
external factors, on which local policy-makers do not generally have much influence:
demographic, socio-economic, cultural, political and technological changes will play a
major role. This uncertainty has to be taken into account, and climate policies have to
be robust against future possible global evolutions is important. These three difficulties
are not, however, impossible to overcome, and we will illustrate how integrated city
modelling can help address these issues.
Keywords
Urban modelling, climate change, adaptation, mitigation
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Résumé en français
Parce qu’elles concentrent plus de la moitié de la population et l’essentiel de l’ac-
tivité économique mondiales, les villes sont des acteurs majeurs des problématiques
environnementales globales. Les politiques de transport, d’urbanisme et de logement
sont ainsi reconnus comme des moyens nécessaires et efficaces d’action pour réduire
les émissions ainsi que pour réduire la vulnérabilité aux impacts du changement cli-
matique. Jusqu’à présent, malheureusement, il n’y a pas de consensus sur ce qui doit
être fait, et encore moins sur comment le faire. Trois difficultés, au moins, expliquent
cela. Tout d’abord, les politiques climatiques interagissent avec les autres objectifs des
politiques urbaines, comme la compétitivité économique ou les problèmes sociaux, en-
trainant des synergies et des conflits. Ensuite, les inerties sont un facteur-clef à prendre
en compte : les modifications structurelles des villes s’opèrent très lentement. Si l’on
veut que les villes soient adaptées au climat de la fin du XXIème siècle, il est indis-
pensable de commencer à agir dès maintenant. Enfin, les effets des politiques urbaines
dépendent de nombreux facteurs exogènes, et inconnus au moment où la décision doit
être prise : les changements démographiques, socio-économiques culturels politiques
et technologiques vont jouer un rôle majeur. Ces trois difficultés ne sont cependant pas
insurmontables, et nous illustrerons comment une modélisation intégrée peut permettre
de répondre à une partie de ces problèmes.
Mots-clef
Modélisation urbaine, changement climatique, adaptation, mitigation
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Résumé long en français
Parce qu’elles concentrent plus de la moitié de la population et l’essentiel de l’ac-
tivité économique mondiales, les villes sont des acteurs majeurs des problématiques
environnementales globales. Elles le sont notamment dans le cadre de la réduction des
émissions de gaz à effet de serre, et de la réduction de la vulnérabilité au changement
climatique et aux risques naturels. Les interactions d’une ville avec l’environnement
sont complexes, et régies par de nombreux facteurs. L’un d’entre eux, cependant, a un
statut tout à fait particulier : son organisation spatiale, parce que celle-ci joue un rôle
prépondérant dans l’intensité et dans l’organisation des flux qui caractérisent le fonc-
tionnement de la ville, et parce que celle-ci détermine l’exposition aux aléas naturels.
Les politiques de transport, d’urbanisme et de logement sont ainsi reconnues comme
des moyens nécessaires et efficaces d’action pour réduire les émissions, ainsi que pour
réduire la vulnérabilité aux impacts du changement climatique . Il n’est donc pas sur-
prenant que la réflexion sur l’évolution attendue de la structure spatiale des villes soit au
cœur de nombreuses réflexions prospectives sur l’adaptation et l’atténuation du change-
ment climatique, notamment au sein du GIEC, de la Banque Mondiale, ou de l’OCDE.
Jusqu’à présent, malheureusement, il n’y a pas de consensus clair sur la manière d’uti-
liser ce levier efficacement. Dans ce document, notre thèse est que trois raisons, au
moins, expliquent cela, et jouent un rôle clé dans l’analyse des politiques climatiques
urbaines.
Tout d’abord, l’inertie est un facteur déterminant dans la définition de ces poli-
tiques. En effet, une fois construite, une ville n’évolue que très lentement. En Europe,
il a ainsi fallu des siècles pour parvenir à la structure des villes actuelles, et comme
les bâtiments ont généralement des durées de vie variant de 50 à plus de 100 ans, nos
choix actuels conditionnent en grande partie les émissions et la vulnérabilité urbaines
tout au long du siècle. Si l’on veut que les villes soient adaptées au climat de la fin du
XXIème siècle, et si l’on veut réduire significativement les émissions de gaz à effet de
serre d’ici quelques décennies, il est indispensable de commencer à agir maintenant, et
à modifier la conception des bâtiments et les stratégies de planification urbaine.
Deuxièmement, l’évolution d’une ville dépend de nombreux facteurs exogènes, et
inconnus au moment où la décision doit être prise : les changements démographiques,
socio-économiques, culturels, politiques et technologiques vont jouer un rôle majeur.
Par exemple, le succès de stratégies visant à réduire les émissions liées aux transports
est dépendant des évolutions futures des prix énergétiques, et des technologies qui exis-
teront à l’avenir. Cette incertitude doit être prise en compte, et les politiques climatiques
doivent pouvoir être robustes face à celle-ci. Nous affirmons qu’il est important que la
planification urbaine soit faite dans un esprit de prospective intégrant cette incertitude,
et nous proposons ici un exemple d’approche basée sur la construction de scénarios.
Troisièmement, les politiques climatiques urbaines ont un impact sur les autres ob-
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jectifs des décideurs urbains, comme la compétitivité économique, ou la gestion de pro-
blèmes sociaux. Ces interactions peuvent conduire à des arbitrages à réaliser, lorsque
ces objectifs s’opposent, ou bien à des synergies lorsqu’une mesure a des effets se-
condaires positifs. Des conflits et des complémentarités existent aussi entre politiques
d’adaptation et d’atténuation, car celles-ci sont souvent basées sur les mêmes outils.
Ces problèmes d’acceptabilité sociale et politique, et d’efficacité, sont importants, et
doivent être pris en compte dans l’analyse des politiques climatiques urbaines. Nous
montrons ainsi qu’intégrer différents objectifs dans un cadre cohérent (ce que à quoi on
réfère parfois par l’expression anglaise « mainstreaming ») peut permettre de concevoir
des politiques plus efficaces et plus acceptables.
Nous allons présenter quelques outils permettant de s’attaquer à ces problèmes. Les
modèles prospectifs, bien qu’ils soient une description très simplifiée de la réalité, avec
des hypothèses qui restreignent les possibilités qu’ils peuvent explorer, sont un outil
efficace pour créer des scénarios prospectifs et analyser des rétroactions complexes.
En permettant aux acteurs des problématiques climatiques de mieux comprendre les
principaux mécanismes et interactions en jeu, ils constituent une base utile pour la
discussion. Nous allons présenter ici un tel modèle, NEDUM-2D, et allons l’utiliser
pour illustrer dans quelle mesure il peut aider à résoudre les problèmes que nous avons
soulevés.
Développer des modèles d’aide à la décision pose des difficultés techniques : les
modèles doivent prendre suffisamment de mécanismes pour pouvoir analyser la réa-
lité. D’un autre côté, cependant, ils doivent rester suffisamment simples pour que leurs
conclusions et leur domaine de validité restent clairs à leurs utilisateurs, c’est-à-dire
qu’il faut éviter un effet de « boîte noire ». Les modèles doivent donc être conçus et dé-
finis en fonction de la question à laquelle ils doivent apporter des éléments de réponse.
En ce qui concerne les questions climatiques, les modèles urbains existants ne sont pas
suffisants : souvent, ils sont trop complexes ne prennent pas en compte des mécanismes
nécessaire dans l’étude des problèmes climatiques. C’est pourquoi nous avons décidé
de développer notre propre modèle : NEDUM-2D.
Un tel modèle est un travail qui ne peut être achevé : il doit être constamment
complété, raffiné, ou parfois simplifié pour correspondre aux besoins, questions et cer-
titudes de ses utilisateurs. Ce que nous proposons ici n’est pas un outil permettant de
résoudre définitivement out les problèmes climatiques urbains, mais c’est un premier
pas dans le développement d’un cadre permettant se s’attaquer à certains de ces pro-
blèmes.
La partie I de cette thèse est une introduction qui développe les idées présentées
ici. Elle présente dans quelle mesure les problèmes climatiques sont importants pour
les décideurs urbains. Le premier chapitre expose les enjeux liés à la réduction des
émissions de gaz à effet de serre : il met en évidence pourquoi les émissions urbaines
ont une importance particulière dans le débat général sur l’effet de serre, et en quoi
les politiques urbaines peuvent etre efficaces. Le deuxième chapitre expose les enjeux
liés à la vulnérabilité des villes aux impacts futurs du changement climatique, et aux
politiques de réduction de cette vulnérabilité. Basé sur ces deux revues, le troisième
chapitre explique la thèse de ce document, et résume les principaux résultats qui seront
obtenus dans les parties II et III.
La partie II présente la modélisation que nous avons adoptée. La modélisation inté-
grée des villes vise à fournir une description quantifiée des interactions entre différents
processus urbains, et peut décrire l’influence d’évolutions globales sur ces processus.
C’est un outil efficace pour répondre aux problèmes soulevés dans le chapitre 3. Cepen-
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dant, l’utilisation de tels outils pose des problèmes spécifiques, que chaque chapitre de
cette partie va examiner. Le Chapitre 4 fait tout d’abord une brève revue des approches
et des théories existantes pour modéliser les villes. Les chapitres suivants présentent et
expliquent les modèles que nous avons conçus. Notre approche est itérative. Partant du
modèle standard développé par l’économie urbaine, nous introduisons progressivement
des mécanismes additionnels pour répondre à des problèmes de complexité croissante.
Enfin, la partie III explore dans quelle mesure les modèles que nous avons conçus
peuvent répondre aux questions que nous avons soulevées dans la partie I, et peuvent
aider à concevoir ou à évaluer des politiques locales d’atténuation des émissions de
gaz à effet de serre et d’adaptation face aux conséquences du changement climatique.
Cette partie est basée sur trois articles de recherche. Avant chacun d’entre eux, un brève
introduction explique le contexte et présente les principales conclusions.
x
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Summary
Because they are home to more than half of the world population, and because
most of the world economic activity takes place within them, cities are at the forefront
of global environmental issues, among which greenhouse gas emissions reduction, and
vulnerability to climate change and natural hazards. Interactions between a city and its
environment are complex, and influenced by numerous factors. One of them, however,
plays a special role: the urban geographical form, i.e. the spatial repartition of people
and assets because it plays a major role in shaping the fluxes2 that characterize the life
of a city, and in constraining the infrastructure3 locations, types and shapes.
Land use planning, urban transport and housing policies are now recognized as ma-
jor tools for the reduction of both greenhouse gases emissions (climate change "miti-
gation") and vulnerability to climate change impacts ("adaptation" to climate change).
It is therefore not surprising that reflexions on city spatial structure are at the heart of
many prospective studies on climate change adaptation and mitigation, for instance in
IPCC, OCDE, UN-Habitat or the World Bank4. So far, however, how to use efficiently
most of these tools remains rather unclear. In this work, our thesis is that at least three
main difficulties explain this, and play a key role in urban climate policies analysis.
First, inertia is a key factor when designing optimal climate policies: structural
modifications in cities occur slowly over a long time horizon. Some immediate actions
are required if cities are to be adapted to a different climate or to help reduce green-
house gases emissions within a few decades. We claim that it is especially urgent to
start changing building design and urban planning habits.
Second, the evolution of a city depends on several external factors, on which local
policy-makers do not generally have much influence: demographic, socio-economic,
cultural, political and technological changes will play a major role. For instance, suc-
cess of strategies aiming at reducing transport related energy consumption is dependent
on future transport prices. This uncertainty has to be taken into account, and climate
policies have to be robust against future possible global evolutions. We affirm that ur-
ban planning needs to be done in a "prospective" mindset, considering the uncertainty
on many drivers of urban dynamics, and we propose a scenario-based approach to do
so.
Third, urban climate policies are not developed or implemented in a vacuum; they
interact with other policy goals, such as economic competitiveness or social issues.
Urban policies have multiple goals, such as enhancing the quality of life and the city’s
2of people, goods, energy, water, information etc.
3transport infrastructure, buildings, plants etc.
4cf. Van Ypersele (2007), Kamal-Chaoui and Robert (2009), UN-Habitat (2011) and Hoornweg et al.
(2011a).
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economic competitiveness by means of affordable housing and office space, amenities,
and efficient public services (from good schools to rapid transportation). Urban poli-
cies also have social objectives aimed at poverty and social segregation issues, safety
and security, and public health. They have local environmental goals as well, such
as reducing air and water pollution and preserving natural areas. In addition to this
long list of goals, urban policies now face new challenges from climate change. Envi-
ronmental policies can result in positive feedback with respect to economic and social
issues. Conflicts among different policy goals can also take place leading to trade-offs
and implementation obstacles. Social and political acceptability issues are important
and the political economy of climate policies needs to be investigated. We show that in-
tegrating various goals in a consistent decision-making framework (what is sometimes
referred to as "mainstreaming") allows for more efficient and acceptable policies.
We will present some tools which can help solve these problems. Prospective stud-
ies that explore various possible evolutions of global variables and their local conse-
quences on cities are for instance especially useful to design the best policies. Quanti-
tative models, although they are highly simplified descriptions of reality, with hypothe-
ses restricting the possibilities they can explore, are an efficient tool to create such
prospective scenarios and analyze complex feedbacks. By enabling decision makers
and stakeholders to understand the main mechanisms and interactions between vari-
ables, they can create a basis for policy discussion. We will present here such a model,
NEDUM-2D, and use it to illustrate to what extent it can help address previous issues.
Developing models which can help policy making raises technical difficulties: mod-
els have to include the main processes and mechanisms, to be able to properly analyze
the reality. At the same time, however, they have to be simple enough so that their
conclusions and their validity remain clear to its users, to avoid the "black-box"effect:
models have to be designed based on the question they are trying to answer. For cli-
mate questions, existing integrated urban models are not sufficient: they are often too
complex, and at the same time often do not take into account mechanisms relevant for
environmental issues. We therefore decided to develop our own model, NEDUM-2D.
Such a model is a never-ending work: it should be always completed, refined,
or sometimes simplified to meet needs, questions, and beliefs of its users. What we
propose here is not a definitive tool to solve all urban climate problems, but it is a
first step towards the development of a framework which may enable to address some
issues.
Part I is an introduction that develops the ideas presented here. It presents to what
extent climate issues are of relevance for urban decision-makers. The first chapter deals
with mitigation issues : it highlights why urban greenhouse gases emissions matter in
the broader global warming debate, and how urban policies act on them. The second
chapter looks into detail at cities vulnerability to climate change impacts, and at policy
options to reduce this vulnerability. Based on these reviews, Chapter 3 will explain the
thesis of the present document, and will sum up the main findings we will present in
Parts II and III.
Part II explains the modeling approach we have followed. Integrated city modeling
(ICM) aims at giving a quantitative description of the interaction between different
urban processes, and can describe the influence of the evolution of global parameters
on these local processes. It is therefore an efficient tool to address issues described
in Chapter 3. Using ICM poses however specific problems, to which each chapter of
this Part aims to answer. Chapter 4 does, first, a brief review of existing approaches
and theories for city modeling. It defines more precisely what exactly means "City
2
Modeling", and its challenges, advantages and limitations. Next chapters present and
explain the models we have designed. Our approach is iterative. Starting from the
classical urban economy model, we introduce progressively additional mechanisms to
answer increasingly complex problems.
Part III explores to what extent the models we have designed can answer the ques-
tions we have raised in Part I, and to what extent it can give some useful information
for the design and assessment of mitigation and adaptation policies at local scale. This
part is based on the text of three research articles (Viguié and Hallegatte, 2011; Viguié
et al., 2011; Viguié and Hallegatte, 2012). Before each of them, a short introduction
explains the context and highlights main conclusions.
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Chapter 1
Cities and greenhouse gases
emissions
It is particularly ironic that the battle to save the world’s remaining healthy
ecosystems will be won or lost not in tropical forests or coral reefs that
are threatened but on the streets of the most unnatural landscapes on the
planet.
Worldwatch Institute, 2007p. xxiv. , cited in UNFPA, 2007
We live today in an urbanizing world, and cities are already responsible for an im-
portant share of global greenhouse gas emissions. Understanding how urban lifestyles
impact GHG emissions is therefore of foremost importance to reach a world low-
carbon development pathway.
This chapter first presents main figures concerning cities and present urbanization
trends (Section 1.1). It then considers issues related to the definition of "urban" GHG
emissions, and presents major figures of available assessments (Section 1.2). Possi-
bilities of emission abatement depend on the origin of these emissions: Section 1.3
breaks down urban emissions in several sectors and briefly presents some abatement
options. Finally, Section 1.4 highlights the particular role played by a variable: the
urban shape, and explains why urban decision-makers can have a determinant role in
global emission reduction policies.
1.1 An urbanizing world
Cities are now home of more than half of the world population (Fig. 1.1). While the
urban population represented just a small fraction of the world population until the
middle of the 19th century, it suddenly increased during the industrial revolution, first
in Europe and then in the rest of the world. This transfer is more or less complete in
developed countries, but in developing countries it is currently occurring very fast. The
threshold of over 50% of the world population living in cities has just been passed and
the figures are still rising (unless there is a note to the contrary, all figures quoted are
from UNPD, 2008).
Four fifths of North Americans and 90% of Belgians, Islanders and Israelis live in
towns (see, for example, Huriot and Bourdeau-Lepage, 2009 for a more detailed dis-
cussion of this point). The proportion of urban dwellers is lower in the less-developed
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Figure 1.1: People Living in Cities, as a percentage of world population. Source: UNPD, 2008
countries but is still close to 44% of the population and is growing constantly; it is
estimated that 50% of their population will be urban by 2020.
When this is viewed in the light of an increasing world population, this increase in
urban dwelling is leading to a veritable explosion in the number of world-wide cities
inhabitants. The United Nations estimates that by 2050, the world’s urban popula-
tion will almost double from 3.4 billion to 6.3 billion, representing most of the global
population growth over that time.
The pace or urbanization in the world today is unprecedented, with a near quin-
tupling of the urban population between 1950 and 2011. There are everyday 190,000
more urban dwellers on the planet. This is the equivalent of the population of Munich,
Stockholm or Lyon urban area added every week. The speed of this growth has never
been matched in history. It look 130 years for London to rise from one million to 8
million inhabitants but it only took 45 years for Bangkok, 37 for Dakar and 25 years
for Seoul to see the same increase in population (UN-Habitat, 2004).
The fastest rates of urbanization are currently taking place in the least developed
countries, followed by the rest of the developing countries – comprising three quarters
of the world’s urban population. From now until 2020 almost all world demographic
growth will take place in the countries of the South, their urban populations growing
from 2 to 4 billion out of a total population which will increase from 5 to 7 billion.
Housing 2 billion inhabitants means building the equivalent of seven new cities of
10 million inhabitants every year, i.e. seven times Shanghai or Jakarta or ten times
London. In China alone, it is expected that, until 2035, the urban population will
increase by around 315 million people (UNPD, 2010), a figure higher than current
total US population (312 million in 2011, according to US census bureau).
This growth is not uniformly distributed among cities. It is expected (UNPD, 2008)
that the number of very large cities (conurbations of over 10 million inhabitants, like
Paris conurbation for example) will grow from 19 to 26 by 2025 (Fig. 1.2), two thirds
of them will only experience modest population growths (less than 2% a year). At
present these represent 9% of the urban population and by 2025 they will represent
about 10%. By 2025 almost half of new urban dwellers will be housed in towns of
less than 500,000 inhabitants, towns which already, today, are home to over 50% of the
world urban population.
Another important fact to note is that the present growth in cities is more and more
land hungry (Angel et al., 2005); average urban density (the number of inhabitants
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Figure 1.2: The world’s megacities, 2007 and 2025. Source: UN-Habitat, 2008
per square kilometre of built surface) has been diminishing for two centuries due to
improvements in modes of transport. Between 2000 and 2030, the world’s urban pop-
ulation is expected to increase by 72 per cent, while the built-up areas of cities of
100,000 people or more could increase by 175 per cent . In the past decade, the av-
erage density of towns in developing countries has decreased by 1.7% per year and
that in developed countries by 2.2% per year (for more information see the notes to
Chapter 4 of UNFPA, 2007). If current trends are maintained during the next 20 years
built surface (green areas excluded) of towns of 100,000 inhabitants and more, which
covered in 2005 an area the size of Morocco is set to triple. The built surface of devel-
oping countries cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants will be multiplied by 3 and
will reach 600,000 km2 (equivalent to the surface of France) while the built surface of
developed countries cities will be multiplied by 2.5 and will reach 500,000 km2 (the
surface of Spain).
1.2 A global perspective on GHG emissions
Defining cities emissions or energy consumption raise several issues. First, there is
no globally accepted definition of the boundaries of an urban area or city, which often
leads to figures based on different references when considering figures disclosed by
different countries (Hoornweg et al., 2011a). Further than this, another issue is that the
scope of the activities to be taken into account is also not consensual. Indeed, one must
decide whether energy consumption or emissions are the "responsibility" of those who
directly produce them or those whose consumption drives their production. The main
issue is to what extent "upstream" consumption and emissions or "embodied" consump-
tion and emissions, which are associated with extraction, production, transportation of
products, or services used by the city (Satterthwaite, 2008; Hoornweg et al., 2011b,a),
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should be included. The World Resources Institute (WRI) and World Business Council
for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) introduced three scopes that should be consid-
ered for calculating greenhouse gas emissions, and which are listed in Tab. 1.1. All the
following figures are either given from the perspective of the location of final energy
consumption (scope 2), or from the perspective of the standard produced by UNEP,
UN-HABITAT and the World Bank, which includes all emissions produced within a
city, major emissions from consumption within a city, and major upstream emissions
that are attributable to city residents (between scope 2 and 3).
Definitions Examples
Scope 1 All direct emissions sources
located within the geopolitical
boundary of the local government.
Use of fuels such as heavy fuel
oil, natural gas or propane used for
heating.
Scope 2 Indirect emissions that result as a
consequence of P activity within
the jurisdiction’s geopolitical
boundary j limited to electricity,
district heating, steam and cooling
consumption.
Purchased electricity used within
the geopolitical boundaries of the
jurisdiction associated with the
generation of GHGs at the power
plant.
Scope 3 All other indirect and embodied
emissions that occur as a result
of activity within the geopolitical
boundary.
Methane emissions from solid
waste generated within the com-
munity which decomposes at land-
fills either inside or outside of the
community’s geopolitical bound-
ary.
Table 1.1: Emissions scope for cities. Source: UN-Habitat, 2011, after ICLEI and Australian Government
Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, 2008.
1.2.1 Energy consumption
Even though they represent only 2.8 percent of the Earth’s land area1 , cities are re-
sponsible for two thirds of the world’s energy consumption2(IEA, 2008). Some cities
consume as much energy as entire countries: London for instance, with a population
around 7.8 million, consumes about as much final energy as Ireland3.
Energy use per inhabitant tends to be smaller in cities than in rural areas in devel-
oped countries. Indeed, higher density settlement in cities leads to energy efficiency
gains, especially in transportation. For example, in the European union, in 2006, final
energy demand on a per-capita basis was about 3.5 Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent
(Mtoe) in urban areas, slightly lower than the EU average of 3.7 Mtoe per capita, and
than the average per-capita consumption in rural areas of around 4.9 Mtoe. In the USA,
each urban resident consumes 11% less transport than the average US resident (IEA,
2008).
By contrast, in the developing world, residential per-capita energy use tends to
be significantly higher in cities than in rural areas: city dwellers tend to have higher
incomes and better access to energy services. This income effect generally outweighs
1Several figures exist for urban settlements total surface. This figure refers to all urban settlements,
including their green areas and empty spaces, as measured by (adjusted) night-time lights (UNFPA, 2007,
chapter 4). A discussion about alternative figures is given in Angel et al., 2005.
2All the following figures are given from the perspective of the location of final energy consumption.
3Source: UK department of energy and climate change, and Eurostat.
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Figure 1.3: Energy demand as percent of total energy demand, and related carbon dioxide emissions 2005.
Source: Hoornweg et al., 2011a.
the efficiency gains (IEA, 2008). An extreme example is given by china, where the per-
capita energy use of urban areas is about 80% higher than in the country as a whole4
(IEA, 2008).
Overall, the proportion of global energy consumed in cities is greater than the pro-
portion of the world’s population living in cities (66% compared to 50%).
1.2.2 GHG emissions
Cities probably emit between 30 and 40 per cent of all anthropogenic GHG emissions
(Satterthwaite, 2008)(see Tab. 1.2). This share is lower than their share in energy con-
sumption because of land-use and deforestation-related emissions which are generally
not considered "urban".
When focusing on energy-related emissions, the pattern is different. The Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA), which devoted one chapter of it 2008 World Energy
outlook (IEA, 2008) to energy use and GHG emissions in cities, estimated that energy
use in cities translates into roughly 71% of global energy-related CO2 emissions (an
estimated 19.8 Gt of CO2 in 2006, cf also Fig. 1.3)5. This figure is expected to rise
to 74 percent by 2030, although the numbers vary widely depending on how cities or
urban areas are defined (UN-Habitat, 2011). The share of global energy-related CO2
emissions in cities is higher than that for energy use because as developing countries
urbanize, they tend to shift from biomass and waste (assumed to be CO2 neutral) to
more CO2-intensive energy sources (IEA, 2008)6.
In developing countries city residents emit more CO2 per capita because they tend
to consume more energy than rural residents. This fact, coupled with the projected in-
4On average, each urban citizen in China consumes 2.6 Mtoe, compared with 1.4 Mtoe nationally (IEA,
2008).
5This is more than four times the total emissions of China at that time.
6Adding non energy-related emissions, however, can lead to different conclusions. For instance, in Brazil,
main sources of emissions at the national level are related primarily to rural activities, such as deforestation
and cattle raising. If per capita energy-related CO2 emissions are higher in Brazilian cities than in rural areas,
total per capita CO2 emissions follow a different pattern (Dodman, 2009).
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Sector Percentage of
global GHG
emissions
Justification for estimating the proportion of GHGs from
cities, from the perspective of the location of activities that
produced them
Percentage of
GHGs allocated
to cities
Energy supplya 25.9 A high proportion of fossil fuel power stations are not in
cities, especially the largest cities. One third to one half of
emissions from city-based power stations.
8.6-13.0
Industry 19.4 A large proportion of heavy industry (which accounts for
most GHGs from industry) is not located in cities, including
many cement factories, oil refineries, pulp and paper mills,
metal smelters. Two-fifths to three-fifths of emissions in
cities.
7.8-11.6
Forestryb 17.4 No emissions assigned to cities. 0
Agriculture 13.5 Some large cities have considerable agricultural output, but
mostly because of extended boundaries encompassing rural
areas. No emissions assigned to cities.
0
Transport 13.1 Private use of motor vehicles a large part of this. Should
commuting by car by those living outside cities be assigned
to cities? Should city dwellers driving outside city bound-
aries be assigned to their city? 60 to 70 per cent of emissions
assigned to cities.
7.9-9.2
Residential and
commercial
buildings
7.9 Large sections of middle- and high-income groups in de-
veloped countries live outside cities - and a significant and
increasing proportion of commercial buildings are located
outside cities.60 to 70 per cent of emissions assigned to
cities.
4.7-5.5
Waste and
wastewater
2.8 More than half of this is landfill methane; but a proportion
of this would be released outside urban boundaries from
waste generated inside cities. 54 per cent of emissions as-
signed to cities.
1.5
Totalc 100 30.5-40.8
a A large part of this is from fossil fuel power stations. Excludes refineries, coke ovens, etc., which are included under
industry.
b Land use and land-use changes.
c Total emissions for the GHGs covered by the Kyoto Protocol amounts to 49 billion tonnes of CO2eq.
Table 1.2: Cities’ contribution to global anthropogenic GHG emissions, by sector. Source : UN-Habitat,
2011, after IPCC, 2007c; Satterthwaite, 2008.
12
crease in global urbanization, produces an expected trend towards an increasing propor-
tion of global CO2 emissions from cities. The implementation of new climate-change
policies in cities is therefore especially important (IEA, 2008).
1.2.3 An heterogeneous pattern
Emissions of cities vary widely across the world. The World Bank has listed urban
greenhouse gas baselines for about 70 cities (Tab. 1.3, after Hoornweg et al., 2011a).
While the methodology and data available for each city may vary, Tab. 1.3 is a useful
starting point for first international comparisons. Some important trends emerge: de-
veloping countries tend to have lower per-capita emissions than developed countries;
dense cities tend to have relatively lower per-capita emissions (particularly those with
good transportation systems); cities tend to have higher emissions, if they are localized
in a cold climate zone (Hoornweg et al., 2011a).
An important conclusion is that, even if rich cities tend use more energy than poor
cities and therefore emit more greenhouse gas emissions, for similar climatic condi-
tions there is no inevitable relationship between economic wealth and increasing emis-
sions. This is especially true when greenhouse gas accounting excludes the consump-
tion of manufactured goods within cities: per capita emissions can be comparatively
low in cities that are efficient and well planned. For example, Tokyo and Seoul are
much richer than Beijing and Shanghai, but emissions per capita are twice to three
times smaller7 (Hoornweg et al., 2011a). To understand which characteristics or poli-
cies enable to follow a low-carbon pathway, we have to examine more precisely the
different sources of emissions and energy consumption in cities; this is the subject of
the next section.
1.3 A local perspective onGHG emissions: sectoral anal-
ysis8
GHG are emitted in cities by various sectors and activities. This section briefly explores
the main sources of emissions and the potential of mitigation. Many excellent reviews
of of urban emissions exist (Dodman, 2009; Rosenzweig et al., 2011; UN-Habitat,
2011; Hoornweg et al., 2011a to cite the most recent ones), so this section will only
present some key elements and conclusions that emerge from this literature.
1.3.1 Different sectors
Globally, different activities or sectors emit different quantities of different gases, with
diverse impacts upon climate change (for instance, see Fig. 1.4): consumption of fossil
fuels for energy production, industrial processes, waste decomposition, agriculture and
land-use change. The main sources of GHG emissions from urban areas (Tab. 1.2)
are related to energy production, even if waste emissions do play an important role
7In 2005, GDP per capita in Seoul (23,000 $) and Tokyo (36,000 $) were two and three times higher than
in shanghai (11,000 $) and Beijing (9,000 $). Emissions per capita were 4.1tCO2e in Seoul, 4.9tCO2e in
Tokyo, 11.7tCO2e in Shanghai and 10.1tCO2e in Beijing (Hoornweg et al., 2011a). See alsoDhakal (2004)
for an in-depth analysis.
8This whole section draws extensively on Dodman, 2009 and UN-Habitat, 2011
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Country Annual GHG
emissions
(tCO2e/capita)
and year
City Annual GHG
emissions
(tCO2e/capita)
and year
Country Annual GHG
emissions
(tCO2e/capita)
and year
City Annual GHG
emissions
(tCO2e/capita)
and year
Argentina 7.64 2000 Buenos
Aires
3.83 Portugal 7.71 2007 Porto 7.3 2005
Australia 25.75 2007 Sydney 0.88 2006 Republic of
Korea
11.46 2001 Seoul 4.1 2006
Bangladesh 0.37 1994 Dhaka 0.63 Singapore 7.86 1994
Belgium 12.36 2007 Brussels 7.5 2005 Slovenia 10.27 2007 Ljubljana 9.5 2005
Brazil 4.16 1994 Rio de
Janeiro
2.1 1998 South
Africa
9.92 1994 Cape Town 11.6 2005
Sao Paulo 1.4 2000 Spain 9.86 2007 Barcelona 4.2 2006
Canada 22.65 2007 Calgary 17.7 2003 Madrid 6.9 2005
Toronto
(City of
Toronto)
9.5 2004 Sri Lanka 1.61 1995 Colombo 1.54
Toronto
(Metropoli-
tan Area)
11.6 2005 Kurunegala 9.63
Vancouver 4.9 2006 Sweden 7.15 2007 Stockholm 3.6 2005
China 3.4 1994 Beijing 10.1 2006 Switzerland 6.79 2007 Geneva 7.8 2005
Shanghai 11.7 2006 Thailand 3.76 1994 Bangkok 10.7 2005
Tianjin 11.1 2006 UK 10.5 2007 London
(City of
London)
6.2 2006
Chongqing 3.7 2006 London
(Greater
London
Area)
9.6 2003
Czech Re-
public
14.59 2007 Prague 9.4 2005 Glasgow 8.8 2004
Finland 14.81 2007 Helsinki 7 2005 US 23.59 2007 Austin 15.57 2005
France 8.68 2007 Paris 5.2 2005 Baltimore 14.4 2007
Germany 11.62 2007 Frankfurt 13.7 2005 Boston 13.3
Hamburg 9.7 2005 Chicago 12 2000
Stuttgart 16 2005 Dallas 15.2
Greece 11.78 2007 Athens 10.4 2005 Denver 21.5 2005
India 1.33 1994 Ahmedabad 1.2 Houston 14.1
Delhi 1.5 2000 Philadelphia 11.1
Kolkata 1.1 2000 Juneau 14.37 2007
Italy 9.31 2007 Bologna 11.1 2005 Los Ange-
les
13 2000
Naples
(Province)
4 2005 Menlo Park 16.37 2005
Turin 9.7 2005 Miami 11.9
Veneto
(Province)
10 2005 Minneapolis 18.34 2005
Japan 10.76 2007 Tokyo 4.89 2006 New York
City
10.5 2005
Jordan 4.04 2000 Amman 3.25 2008 Portland,
OR
12.41 2005
Mexico 5.53 2002 Mexico
City (City)
4.25 2007 San Diego 11.4
Mexico
City
(Metropoli-
tan Area)
2.84 2007 San Fran-
cisco
10.1
Nepal 1.48 1994 Kathmandu 0.12 Seattle 13.68 2005
The Nether-
lands
12.67 2007 Rotterdam 29.8 2005 Washington,
DC
19.7 2005
Norway 11.69 2007 Oslo 3.5 2005
Table 1.3: Representative GHG baselines for selected cities and countries. Source: World Bank,Hoornweg
et al., 2011a.
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Figure 1.4: Global GHG emissions by sector and end use/activity. All data is for 2000. All calculations are
based on CO2 equivalents, using 100-year global warming potentials from the IPCC (1996), based on a total
global estimate of 41,755 MtCO2 equivalent. Land use change includes both emissions and absorptions.
Dotted lines represent flows of less than 0.1% percent of total GHG emissions. Source: World Resources
Institute.
in cities in developing countries. Following discussions will focus on energy-related
GHG emissions: manufacturing, transport, services and residential buildings.9
Manufacturing on one side, and buildings, services and transport on the other side
follow different dynamics. Whereas manufacturing emissions have decreased in some
OECD countries where mitigation policies have been implemented, buildings, services
and transportation energy consumption (Fig. 1.5(a)) and emissions (Fig. 1.5(b)) have
increased over time. Fig. 1.6 presents equivalent results for France.
Part of the explanation comes from the fact that whereas manufacturing emissions
are mainly driven by cost maximizing behaviors, and can react well to financial in-
centives such as energy prices increase, other sectors appear to be mainly driven by
non-monetary preferences, and do not respond as well to price incentives. Some stud-
ies even measured negative GHG emissions abatement costs in these sectors, through
the implementation of efficiency measures (Fig. 1.7). Let us examine now these sectors
in more detail.
1.3.2 Commercial and residential buildings
GHG emissions from commercial and residential buildings are associated with both di-
rect emissions (onsite combustion of fuels), indirect emissions (from public electricity
use for street lighting and other activities and district heat consumption) and emissions
associated with embodied energy (e.g. in the materials used for their construction)
(UN-Habitat, 2011). They seem to account for a significant share of urban GHG emis-
sions, even if due to the non-comparability of urban emissions inventory, it is not possi-
9See for instance UN-Habitat (2011) for a detailed discussion on waste emissions. An important idea
concerning this sector is that emission level are greatly determined by the development level. Urban areas
have the potential to greatly reduce — or even eliminate — emissions from waste, because the concentration
of people and activities in urban areas means that waste can be collected efficiently, and methane emissions
from landfills can be captured and flared or used to generate electricity.
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(a) Total final energy consumption by Sector, IEA14.
(b) Changes in CO2 emissions, and emission shares by sector, IEA14.
Figure 1.5: Final energy consumption and emissions by sector, IEA14. Source: IEA, 2007.
Figure 1.6: Changes in GHG emissions per sector in France between 1990 and 2007. Source: SOES, 2010,
after Citepa, UNFCCC, December 2008.
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Figure 1.7: The "low hanging fruits" of urban GHG mitigation. Source: ICLEI, 2010, after McKinsey &
Company, 2009.
ble to exact global figures. For instance, according to Tab. 1.2, they represent between
15% and 40% of global cities emissions, whether energy supply-related emissions are
fully associated to these emissions or not. To take another example, in Paris, they rep-
resent 27% of total GHG emissions (based on the "bilan carbone" method, source: City
of Paris and ADEME).
Residential buildings As shown in Fig. 1.8, in IEA 15 countries, overall residen-
tial emissions10 have increased over the period from 1990 to 2004, mainly driven by
electricity use for appliances.
This graphic shows also the repartition of emissions by end-use: space heating is
the main contributor, but appliances are rapidly approaching the same level11. The
type of fuel used for electricity production, heating and cooling is a main determinant
of this repartition, and of GHGs emitted. For instance, in France, emissions due to
appliances are negligible compared to heating-related emissions, because of the low
carbon content of electricity production (SOES, 2010). Prague uses less energy per
capita for heating than New York City, but its emissions from heating are higher due
to its reliance on coal. The emissions of Cape Town and Geneva are also higher than
other comparable cities due to the predominance of oil instead of natural gas for heating
(UN-Habitat, 2011).
Another important factor is average dwelling size: larger houses consume more
energy for heating and cooling. Difference between countries and across time can be
big. For instance, the average size of homes built in the United States has increased
significantly, from 139m² in 1970 to 214m² in 2005. It is much greater than average
dwelling size in the UK (87 m²) (Gupta and Chandiwala, 2009). This can be illustrated
by Fig. 1.9, which shows a decomposition of changes in residential CO2 emissions,
for IEA 15 countries. "Activity" (i.e. population variation) and "structure" effects (i.e
i.e. higher levels of appliance ownership and use and increased dwelling size area per
10Excluding embodied energy, and corrected for yearly climatic variations.
11The energy and CO2 emissions increases from appliances are now being driven by a wide range of
mostly small appliances, as well as by air conditioning in some countries. Policies such as minimum energy
performance standards have had some impact in curbing the increase in energy consumption of large appli-
ances. However, these large appliances now represent only 50% of total appliance energy consumption, and
this share is falling (IEA, 2007).
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Figure 1.8: Household CO2 Emissions by End-use, IEA15. Source: IEA, 2007
Figure 1.9: Decomposition of Changes in Household CO2 Emissions, 1990 - 2004. Source: IEA, 2007.
"Activity" represents population variation, "structure" appliance ownership and dwelling size area per person
and "intensity" energy used per floor area or per appliance.
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Figure 1.10: Overview of Key Trends in the Service Sector, IEA19. Source: IEA, 2007
person), are the main cause of residential CO2 emissions variation.
Services and commercial buildings Between 1990 and 2004, CO2 emissions from
services and commercial buildings rose by 29% (Fig. 1.10), with an especially im-
portant increase in electricity consumption, which reflects the growing importance of
electricity-using devices such as lighting, office equipment and air conditioning. Even
if in some countries, a decrease in energy intensity (energy consumed per output unit)
has been observed,12 energy consumption has been driven by rising output from the
sector (as measured by value-added), which increased by 45%. (IEA, 2007).
Contrary to residential buildings, few disaggregated end-use data about services are
available, but it seems that thermal uses of energy (space heating, water heating and
cooking) account for just over half of the total energy use in services. Space cooling
still has a relatively small share, but is growing rapidly in many countries (IEA, 2007).
Table 1.4 presents for instance data for Canada and the United Kingdom.
Space heating Space cooling Lighting Other Total
ElectricityOther
fuels
ElectricityOther
fuels
ElectricityOther
fuels
ElectricityOther
fuels
ElectricityOther
fuels
Canada 4 36 7 0 13 0 29 11 53 47
United
Kingdom
7 39 5 0 20 0 17 12 49 51
Table 1.4: Percentage Share of Service Sector Energy Consumption by Energy Commodity and End-use,
2004. Source: IEA, 2007.
1.3.3 Transports
Urban areas rely heavily on transportation for both internal and external movements
of goods and people. Globally, transportation is responsible for about 23 per cent of
total energy-related GHG emissions and 13 per cent of global GHG emissions (IPCC,
2007c). Similarly to buildings-related emissions, freight and passenger transport emis-
sions have increased over recent years, both in developed countries and in developing
12Between 1990 and 2004 there was an overall decline of 14% in the energy intensity of the service sector
(as measured by final energy use per unit of value-added).
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Figure 1.11: Overview of Key Trends in Passenger Transport, IEA17. Source: (IEA, 2007).
countries. IEA has for instance measured that between 1990 and 2004, CO2 emis-
sions of passenger transport (both urban, rural and inter-urban) rose by 24%, mainly
driven by the 31% increase in passenger travel (measured by the number of passenger-
kilometres) (Fig. 1.10).
It is here again impossible to give exact global figures of urban transport emissions:
according to Tab. 1.2, they represent between 25% and 30% of global cities emissions,
and in Paris they represent 54% of total GHG emissions (based on the "bilan carbone"
method, source: City of Paris and ADEME).
Little data exist specifically about urban transport, but both in developed and devel-
oping countries, urban transport activities, and transport emissions, appear to increase
as economies grow. An illustrative example is China, where Darido et al. (2009) reports
the CO2 emissions from transport in 17 sample cities. On average, these emissions in-
creased between 2002 and 2006 by 6 per cent per year, a figure which ranged from 2
to 22 per cent between the sample cities. The CO2 emissions per capita from transport
also increased in all cities and ranged between 0.5 and 1.4 tonnes per person in 2006,
with Beijing being the highest.
A major determinant of passenger transport-related GHG emissions is transport
mode. Indeed, emissions per passenger.km are extremely different depending on the
mode. In cities, public-transport emissions per passenger km are generally between 100
and 20 times lower than cars emissions, and urban transport emissions depend mainly
on the proportion of journeys made by private as opposed to public transportation. For
instance, if in London, New York and Washington, DC, transportation represents a
significant contribution to the cities’ emissions (22, 23 and 18 per cent, respectively),
figures are significantly lower than in in Barcelona (35 per cent), Toronto (36 per cent),
Rio de Janeiro (30 per cent) and São Paulo (60 per cent), which are strongly reliant
on private motor vehicle transportation(UN-Habitat, 2011, after Newman, 2006 and
Dodman, 2009).
Transport emissions is an especially important issue in developing countries, where
motor vehicle ownership is expanding rapidly. Worldwide, there are in 2011 about 1.2
billion passenger vehicles. This figure is projected to reach 2.6 billion by 2050, the
majority of which will be found in developing countries (UN-Habitat, 2011,Wright
and Fulton, 2005).
Several mitigation options exist, generally relying on advances in transport technol-
ogy or on changes from one mode of transportation to another. As will be explained in
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Section 2.4.2, when urban shape is appropriate —generally when densities of people,
economic activities and cultural attractions are high enough— public transport system
development can be effective. This is true in both developed and developing coun-
tries, as highlighted by Bogotá (Colombia), where a bus rapid transit system (known
as TransMilenio) combined with car-restriction measures13 has shown that an erosion
of the relative importance of the public transport mode can be stopped (Lefèvre, 2007;
Wright and Fulton, 2005). Similar systems have also been proposed for several cities
in Africa — for example, in Dar es Salaam (UN-Habitat, 2011) — and in Asia (see
for instance Lefèvre, 2009 for an analysis in Bangalore, India). Policies influencing
urban transport emissions have generally many co-benefits: heavy reliance on personal
transportation often results in urban air pollution, environmental degradation, as well
as road traffic accidents (UN-Habitat, 2011).
One main issue — also discussed in more details in Chapter 3— is whether or not
the urban shape is appropriate for public transport development and use, and whether
urban policies should support an evolution towards such a shape — such policies are
often expensive either financially or politically, as will be illustrated in Chapter 9— or
rely on transport technology improvements. We will see in Chapter 8 that, in the case
of a city such as Paris urban area, transport technology changes appear to have a much
greater impact that planning policies aiming at orienting city shape evolution on a new
pathway. As will be explained, the conclusion might be different for rapidly growing
developing country cities.
1.4 Mitigation at city scale
1.4.1 The key role of urban planning
1.4.1.1 Urban shape and GHG emissions
The uses of land and spatial distribution of population and activities within an urban
area (i.e. the "urban structure", or "urban form") plays a major role in determining its
levels of energy use and GHG emissions. It is indeed one of the main determinant of
the type of habitat, of networks efficiency, and of transport distances and transportation
mode (e.g. the relative importance of public versus private modes).
The high concentrations of people and economic activities in urban areas can lead
to economies of scale, proximity and agglomeration — all of which can have a positive
impact upon energy use and associated emissions, while the proximity of homes and
businesses can encourage walking, cycling and the use of mass transport in place of
private motor vehicles (Satterthwaite, 1999). Dense urban settlements can be seen to
enable lifestyles that reduce per capita GHG emissions through the concentration of
services that reduces the need to travel large distances, the better provision of public
transportation networks, and the constraints on the size of residential dwellings im-
posed by the scarcity and high cost of land (UN-Habitat, 2011).
The type of urban structure often defines the most efficient mode of transport. It
has a direct impact on trip length, on the feasibility of transit or private cars being the
dominant mode of transport. The famous comparison, made by Bertaud (2002), of
Atlanta and Barcelona is illustrative of these points: in 1990, both cities had roughly
13including ‘car-free’ Sundays in which 120km of arterial roadways are closed to private motorized vehi-
cles (UN-Habitat, 2011)
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Figure 1.12: The Built-up Area and Barcelona represented at the same scale. Source: Bertaud, 2002.
the same population (2,5 million inhabitants) but very different average density (cf.
Fig. 1.12).
Firstly, for a given population, built-up area will be smaller and trips will be shorter
in length in cities with high densities than in cities with low density, potentially leading
to an overall smaller transport demand. Smaller trips can also enable to a significant
number of trips done by foot or bicycle. These two effects can be measured in At-
lanta and Barcelona: whereas in Atlanta the longest possible distance between 2 points
within the built-up area is 137 km, in Barcelona it is only 37 km. At the time of the
study, 20% of trips within Barcelona municipality were made by walking, whereas
there share was negligible in Atlanta (Bertaud, 2002).
Secondly, higher population density enable to build efficient public transport net-
works. Barcelona’s metro network is 99 kilometers long and, at the time of the study,
60% of the population was living at less than 600 meters from a metro station, whereas
in Atlanta, only 4% of the population was living within 800 meters from a metro sta-
tion of its 74km long network. To provide Atlanta’s population with the same metro
accessibility as Barcelona does (60% of the population within 600 meter from a metro
station), Bertaud (2002) computed that additional 3,400 kilometers of metro tracks and
about 2,800 new metro stations would be required, which is unrealistic. Comparison
between bus lines length and number of bus stops in Barcelona and Atlanta would have
given the same results.
Numerous other examples exist. A study of London shows for instance a "positive
link between higher density areas and levels of public transport access across London,
which is reflected in the decisions that people make about how to get to work" (Burdett
et al., 2005). In France, a 2005 survey of means of transport used by people to reach
their place of work or study shows that car use in urban centers is smaller than in peri-
urban municipalities, and measures an opposite effect for public transport use (Fig.
1.13(a)). Different availabilities of public transport appears to be a major cause of this
result (Fig. 1.13(b)).
It has been measured that an average household in 48 major US metropolitan ar-
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(a) Means of transport used by people surveyed to
reach their place of work or study.
(b) Reasons for using car.
Figure 1.13: Modal choice for commuting trips in France. Source: SOES (2010), after Insee, “Pratiques
environnementales des ménages” (ongoing survey on households environmental habits), January 2005 (table
taken from Insee, 2007).
eas generates up to 35 percent less greenhouse gas emissions when located in the city
than when located in the corresponding suburb14 (Glaeser, 2009). The city of Toronto,
for which some of the most comprehensive spatial data are available (Hoornweg et al.,
2011a), provides an important observation on spatial distribution of greenhouse gas
emissions: detailed neighborhood greenhouse gas emissions inventories showed a vari-
ation from a low of 1.31 tCO2e per capita in an area with multifamily units proximate
to services and public transit, to a high of 13.3 tCO2e per capita in a typical sprawling
neighborhood with large single family homes distant from all services and totally auto-
mobile dependent (VandeWeghe and Kennedy, 2007). As the distance from the central
core increases, private motor vehicle emissions begin to dominate the total emissions.
This pattern is supported by an earlier study, which found that low-density suburban
development in Toronto is 2 to 2.5 times more energy and GHG intensive than high-
density urban core development on a per capita basis (Norman et al., 2006). This
suggests that "what you buy is important, but where you live is much more important,
especially if you take into account the weather conditions and the rigid patterns of
emissions associated with urban form and buildings" (Hoornweg et al., 2011a). Finally,
we should cite the influential study by Newman and Kenworthy (1989) which was one
of the firsts to suggest that gasoline use per capita declines with urban density, although
the relationship measured weakens once GDP per capita is brought into consideration
(UN-Habitat, 2011).
Density may also affect household residential energy consumption. More compact
housing uses less energy for heating. For example, households in the US living in
single-family detached housing consume 35 per cent more energy for heating and 21
per cent more for cooling than comparable households in other forms of housing (UN-
Habitat, 2011). In addition, dense urban areas generate a more intense urban heat-
island effect (cf. Box in Section 2.1.1): this increases the number of ’cooling days’ and
decreases the number of ’heating days’, with the latter tending to have a greater effect
on energy consumption. Consequently, residential buildings in dense urban areas tend
to consume lower levels of energy (Ewing et al., 2008).
Naturally constrained cities, such as Singapore, Hing Kong, Portland, Seattle, Barcelona,
and Vancouver, provide important lessons: Geography—oceans and mountains—limits
14The largest difference is seen in New York City where a Manhattan household generates 6.4 tCO2e less
than their suburban neighbors.
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Figure 1.14: Defining spatial structure: the pattern of trips. Source: Alain Bertaud "Order without design"
(to be published).
the land available for development in these cities and has forced them to develop up in
a high density mode that has led to lower greenhouse gas emissions (Hoornweg et al.,
2011a).
Energy production in low-density cities It should be noted that, if less-density
cities may be less adapted to reduced transport-related energy consumption than com-
pact cities, low densities may be compatible with climate-friendly development. In-
deed, it may enable larger decentralized renewable energy production in the city (e.g.
photovoltaic panels on roofs), which may counterbalance transport-related increased
energy need (Giraud et al., 2010). This scenario is dependent on future transport and
renewable energy production technologies, but may potentially disentangle climate and
density issues.
1.4.1.2 Beyond the density concept
The debate about sustainable urban shape has long turned around the issue of density.
However, density is just one of a variety of factors that influences the sustainability
of urban form (Neuman, 2005). For instance, Jabareen (2006) has identified seven
concepts for a sustainable urban form — namely, compactness, sustainable transport,
density, mixed land uses, diversity, passive solar design, and greening. Based on these
criteria, the ’compact city’ model is identified as being most sustainable, followed
by the ’eco-city’, ’neo-traditional development’ and ’urban containment’ — although
this classification and ranking is based on reviews of literature rather than empirical
research (UN-Habitat, 2011). Strategies to increase urban density may or may not have
a positive influence on GHG emissions and other environmental impacts.
An interesting analysis is given by Bertaud (2002). He distinguishes four ur-
ban structures: In the first, "mono-centric", represented by such cities as New York
(US), London (UK), Mumbai (India) and Singapore, most economic activities, jobs
and amenities are concentrated in the central business district (CBD). Most commuters
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travel from the suburbs to the CBD and public transport can be promoted. The second,
"poly-centric", exemplified by such cities as Huston (US), Atlanta (US) and Rio de
Janeiro (Brazil), jobs and amenities are distributed across the built-up area, and most
trips are from suburb to suburb. A very large number of possible travel routes exists,
but with few passengers per route, and public transport is difficult and expensive to
operate. The third, "urban village" is an ideal city where people live close to their place
on employment. It has often been the aim of urban planners, however it is not feasible,
as "it implies a systematic fragmentation of labour markets which would be econom-
ically unsustainable in the real world". It would require firms not to take advantage
of spillover economies (cf. following box), and people to restrict their job searches
to businesses within walking or biking distances from their homes, or to always move
in new homes close to their job15. The last city structure, "composite", is the most
common type of urban spatial structure with a dominant center together with a large
number of jobs located in the suburbs. Public transport can be promoted for trips from
the suburbs to the CBD, trips from suburb to suburb are more easily made with public
transport
Spillover economies
What characterizes cities is a concentration of population and goods in a reduced
space; in economics, it is assumed that cities exist mainly because they draw in
businesses who wish to take advantage of spillover economies (cf. Duranton and
Puga, 2004). This designates a growth in productivity caused by geographical
proximity. It might for example mean the geographical proximity of businesses in
the same sector, to have access to specialized products or experts that could not be
found without this concentration (for example concentrations of banks in financial
districts) or the geographical proximity of businesses in different sectors where the
diversity of skills and experience encourages innovation. Empirical research con-
firms that spillover economies are substantial; average increases in productivity
of between 4% and 20% have been measured across cities for each doubling of
population. These effects are particularly noticeable in certain industries and es-
pecially in certain services (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004).
1.4.1.3 Acting on urban shape, in practice
If urban shape appears to be an important determinant of GHG emissions, it is a dif-
ficult lever to use, once city are already built: structural modifications in cities occur
slowly over a long time horizon, and cities have a tendency to lock-in the form that they
grow into. As will be studied in more details in Chapter 4, one of the major determinant
of a city shape is its transport system: "Once buildings grow around transportation and
service nodes, they are all but locked-in" (Hoornweg et al., 2011a). For instance, while
many US cities are defined by their reliance on the automobile for most travels, Euro-
pean cities tend to be more compact, with a greater reliance on public transportation.
It is therefore especially important to ensure that current rapidly growing developing
world cities adopt urban shapes which will not constrain future mitigation strategies.
The comparison between Atlanta and Barcelona, from Bertaud (2002), is, again, a
good illustration of this idea. At the time of the study, average density was 6 people
per hectare in Atlanta, compared to Barcelona 171 p/ha. In Atlanta, reaching a 30 p/ha
threshold (which roughly corresponds to the lowest threshold to enable efficient public
transport) over a period of 20 years, assuming that the historical population growth rate
15it is for instance impossible for couples who do not work in close locations.
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of 2.7% per year continues uninterrupted, would require the current built-up area to
shrink by 67 %. "In other words, about 67% of the existing real estate stock would has
to be destroyed, the land over which it lays has to revert to nature and its population
and jobs have to be moved into the 33% of the city which would remain" (Bertaud,
2002), which appears difficult to implement in practice.
1.4.2 Cities role in global mitigation policies
1.4.2.1 Cities can play a major role
Cities can play a major role in global efforts to reduce GHG emissions, for three reasons
(UN-Habitat, 2011):
First, municipal governments often have jurisdictional responsibility for key pro-
cesses — land-use planning, transportation, waste collection and disposal, and en-
ergy consumption and generation — which shape GHG emissions (UN-Habitat, 2011).
They can also generate strong markets for efficient energy products and service: cities
can promote green growth through their screening of investments in infrastructure and
transport, financial and tax incentives, partnerships, regulation of energy suppliers, in-
creased consumer awareness, and job training (Hoornweg et al., 2011a). As explained
in Giraud et al. (2010), local authorities have two principal options in reducing GHG
emissions. As an organizational entity, they have direct control on energy use in pub-
lic buildings, public fleet, etc. The first option is therefore to target these emissions.
The second option consists in using their capacities and policy levers to reduce GHG
emissions from activities occurring within their administrative area on which they have
direct or indirect influence: locally provided public services, land-use zoning, trans-
portation, natural resources management, buildings, and waste and water services (Bet-
sill, 2001; Bulkeley and Kern, 2006; Betsill and Bulkeley, 2007; Corfee-Morlot et al.,
2009; Kamal-Chaoui and Robert, 2009). However, this tool is not always easy to use,
because external factors, beyond urban decision-makers policies, may also have com-
parable influence on these areas, and because using this tool might have side-effects on
other urban policy goals. This issue is studied in more details in Chapter 3, and we will
see in Part III that it is possible to address it through the use of an integrated model (cf.
Chapters 9 and 8).
Second, drivers of emissions — and mitigation options — differ across the world,
and depend on geographic, climatic, economic and cultural conditions. Cities and
metropolitan authorities are often well positioned to develop policy solutions adapted to
their local context (Giraud et al., 2010). It is increasingly clear that non-governmental
actors have a significant role in addressing climate change at the urban level. Private-
sector organizations and civil society groups are now involved in a range of measures
(e.g. promoting behavioral change and reducing energy use in commercial buildings)
independently of local and national governments. Municipal governments often pro-
vide a key interface for engagement with stakeholders in the private sector and civil
society (UN-Habitat, 2011). Furthermore, given their ability to influence many poli-
cies that address diffuse emissions sources, local authorities can implement both short-
and long-term policies that influence emissions sectors—and often go beyond the direct
influence of national governments (Giraud et al., 2010).
Third, the concentration of people/business in urban areas means that solutions
(e.g. mass transit or requirements for energy savings in offices) are feasible. In other
words, cities can act as laboratories where solutions for addressing climate change can
be tried and tested (UN-Habitat, 2011). At city geographic scales, experimentation and
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learning can be expected to be more rapid and lessons learnt can disseminate more
quickly than at bigger scales, and lessons from such experience may filter up or over to
influence action elsewhere (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009).
1.4.2.2 Benefits of a multi-scale approach for coping with climate change
Involving cities as key actors in global GHG emissions reduction can be very efficient
(Ostrom, 2009). Waiting for a single worldwide "solution" to emerge from global ne-
gotiations is indeed problematic, because each country has an incentive to wait for the
others to act first. It is the free-rider problem. While GHG emissions reduction poli-
cies benefit to all countries as a whole, each state has privately an incentive to adopt as
few mitigation policies as possible, as they can harm its economic competitiveness. In
practice, considerable disagreements exist even among the major states, and there has
been a "decades-long failure at an international level to reach agreement on efficient,
fair, and enforceable reductions of greenhouse gas emissions" (Ostrom, 2009).
Efforts to reduce global GHG emissions can be best addressed at multiple scales
and levels: contrary to states, cities have generally privately much to gain from embrac-
ing the low-carbon agenda, and are therefore not really threatened by free-riding issues.
The cobenefits of green action often more than cover the costs. Increased efficiency can
lead to cost savings and energy security, which can compensate for the initial invest-
ment16. Reducing pollution has a direct impact on health, quality of living, attraction
of private capital and human resources. Finally "embracing such an important global
cause helps cities to position themselves within a group of leaders, access information
and technology, and learn by doing." (Hoornweg et al., 2011a).
Even if, alone, cities efforts in mitigating global GHG emission may not be suffi-
cient to reach ambitious global targets, there is therefore much to gain in supporting
it. "Given the slowness and conflict involved in achieving a global solution to climate
change, recognizing the potential for building a more effective way of reducing green
house gas emissions at multiple levels is an important step forward." (Ostrom, 2009).
In Chapter 8, we will show an example of the link between global and local mitigation
efforts.
1.4.2.3 Cities are actually taking action
Numerous cities are actually taking action on climate change, sometimes even without
national pressure: Stockholm, Toronto, Copenhagen, New York, as well as smaller
cities such as Mannheim (Germany), Nantes (France), Boulder (United States)... For
instance, here is a brief summary of some urban climate change strategies (See for
instance Rosenzweig et al. (2011); Hoornweg et al. (2011a); Rosenzweig et al. (2010)
for other examples):
Paris (2,230,000 inhabitants, 105 km²) In October 2007, Paris adopted a climate
strategy ("plan climat") involving a wide range of measures on transport, urban plan-
ning, waste, residential sector etc. The aim is to decrease, in 2020, the city’s GHG
emissions by 25%, compared to 2004. Objective for the city’s administration emis-
sions are stricter: 30% in 2020, with a 30% decrease of city’s administration buildings
and public lighting energy consumption and 30% of the energy provided by renewable
16for instance, investment costs were recovered by savings in energy bills after three years, when the city
of Los Angeles retrofitted most of its public buildings. (Hoornweg et al., 2011a).
27
resources. Policies encompass a renovation of Paris schools, financial help to landown-
ers to better insulate their buildings, an optimization of public vehicle use and of public
lighting, the installation of a total of 200 000m² of photovoltaic panels, and financial
help and stricter insulation norms for new social housing buildings.
Greater Lyon (1,300,000 inhabitants, 500 km²) The climate strategy was adopted
in November 2007, with an aim to decrease the city’s GHG emissions by 20% in 2020
compared to 2004. Policies encompass financial help and stricter insulation norms for
new social housing buildings, the development of a more integrated public transport
network and installation of photovoltaic panels.
Greater London (7,800,000 inhabitants, 5000 km²) In its climate strategy, the Greater
London aims at achieving a 60% reduction in London’s emissions by 2025, by ensur-
ing that "25% of London’s energy is delivered through more efficient decentralized
energy", by "improving the energy efficiency of London’s homes and buildings" and
by reducing emissions from transport. (Source: Greater London Authority). Measured
encompass for example the "RE:NEW" policy, giving households energy efficiency ad-
vice and installing for free simple energy efficiency improvements17, the development
of area wide district heating networks, encouraging clean transport technologies such
as hybrid buses or cycling throughout the city.
Several international city alliances have also been created to disseminate informa-
tion. For instance, ICLEI ("local governments for sustainability") is an international
association of local governments that have made a commitment to sustainable develop-
ment. The World Mayors Council on Climate Change was founded by Kyoto’s mayor
in December 2005, following the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. The C40
Cities Climate Leadership Group of large cities, launched in October 2005, now has 40
participating and 19 affiliate cities.
1.5 Conclusion: GHG emission reduction in practice
This chapter has two main conclusions. First, cities can play a major role in global
GHG emission reductions, because a significant share of global GHG emissions is
under direct or indirect influence of urban governments, and because they often have
more incentive to act than national governments as climate policies may be cheap or
even profitable.
Several policies can be used, which require different anticipation levels. Whereas
city’s administration vehicles route optimization can be quickly implemented, the de-
velopment of new public transport routes or renovation of a large number of buildings
takes more time, and change in a city structure is even longer.
However, there is still a large uncertainties about how to design best climate strate-
gies. First, there are large knowledge gaps in our understanding of optimal design of
long-term policies, especially urban planning, because it is difficult to conduct exper-
iments and because there is no fully comparable historical example. Side-effects and
actual cost of such structural policies are also uncertain.
Second, the actual global effectiveness of short-term policies is also under debate.
It remains unclear whether short-term policies such as energy efficiency measures in
17such as "energy display devices, radiator panels, aerated taps and showerheads, hot water tank jackets
and draught-proofing". Source: Greater London Authority
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transport systems or energy and heat networks and infrastructures will be the cheapest,
or the best option, or even simply sufficient, and to what extent they should be comple-
mented by structural, long-term policies (cf. Allaire and Criqui, 2007). This issue is
related to some extent to the uncertainty concerning global future evolutions, such as
energy prices, or socio-economic changes, on which urban government have little or
no influence.
These issues will be studied in more details in Chapter 3. Our thesis in the present
work, is that they can be addressed, and that one tool to help doing so is integrated
city modelling. Using such a model, we will deal with relative strength of short-term
and long-term policies in Chapter 7 and 8, and with side-effects of structural policies
in Chapter 9.
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Chapter 2
Cities and climate change
vulnerability
This chapter is based on a report, written with Stéphane Hallegatte for ONERC1 (Viguié
and Hallegatte, 2010). It looks at the various impacts (positive and negative) that cli-
mate change may have on towns and cities, and on main reasons why cities are vulner-
able to these impacts. It focuses on mainland French cities case.
This chapter will briefly look at the different impacts that climate change may have
on urban environments. These impacts are very dependent on context, in particular
the geographic zone and the way the city and the society under consideration function.
Although we will briefly describe impacts that may affect cities in other parts of the
world, we will focus here on French cities.
Few climate change impacts are specifically urban and most are also felt in rural ar-
eas. However some impacts will be particularly felt in urban areas. It is the case for heat
waves, for instance, because of the heat island effect(cf Section 2.1.1). Some impacts
will be identical in rural or urban areas but will call for particular responses in cities.
For example natural hazards management cannot be undertaken similarly in areas with
high or low population densities. The most distinctive specificity of climate change
impacts in urban areas is their interdependence. Because cities are deeply integrated
systems, and highly dependent on networks (water, electricity, transport, communica-
tions), impact on various sectors can interact, and should therefore be considered as a
whole. A sector by sector approach appears particularly unsuited to large urban urban
areas.
Most of following figures and data are taken from the work of the IPCC (IPCC,
2007a) and from ONERC reports (ONERC, 2009a and ONERC, 2009b). Knowledge
concerning future climate change impacts is limited and unanticipated impacts may
appear during the course of the century. It is equally possible that impacts may be less
serious than we presently think.
Definition of vulnerability An important idea is the difference between hazards, that
may occur as a result of climate change, and vulnerability. Climate change may give
1French National Observatory for Climate Change Effects
http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/-Impacts-et-adaptation-ONERC-.
html
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Figure 2.1: Hazard, exposure, vulnerability and risk.
rise to changes in natural rhythms, i.e. events that may have a negative impact on
society (hazards). These hazards will have a certain probability, which will change
depending on the event under consideration. The exposure includes everybody and
everything that might be affected by the event. For example this might mean all the
population, buildings and facilities situated in a flood-prone area. Faced with events, a
given city may be more or less negatively affected, depending on the way it has been
planned, its history, its economy and its ability to adapt. Vulnerability2 is measured
by this degree to which a city may be negatively affected by the event (it depends on
the existence of defense systems, the ease with which an affected area can recover
etc.) Finally risk is the result from the three following components: the hazard, the
exposure, and the vulnerability in the face of the event.
Reducing the risk requires action in each of these components. Here, mitigating an
hazard or its probability is directly linked to mitigating climate change, i.e. reducing
GHG emissions. Due to strong climate inertia and current trends in GHG emissions,
it is certain that the climate will undergo large-scale changes during the 21st century
and that we will therefore have to mitigate exposure and vulnerability to reduce the
risk. Acting on these two factors is what is generally known as "adaptation" to climate
change.
2.1 Risks to health
Climate change will lead to some health benefits, such a drop in mortality due to the
cold, as winter temperatures rise. However, it is suggested that without suitable adap-
tive measures, health risks will increase, because of a recrudescence of heat waves (for
instance in southern, central and eastern Europe) and a greater incidence of illnesses
transmitted via food and vectors (mosquitos, ticks etc.).
2.1.1 Heat stress
The 2003 heat-wave (Fig. 2.2) caused an increase in mortality of 14,800 persons in
France between August 1st and 20th. Victims were mainly older people: persons aged
75 and more represent 82% of deaths attributable to the heat wave. This heat wave
cannot be directly attributable to climate change, as it could have taken place in a
climate not modified by human activities. Nevertheless, figure 2.2 (b) shows just how
exceptional it would have been in a non-modified climate. Climate change made this
2In the literature, a debate exist on the exact definition of these concepts (cf. for instance Füssel, 2007). In
the climate change community, for instance, "vulnerability" is often used as an equivalent of "risk", whereas
"sensitivity" is used as an equivalent of our present definition of "vulnerability" (cf. glossary in IPCC, 2007a).
34
Figure 2.2: Characteristics of the summer 2003 heatwave (IPCC, 2007a after Schär et al., 2004). (a) JJA
temperature anomaly with respect to 1961 to 1990. (b) to (d): JJA temperatures for Switzerland observed
during 1864 to 2003 (b), simulated using a regional climate model for the period 1961 to 1990 (c) and
simulated for 2071 to 2100 under the A2 scenario using boundary data from the HadAM3H GCM (d). In
panels (b) to (d): the black line shows the theoretical frequency distribution of mean summer temperature
for the time-period considered, and the vertical blue and red bars show the mean summer temperature for
individual years.
event more likely and will have a tendency increase the probability of similar events
more in the future, until it becomes a recurrent feature. Fig. 2.2(d) illustrates what
could be a normal summer weather by the end of the century, according to some climate
scenarios (if there is no global policy on the reduction of GHG emissions).
In all emission scenarios, climate model simulations show an increase in average
summer temperatures and in temperature variability from one year to another. Taken
together, these lead to an increased risk of summer heat-waves. Cities are particularly
vulnerable to this impact because of the urban heat islands effect (cf. box). In several
developed countries, the aging of the population reinforces the vulnerability to this
impact, and increases health risks.
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Figure 2.3: Minimum temperatures (night) in Paris and around Paris during the heat wave of 2003. We
can see differences of up to 7°C created by the urban heat island effect. Source: V. Masson, G. Pigeon, A.
Lemonsu, C. Marchadier, CNRM, Météo-France.
The Urban Heat Island effect
In towns and cities exist a micro-climate, due especially to the existence of urban
heat island (UHI). This designates higher air temperatures, regularly observed
close to the ground in urban areas, when compared to the rural areas that sur-
round them. According to several studies looked at by Oke (1987), the maximum
intensity of a UHI can go from 2°C for a town of 1000 inhabitants up to 12°C for
a city of several million inhabitants.
For example, during the 2003 heat wave, the temperature differences were of 7°C
between the centre of Paris and certain rural areas (Figure 2.3) In practice, the
difference in temperature between the centre of a city and rural areas depends on
the architectural characteristics of the city (such as its spread, its density and the
height of the buildings) and the characteristics of the rural area used as a control.
A UHI has a recurrent daily variability and its intensity is generally stronger at
night. It intensifies or forms progressively during the night time cooling period
because of a rate of cooling that is slower in the more built up areas than in the
periphery. In the majority of cases, the maximum attained by a UHI seems to be a
few hours after the sun has set. Often the UHI diminishes rapidly after sunrise.
The intensity of the UHI diminishes as the wind rises. UHI disappears when wind
speeds are over 11 m/s. When there is a moderate wind (3-6 m/s), the temperature
field is shaped like an extended plume depending on the wind direction. In case
of weak wind (< 2 m/s), THe UHI can be composed of several cells, and its shape
varies according to land-use and urban heterogeneity.
The intensity of a UHI diminishes as cloud cover increases. Clouds act by modify-
ing the night-time radiative cooling during which a UHI is formed. The influence
of seasons was studied on cities in temperate climates and in other types of cli-
mates (Mexico and Cairo for example). It has been shown in these studies that
UHIs are more frequent in summer and that they are weaker and less frequent
when there is rain. Nevertheless, the maximum intensity of UHIs (the difference
between temperatures in town and the rural areas that surround them) is the same
whatever the season.
36
The impact on health will depend on the infrastructure in place, planning policies, types
of homes and lifestyles. For instance, high temperatures and humidity in Paris during
2003 heat wave were close to those normally observed in Seville during an ordinary
summer, but in Seville, these climatic conditions do generally not have such serious
consequences. This is due to several reasons, but especially a built environment that
is better suited to Seville’s high temperatures and adequate population habits (closing
shutters so that heat cannot enter during the day, inactivity when temperatures are at
their highest, vulnerable people habit of rehydrating themselves properly and avoiding
activities that might put them at risk etc.).
Vulnerability reduction policies may therefore encompass adapting building tech-
niques for new buildings, and - optionally - altering existing buildings, in order to
address these events. It encompasses also alert and safety plans. Adapting homes and
planning, means, on the one hand, promoting better heat comfort levels in buildings
and streets (better protection from heat penetration) and, on the other hand, fighting
the presence of urban heat island3 (installation of road surfaces and roofs that reflect
solar rays, city greening (Gill et al., 2007) etc.). Part of this adaptation can be un-
dertaken at the building level (type and position of glazed surfaces for example), and
part at urban area level, with urban planning choices (width and orientation of streets,
parks and gardens etc.). Architecture and planning are very regulated and we should
therefore not expect spontaneous changes by professionals or by households. It will be
probably necessary to change standards, regulations and practices. Municipal authori-
ties will have a crucial role to play in this area, in cooperation with other national and
regional administrative bodies. In the academic world, questions linked to best choices
for adapting cities to heat stress are at present the subject of intense research4.
2.1.2 Illnesses range extension
Climate has an effect on the extension range of several diseases. For instance, in Europe
some studies show that climate change may cause a northward extension of the range
of several illnesses, notably Lyme disease (a parasitic illness transmitted by bites from
ticks) and Leishmaniasis (a parasitic illness transmitted by mosquitoes and of which
dogs are the main carriers) (IPCC, 2007a). This last illness is, at the moment, present
in the Mediterranean region. In the same way, because of changes in the distribution of
plant species, climate change may have an impact on the occurrence of certain allergies
caused by pollens. However, these results remain broadly uncertain. The re-emergence
of endemic malaria in Europe seems, in any case, to be very unlikely5.
However, the opposite is true in developing countries which are particularly vul-
nerable to an increase in the range of several illnesses and especially malaria. This
extension may indirectly impact European countries, by increasing the possibility of
locally importing these illnesses. Finally we also need to note that higher temperatures
may have an impact on food security, salmonella risk being, for example, particularly
sensitive to temperatures (IPCC, 2007a).
These impacts are not urban in essence, but concentration of populations in cities
make risks greater in urban contexts.
3Cf. for instance Rosenzweig et al., 2009
4For instance VURCA, MUSCADE and ACCLIMAT projects, cf. http://www.cnrm.meteo.fr/
ville.climat/?lang=en.
5Malaria was rampant in former times in Europe, on a large scale, and has been almost eradicated on the
continent during the 20th century, especially thanks to progress in medicine, disinsectification and the drying
out of marshes.
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Figure 2.4: Large-scale relative changes in annual runoff (water availability, in percent) for the period 2090-
2099, relative to 1980-1999. Values represent the median of 12 climate models using the SRES A1B sce-
nario. White areas are where less than 66% of the 12 models agree on the sign of change and hatched areas
are where more than 90% of models agree on the sign of change. Source: IPCC, 2007a.
2.1.3 Water resources
Climate change has an effect on fresh water availability across the world (Fig. 2.4).
For instance, water stress will probably increase in central and southern Europe and
especially in southern France. At European level, the percentage of areas suffering
from intense water stress will probably increase by 19 to 35% in the 2070s and the
number of people in water stress from 16 to 44 million (IPCC, 2007a). Beyond the
quantitive problem (reducing of the quantity of accessible water), a qualitative one
exist too: less water resources generally also lowers the quality of the water, since the
dilution of polluting substances takes place in a lesser volume. Decrease of freshwater
availability is a rather robust conclusion of climate models.
This impact is not particularly urban but it will be felt in towns and cities, especially
in those already exposed to some extent to water stress. This impact will mainly be felt
as a worsening of already existing issues, and a main vulnerability indicator is present
day unsustainable use of water. Conversely, adaptation policies will consist in reducing
water demand and resource pollution.
2.1.4 Air quality
Climate change may worsen local pollution, in particular in cities where some pollu-
tants concentrations are large. Indeed some pollutants, such as ozone, are created by
heat and sunlight acting on certain exhaust fumes. The increase in uninterrupted sunny
weather in summer could then favor an increase in episodes of this sort of pollution.
However, this risk is dependent on automotive traffic increase or decrease, and on vehi-
cles exhaust fumes generation (for instance, increased modal share of electric vehicles
could decrease pollution).
Similarly to impact on water resources, this impact will mainly be felt as a worsen-
ing of already existing issues. The impact will be especially felt in places with already
high ozone pollution levels. Main adaptation policies consist in trying to reduce pol-
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lution now (lessening of road traffic, replacement of older cars, regulations such as the
creation of Priority Air Action Zones (ZAPA) in France, lowering of industrial emis-
sions etc.) and its impact on the population (information on pollution levels, monitoring
the population at risk etc.).
2.1.5 Migrations and tensions created by environmental impacts
These are indirect impacts created by other more direct consequences of climate change,
occurring not necessarily in the same location. It can be for instance tensions within a
country or between countries caused by the environmental impacts of climate change
or from large-scale migrations caused by sea-level rise. An especially important case
in developing countries is rural exodus acceleration due to countryside food-producing
farming productivity decrease. This type of impacts is not very likely in developed
countries.
2.2 Risks caused by natural disasters
In France, the most common natural hazards are floods, storms and clay soils expansion
and contraction. Floods can be divided in two groups: coastal floods, which are likely
to increase due to sea level rise (SLR), and inland floods, which risk may vary as
a consequence of changes to precipitation patterns and watercourses runoffs. Here,
again, impact is not just on urban areas. However, high concentrations of population
and heritage, as well as the intricated way urban economies are organised, make these
risks particularly difficult to manage in an urban environment. In France, because of
growing urbanization, especially in risk-prone areas (cf. Section 1.1), these risks have
greatly increased in the last few decades.
2.2.1 Sea level rise and coastal floods
SLR will have consequences in terms of material losses due to the slow submerging
of the coast. It may also threaten human lives because of the increased risk of coastal
flooding following storms.
Due to the melting of glaciers, to the progressive receding of ice in Greenland and
Antarctic, and especially to the dilatation due to sea warming, it is estimated that ocean
average level will rise during the coming centuries. The amplitude of this increase is
difficult to determine but there is a strong probability that it will be between 20 cm to 1
m by 2100 even though there are more pessimistic projections in some of the literature
(IPCC, 2007c). At the present time, a SLR of about 3 mm per year is already measured.
The impacts of such a rise do not come from the progressive rising alone, since
this will happen very slowly. An essential consequence is the impact of the rise on
tides and storm surges (cf Box). Permanent SLR due to climate change will widen the
area that can be submerged in case of storm. It will also lead to an increase in floods
frequency and intensity in areas already at risk. This effect will be all the more marked
since climate change may well cause an acceleration in coastal erosion and therefore
alter existing natural barriers to coastal floods (IPCC, 2007a).
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Storm surge
Due to the local lowering of atmospheric pressure, and to winds which "chase"
the seawater onto the coast, local sea level can rise during a coastal storm. This
sudden rise in the level of the sea ("storm surge") can cause coastal floods and
have serious consequences. Storm surge was up to 8m when hurricane Katrina
struck Louisiana in August 2005 (Source: Center for the Study of Public Health
Impacts of Hurricanes) and up to 1.5m (which added to the high tides) when the
European windstorm Xynthia struck Vendée and Charente-Maritime, in France, in
February 2010 (Source: SHOM).
Slow drowning of coastlines due SLR may cause significant losses. This phenomenon
should not be analyzed in isolation, but added to that of the erosion, that we can see
at present and which climate change may also influence. Erosion is a natural phe-
nomenon of receding coastlines and is observed throughout the world but is one that
is getting worse due to a variety of pressures, especially pressure from human activity.
In France, for example, according to the Eurosion database (cited in ONERC, 2009a),
one quarter of the coastline of the mainland (27%) is suffering from erosion while 44%
is stable and only 10% in extension. The rest of coastline consists of coats that are
artificially fixed (port areas and sea walls) or coasts whose properties have not been
studied (respectively 17% and 5% of the coast line). Sandy coasts are more affected
by erosion. An increased risk of coastal erosion from climate change is almost a cer-
tainty in France during the 21st century (cf. studies cited in ONERC, 2009a), as rising
sea levels, wind, temperature, atmospheric pressure and swell can influence erosion
occurrence and gravity. Low lying areas such as the Mediterranean regions or Vendée,
Charente-Maritime, Nord-Pas-de-Calais and the Aquitaine regions are the most seri-
ously threatened.
The OECD undertook a study (Nicholls et al., 2007) which compared the exposure
of large port cities (more than 1 million inhabitants in 2005) to coastal flooding at the
present time and for a projection for the 2070’s, based on socio-economic development
and climate scenarios (Fig. 2.5). The analysis suggested that about 40 million people
(0.6% of the world’s population or about 1/10th of the cities under consideration) are
at present exposed to one in a hundred year floods. In financial terms the total value
exposed in 2005 in all the cities under consideration was estimated to be 3,000 billion
dollars, which corresponds to about 5% of world GDP in 2005. The United States,
Japan and the Netherlands are the countries with the highest figures. By the 2070’s,
the total exposed population could triple due to the combined effect of the rise in sea
levels, demographic growth and increasing urbanization (Fig. 2.5(a)). The exposure
of assets would increase more than tenfold reaching more than 9% of projected world
GDP for this period.
At global level demographic growth, socio-economic growth and urbanisation are
the most important factors which are leading to increased exposure to risk. this is
particularly true in developing countries, since areas close to sea level are often most
urbanized. Climate change and erosion may accelerate this movement and considerably
increase risk exposure growth (Fig. 2.5(b)).
In developed countries, such as France, demographic and economic growth is slower
that in developing countries and the role of climate change and SLR in increasing
coastal flooding risk is greater, and sometimes even dominates socio-economic effects.
Vulnerability to this impact will come from the geographical situation, and also
from the type of development; it is essential to limit vulnerability, by avoiding implant-
ing people and buildings in risk areas and to protect those that are already there, while
40
(a) Map showing the Top 20 cities for exposed population under the future climate
change and socioeconomic change scenario
(b) Top 10 countries by assets exposed today and in the 2070s showing the influence of future climate change
vs. socioeconomic change
Figure 2.5: Exposure of large port cities (more than 1 million inhabitants in 2005) to coastal flooding at
the present time and for a projection for the 2070’s, based on socio-economic development and climate
scenarios. Source: Nicholls et al., 2007.
41
making sure that these defenses do not justify new installations, in which case exposure
could increase.
Physical protections (e.g. dikes) are not generally considered to be sufficient when
not complemented by land use policies. Although they may carry out their defensive
role well, they may aggravate or create problems elsewhere (the solution to the prob-
lems of some becomes a problem for others). In addition in some cases, the construc-
tion of defenses may lead to an increase in vulnerability. This occurs when, from a false
sense of security brought on by the defenses, new facilities are developed in the pro-
tected areas; the risk in these areas being never zero, this can lead to even higher losses
if there is a serious climate event. It can therefore lead to an increased vulnerability.
It seems more sensible to consider a prevention policy which limits the implantation
of goods and people in risky areas, and protect what is already there rather than new
constructions.
Some risk mitigation policies can also have negative side-effects. For example
restrictive management of land may lead to an increase in its price with consequences
for the cost of living and access to property. It can even lead to consequences in terms of
investment in an area since businesses might prefer to locate to areas where the policies
are less strict and where the price of land is lower. These consequences are complex
and indirect; they depend on a number of factors about which local authorities have
little say (for example national taxes or the economic situation). They will be studied
in Chapters 8 and 9 in Part III.
2.2.2 River floods
Climate change will have a marked impact on flows in water courses, due to variations
in rainfall pattern, snow fall and also to the shrinking or disappearance of glaciers.
Dependent on geographical location, the risk from flooding might increase. It is quite
difficult to make predictions on changes to flood risks and a large number of local
studies are underway on this subject.
To the risk of flooding from water courses, particularly serious in urban areas,
should be added the risk of flooding when rainwater drainage system cannot cope with
the amount of rain falling. This risk is particularly great because certain climate pro-
jections include an increase in episodes of violent precipitation. In addition, ground
cover impermeabilization reduces the capacity of the soil to directly absorb water and
therefore increases flows the drainage system has to cope with. This risk is particu-
larly high in areas where there are intense periods of precipitation, in tropical regions
(Mumbai, Miami and Singapore where major investments are underway, for instance)
and in the Mediterranean area.
Vulnerability reduction policies against this type of flooding are similar to those
that aim to address coastal floods. The main vulnerability factor is the poorly controlled
cities extension into areas at risk (See box on floods seen in the Gard Department, and
see Fig. 2.6).
42
Figure 2.6: Number of individual homes in France exposed to a risk of flooding by catchment area in 2006.
Source: ONERC, 2009b, after MRN, MEEDAT, INSEE, and SANDRE.
Floods in the Gard Department
The flooding seen in the Department of the Gard on the 8 and 9 September 2002
was considered by Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development inspection
team to be "a very serious event, rare but not exceptional". The extent of ma-
terial damage (1.2 billion euros) was about double that of previous events of
the same type. This conclusion is explained in large part by the number of less
than thirty year old buildings situated in flood-prone areas (this was the case for
Aimargues and Gallargues-le-Montueux) or behind defenses that were breached
or submerged by the flood (as in Aramon). An estimate made by the Languedoc-
Roussillon regional environmental body (DIREN) using a 2001 map of flood-prone
areas and the population census of 1990 showed that in the entire region, except
in Lozère sub-region, one in six of the 384,000 inhabitants lived in flood-prone
area. 321,000 were in areas with a high or very high risk of flooding (i.e. water
level higher than 1 m and/or strong water flow during the highest flood recorded).
Source: Trocherie et al., 2004.
Defensive systems, although they might be able to protect what is already there,
are far from being the best solution (cf. Section 2.4.3). Urban sprawl, by extending
artificial surfaces, also hampers the filtration of rainwater into the soil and increases
the risk of flooding elsewhere in the same catchment area. To this should be added to
the risks in built up areas caused by the size of the drainage system which will need to
be able to cope with the most extreme weather conditions.
2.2.3 Contraction and expansion of clay soil
Clay soils expand and contract depending on how much water they hold. When sub-
sidence under a building or infrastructure is not uniform6, large amount of damage
can be caused to the structure, especially if it does not have deep foundations. Dam-
age to assets is often considerable and irreversible, and may require the destruction of
6For example, when the soil under a building does absorb water and dry out at the same rate as the
surrounding soil.
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structures. Detached houses are particularly vulnerable to this, due, especially, to their
foundations not being very deep.
Since 1989, in France, there have been almost 15,000 municipality, spread over
89 geographical departments,7 that have been declared disaster areas due to this phe-
nomenon. According to the French National Reinsurance Fund (Caisse Centrale de
Réassurance), if in 2003 all municipalities asking for their area to be considered as
having suffered from a natural disaster had all had their requests agreed, the total cost
might have reached 3.5 bn C (1.3 bn C was actually paid). This would have been more
than the sum of all costs associated to French droughts for the period 1989-2002 (3 bn
C) (ONERC, 2008, 2009b).
A rise in temperatures and intense precipitations are all favouring contraction and
expansion of clays. Predicted climate change might provoke the occurrence of both of
these phenomena. In France, according to research and the various studies undertaken,
an increase in the risk of the contraction and expansion of clays as a result of climate
change seems almost certain during the course of the 21st century (ONERC, 2009a).
Depending on the nature of the soil, some regions will be more affected than others.
Places already affected by this phenomenon, and therefore those with more clay soils,
will feel this effect of climate change most strongly. Reducing vulnerability against
this phenomenon requires a stricter application of the current building regulations for
new-builds. For existing buildings the first step is the development of evaluation tools
to assess vulnerability.
2.2.4 Storms
Studies suggest that, in temperate latitudes, storm intensity should not increase or not
by very much (IPCC, 2007a). Damage linked to strong winds should therefore not
change. However, rising sea levels could make these same storms more destructive,
due to increased coastal flooding (see Section 2.2.1).
2.2.5 Other types of disaster
Other problems are likely to occur due to climate change: forest fires, avalanches, land
slides (besides those created by erosion and clay soils), technological accidents, for
instance as a consequence of a natural hazard. The impact of climate change on these
events is however not well understood.
Forest fire is of importance for urban areas, especially those where peri-urbanization
is strong, leading to an increase in the number of houses in direct contact with a forest.
This is for instance the case in several cities in the south of France. Overall the popula-
tion is now more vulnerable to fire than in the past and this trend seems set to continue
(ONERC, 2009a). The consequences for urban areas can be illustrated by recent events
in California and Australia (Source: Emergency Events Database, CRED8). Australian
bush fires in 2009 affected almost 10,000 people and caused over 180 deaths and eco-
nomic damage of 1.3 billion dollars. In Los Angeles, fires caused losses of 2 billion
dollars in 2008 and 8 dead and 2.5 billion dollars losses in 2007. In this case it was the
fact that forest and buildings were embedded together that made the fires so dangerous,
and so difficult to manage for emergency services.
However, it is not possible be certain whether the number of forest fires will in-
crease in the future. Higher temperatures and more frequent droughts are evidently
7France is divided in 101 geographical departments, and 36682 municipalities.
8Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters http://www.emdat.be/.
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factors that will increase the risk. Conversely, vegetation pattern changes (or even for-
est disappearance) could limit risk level (cf for instance CGEDD, 2010, for a study in
France).
2.3 Risks on economic activities
2.3.1 Energy consumption variation
Because of temperature change induced by climate change, the consumption of energy
for heating and for air conditioning will certainly vary. These changes will not hap-
pen only in urban areas, but, as today most of the population lives in towns and cities,
changes in urban areas are of great importance when looking at the size and manage-
ment of energy infrastructures. In addition, urban phenomena, especially UHI, interact
with the regional climate to determine energy consumption patterns evolution.
The demand for heating in winter is likely to decrease, and that for air conditioning
to rise. According to some climate scenarios it is projected that, towards 2050, in the
Mediterranean basin each year there will be, on average, a decrease of 2 to 3 weeks of
heating days and an increase of 2 to 5 weeks of air conditioning days. As a consequence
the peaks in demand for electricity may, in some areas alter, move from winter to
summer (IPCC, 2007a).
This might, in some cases, happen in a context of difficult electricity access (and
therefore lead to higher prices or power cuts). Indeed, electricity production is very de-
pendent on water resources. for instance, an increase the temperature of water courses
and lakes could affect cold water sources for nuclear and thermal power stations. The
decrease of water reserves in dams in summer would have an effect on hydraulic power
production. Changes in demand for water, other than in the energy sector, could in-
crease this phenomenon by multiplying usage conflicts, especially with farming and
tourism. Finally, expected changes to the climate could also have an impact on the
production of other renewable energies.
If the impact on electricity production is greatly uncertain, an increase in energy
consumption pattern change is relatively certain in some regions, for instance in areas
in the south of France.
2.3.2 Impact on tourism
Tourism is an important economic activity for a large number of French towns and
cities and also justifies a certain level of infrastructure, such as accommodation (ho-
tels and camp sites), transport (rail networks, stations, road and motorways etc.) and
energy infrastructure. Future changes to tourist demand in a region may have major
consequences on current infrastructure choices and on economic activity, in cities and
in rural areas.
The attractiveness of a tourist destination is the result of many factors, and many
of these are linked to climate. Some are directly linked: numbers of sunshine days and
mean summer temperatures in summer, snowfall for ski resorts etc. Others are indirect;
quantity and quality of available water, natural habitats and landscapes in the different
seasons when considering nature tourism etc.
In 2005/2006 the French Tourism Authority commissioned an exploratory study on
the potential impacts of climate change on tourism in France (Dubois and Ceron, 2006,
see also INSEE, 2008; ONERC, 2009a). This study looked at the vulnerability of a
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number of branches of this activity in France. One of the more vulnerable activities ap-
peared to be skiing and winter sports, especially at lower altitudes. Indeed, this activity
is very sensitive to projected decrease in snow cover (this decrease will happen with a
high level of certainty: in Alpine region, it was computed that snow cover duration will
be reduced by several weeks for each degree of temperature increase) (IPCC, 2007a).
Summer tourism may also be impacted, especially through a decrease of water re-
sources. Tourists habits, such as the infrastructure they use (accommodation, green
spaces, leisure facilities such as swimming pools, golf courses etc.) generate water
consumption, which even if lower than other economic activities, cannot be excluded
from water management issues and debate. Tourism use of water is especially intense
during the summer when the resource is scarce and required for other purposes (ir-
rigation etc.). It is often located in places with limited resource (islands, mountains
etc.). Access to lakes and rivers, which contribute to the landscape or are the basis
for activities (bathing, sailing etc.) can be dependent on climatic context. For instance,
fishing in fresh water can be forbidden in case of high temperatures (it happened during
the 2003 heatwave in France, for example) etc. Decrease in flows and water level can
favor eutrophication and various pollutions which can impact tourism. In France, the
Mediterranean zone might be the most impacted. Water availability variation is pro-
jected with a high certainty level, and impact on tourism has the same level of certainty.
Climate change may also impact tourism through its consequences on ecosystems.
Water stress and forest fires generated buy climate change that may go with it could
lead to consequent changes in patterns of vegetation and alter the landscape.
Discomfort due to heat caused by an increase in summer temperatures may also
have a strong influence on tourism, especially in large cities where temperatures will
be increased still higher by UHIs. This discomfort may lead to variations in overall
tourist activity9 and a redistribution in the timing of tourist activity (increase in tourism
in the spring and autumn for example). Exposure to the health risks that have been
detailed above could translate into a redistribution of touristic attendance, depending
on the place, season, client segment (older people for example).
The impacts of climate change on tourism are therefore very varied and policies
to reduce vulnerability will depend on the impact considered. However, most of them
will encompass a reduction on current vulnerabilities. For instance, ecosystems adap-
tation can be improved by reducing present human-induced stresses. Similarly, water
resources decrease will be less problematic if the overall demand for water begins to
be reduced now.
2.3.3 Changes to French migratory flows
Another consequence of climate change may come from changes to migratory flows.
For instance, in France, until now, the southern part of the country has been in overall
more attractive than the north (Baccarini, 2007). A slow migration of population from
the north to the south of the country can be observed. This trend may change, espe-
cially for older people, because of the heat waves in the south, which climate change
may exacerbate. This may have multiple long-term consequences on local economies.
Demographic projections for French departments and cities may have to take into ac-
count the impact of climate change on attractiveness and therefore on migration. Towns
such as Montpellier, that have a desirable climate, are growing fast at present but, if
9In France, this could lead to an increased touristic attractivity in the north, the west and in mountain
areas since they are cooler.
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they see their attractiveness reduced they may need to invest to compensate for this loss
(air conditioning in public transport, planning and architectural changes etc.).
2.3.4 Spread of economic losses from one sector to others, and the
particular roles of networks (energy, water, communication
and transport).
Because cities are integrated systems with complex, extended and various links, any
impact affecting one part of a city will indirectly affect all other parts. For example,
less tourism will generally mean there will be less economic activity in a number of
other economic sectors (for example services to businesses or property). In the same
way, a flood may have serious direct consequences due to the damage it causes (roads,
homes, factories destroyed), but it will also have indirect consequences: temporary
breaks in communications or electricity supply caused by a flood may have very high
economic costs and affect areas that have not been directly flooded.
Networks are an important element of this vulnerability: transport, water manage-
ment (drinking water and water purification), energy (electricity supply, heating and
cooling networks) and communication networks. A modern city cannot function prop-
erly, as a whole, unless each of these networks works perfectly. Any interruption or
lowering in performance of public transport or electricity supply can easily paralyze or
handicap all economic activity (see below for a study on the impact of climate change
on the Boston Metro system). A purely sectoral approach is therefore unsuited to an
examination of impacts within an urban environment, and systemic studies are neces-
sary. They show the importance of these indirect effects and how important it is to take
them into account.
For instance, about 30% of recent California earthquake losses were related to
transport issues, with employees unable to reach their workplace, and clients unable
to go to commercial zones (Tierney, 1995).
Evaluating these indirect losses is the subject of a number of research projects. It is
impossible to reproduce all the socio-economic mechanisms at stake, but these studies
are trying to include as many number of indirect effects as possible. Often these works
concentrates on the role of transport infrastructure and electricity and water supplies.
All these studies show the importance of these indirect effects and how important it
is to take them into account. They all conclude that the indirect costs are responsible
for a large part of the total cost of these natural disasters. Below are the results of
some of these studies, looking at flooding, earthquakes or power cuts (they are cited in
Hallegatte et al., 2010)..
When the Northridge earthquake occurred, near Los Angeles in 1994, the indirect
losses amounted to 25 to 30% of the total losses. Following the 1994 earthquake, a
total of 69,000 unemployed people.year was caused by firms stopping their activity
(Cho et al., 2001). About half of this unemployment occurred outside of the area that
had suffered material losses. Broken supply lines, caused by the earthquake, were the
origin of most of economic activity interruptions, before interruptions caused by direct
destruction (Tierney, 1995). About one shop in four was affected by delivery problems
in goods and services due to the earthquake. On average, all shops were closed for two
days following the earthquake. Direct damage caused to buildings was only one of the
causes of closure, and was cited in only 32% of cases.
Indirect economic losses in Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina have similarly been
assessed to 42 billion dollars as compared with 107 million dollars in direct damage
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(Hallegatte, 2008). The model used shows that indirect losses increase in a non-linear
fashion as compared with direct losses, which suggests that there is a threshold in the
capacity of the economic system to adapt. In the case of Louisiana, indirect losses
remain negligible if direct losses are less than 50 billion dollars, but increase very
quickly if they are greater. When direct destruction amount 200 billion dollars, indirect
cost reaches the same figure.
In vulnerability evaluation, it is essential to look at the risks for nodal points such
as hospitals (because risks linked to transport and the evacuation of patients are im-
portant), emergency services (some fire stations are in flood-prone areas, which might
paralyze a response to an emergency) and decision making centres.
A number of local characteristics can mitigate these indirect effects (Kroll et al.,
1990; Webb et al., 2002): diversification of the economy, a redundant transport net-
work, and resilience service, for instance, a very brief closure of municipal services,
have enabled to greatly limit Loma Prieta earthquake (California, USA, in 1989) con-
sequences on the local economy.
In urban areas a particular problem is the evacuation in the case of imminent danger.
The case of New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina shows what difficulties might be faced.
First of all, transport infrastructure may be inadequate for the rapid evacuation of the
population, which means that any evacuation needs to be better anticipated which in
turn may lead to a higher risk of a unnecessary evacuation if there is a false alert. Very
densely populated areas, and therefore large urban centers, are naturally particularly
difficult to evacuate. Then particular attention needs to be paid to the various categories
of vulnerable people who are often concentrated in certain districts. These people may
lack information or means of transport, or be vulnerable to the risk of burglary and
looting. Persons with reduced mobility, older people and the sick often find it difficult
to leave their homes without external support. Finally, insufficient understanding of the
risk, evident in those areas that are rarely affected, is a crucial risk factor10.
2.3.5 Combination of sectoral impacts
All the sectoral impacts that we have listed should not be considered separately. Cli-
mate change will compound the effects of all impacts, probably in parallel. This com-
bination might create increased problems, for example if a decrease in water resources
occurs at the same time that an increase in the frequency of heat waves, or if a reduction
in tourism occurs at the same time that a need in in coastal defenses investment. The
total impact on the economy might therefore be much higher than the sum of the parts.
Climate change is not the only challenge cities need to prepare for, and other chal-
lenges have to be taken into account. Adapting to climate change will need to be
undertaken alongside measures aimed at reducing GHG emissions, which will create
not only areas of common interest but also areas of conflict. There may be conflicts
on the policies themselves (when a measure helps to adapt but increases emissions, or
the opposite), or on resources (when investing in mitigation and adaptation at the same
time goes beyond the total investment capacity).
Beyond environmental aspects, in France, it is possible that the population, and
therefore the urban population in cities, decrease significantly in the second half of the
21st century which would be a large shock to urban dynamics. East Germany is an
example; there population decrease in towns is a widespread phenomenon and shows
how difficult it is to manage towns with declining populations. Problems specifically
10That was for instance clearly seen during the Xynthia storm in France
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linked to climate change mays therefore have to be managed in a very different context
from the one we know today.
This combination of factors will have important consequences. Even if each sec-
toral impact could be managed and controlled separately, the management of a com-
bination of simultaneous impacts in multiple sectors, alongside other urban challenges
such as a reduction in population, could be much more difficult to deal with. It could
come up against the limits of a local authority’s ability to cope (in terms of availabil-
ity of funds for investment, technical ability and competence and attractiveness). At
present there is no exhaustive analysis of the impacts of climate change on a city or
region and it remains difficult to judge the difficulties there may be in overcoming
impacts.
2.4 Adaptation at city scale
It is now becoming clearer and clearer that local level is of great importance in climate
change adaptation policies, as it is in mitigation policies (cf. Section 1.4.2). The impact
of adaptation policies is often felt at local level and generally depends on the particular
characteristics of an area; its topography, economic structure, the ability of households
to adapt etc. The best adaptive policies therefore differ from one place to another and
should be specifically designed for that area.
Scaling at town or city level is useful because this scale is not too small: towns and
cities are powerful players, they have the means to put ambitious policies into action.
This scale is not too big either: towns and cities are very integrated systems in which
the various networks (water, electricity and transport), the economic make-up and the
social fabric are embedded and work together.
2.4.1 Main risk factors, and adaptation policies
First let us sum up the main vulnerability factors; unsuitable planning and built envi-
ronment (heat stress, energy consumption), unsuitable defensive work and extension
of the built up area into areas at risk (flooding), widespread pollution and non sustain-
able use of water supplies, (diminution of water resources and impact on tourism), poor
protection of sensitive natural resources (tourism), building regulations poorly enforced
(contraction-expansions of clay soils), inadequate diversification of the economy and
vulnerability of networks to impacts (indirect economic impacts).
A number of measures that aim to reduce vulnerability to climate change first try
to reduce vulnerability to the current climate and its changeable nature, especially as
regards current extreme events; adapting to climate change means first adapting to
the current situation. In large part climate change acts by increasing problems that
exist already, and, leaving aside most notable extreme events, climate change is rarely
the main threat on sustainability. It is therefore possible to imagine measures that
adapt to climate change by modifying, at the edges, measures designed to reduce the
existing risks (for example putting higher sea walls in place to defend built up areas
on the coast). Other measures may however become necessary when the change in
climate becomes more serious. If this becomes the case, then the review of existing
vulnerabilities will become insufficient to construct an adaptation strategy and specific
measures will need to be put in place to counter new potential threats.
In the short-term it would be useful, in the first place, to examine the origins and
evolution of the vulnerability. The increasing risks that we are now seeing and which
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explains the increase in losses linked to natural disasters have precise causes, linked to
current socio-economic changes:
• lack of land leading to building on flood-prone areas, intensified by an increase
in the number of households and the development of detached houses that are
occupying more land
• migration of people southward where risks are higher
• spatial inequalities and social segregation, which concentrates problems in cer-
tain areas and may push the more fragile towards areas at risk.
• the cost of risk mitigation policies, evident in the case of policies for the con-
struction of defensive infrastructure but equally evident in almost all other cases;
as for the example the constraints on new buildings which have a high economic
and political cost (especially at the municipality scale)
• Lack of political will, except in the few years that follow a disaster.
• Loss of the safety reflex (like not living on the ground floor in flood-prone areas)
and a poor risk awareness (not listening to advice in the case of an alert) de-
spite recent developments (like the "vigilance"map produced by Météo-France
for example).
To control the current increase of risk and adapt to climate change we first need to
address these problems. Then measures can be amended to take account of climate
change. Some ideas for adaptation are developed below. These consist mainly of
investment and changes to standards and regulations. As stated in Hallegatte et al.
(2011b) the production and supply of information has also an important role, but these
issues are not specifically urban.
There is rarely an optimal adaptation option. Often the most appropriate adaptation
strategy depends on political and social policies and on the vision a region or city
has of its own future. Ideas suggested here should be considered as being part of an
adaptation toolbox, and the choice of measures remains a political decision deserving
a large public debate (Hallegatte et al., 2011b).
The costs of adaptation are relatively smaller when policies are anticipated11. There
is a tradeoff between implementing policies late, hence with a high cost but with a sense
of urgency, and an early implementation, cheaper, but undertaken without any sense of
urgency and therefore with a higher political investment (cf. Chapter 3).
Let us do now an analysis of four categories of policies : changes to land use and
town planning (Section 2.4.2), direct investment (Section 2.4.3), adaptation to heat
waves (Section 2.4.4) and resilience increase (Section 2.4.5).
2.4.2 The key role of urban planning
Because these places were more easily accessible, many cities have been built along
watercourses or by the sea (Lall and Deichmann, 2010), and many city centers are
therefore in flood-prone areas. For instance, low lying coastal areas exposed to cy-
clones and coastal flooding cover 2% of the world’s surface but are home to 10% of the
11It is cheaper to build oversized defenses than have to make them larger later, it is cheaper to designate
an area as unsuitable for building, than have to re-locate those in an already inhabited area etc.
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world’s population, and, importantly, 13% of the world’s urban population (McGrana-
han et al., 2007, see also the number of large cities located near a large water body, on
Fig. 1.2 in Chapter 1).12
Although the historic centers are in general situated away from areas at risk, recent
extensions to town and cities have created heavy pressure on land in these areas lead-
ing to larger and larger proportions of the population and the local economy placing
themselves at risk. It is a classic scenario found in several cities around the world,
from New Orleans to Shanghai. In France, this progressive urbanization of risk-prone
areas is increased by urban habitat density decrease, related to the greater number of
detached houses: each household is occupying more space than before, land becomes
scarcer and prices rise which leads the next arrivals to live in riskier areas.
This explains, in part, why growth in the number of homes in flood-prone areas
has accelerated in France over the last fifty years; between 1999 and 2006, there was
an increase of 7% in the number of homes build in flood-prone areas, which is almost
100,000 extra homes in 424 municipalities of more than 10,000 inhabitants which are
now at high risk of flooding (Laporte, 2009). In some areas, this urbanization is in-
creased by the presence of amenities which attract people to live in areas at risk, such
as a view over the sea or having a river nearby (see for instance the box about flood
management history in New Orleans).
12Similarly, because these places were rich in rich in natural resources, many cities have been built in
regions with fertile volcanic soil, but with high risk of eruption (cf. for instance Small and Naumann, 2001).
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Flood management history in New Orleans
New Orleans was funded in 1718 and became in the early XIXth century the
largest U.S. city in the South. Because the area protected by natural levees was
very small, most of city developed on natural marshland, artificially dried using
pumps, drainage canals, and artificial levees. From the beginning of the XXth
century, the use of more reliable electric pump and the development of the levees
allowed for an accelerated development of the city. From then, however, New Or-
leans has been flooded four times in spite of its protection system, in 1915, 1947,
1965, and 2005. In 1915, it was a category 4 hurricane that impacted the city and
overflows the protection system along the Lake Pontchartrain coastline. Water
levels reached 13 feet in some districts, and it took 4 days to pump the water out
of the city.
Following this event, pump stations were upgraded and levees were raised along
the drainage canals. In 1947, a category 3 hurricane made landfall on the city
and the Lake Pontchartrain levees failed. Thirty square miles were flooded with
water level reaching 6 feet, and 15.000 people had to be evacuated. Like in 1915,
major improvements were made on the protection system in the immediate after-
math of the disaster, with raises and extensions of the levees. In 1965, however,
hurricane Betsy (category 3) made landfall on New Orleans and flooded the city
again. About 13.000 homes were flooded, leaving 60,000 homeless, 53 deaths,
and more than $1 billion of losses.
This event leaded to the Flood Control Act of 1965 in the U.S. Congress and to an
ambitious plan to protect New Orleans. This plan was supposed to be fully imple-
mented within 13 years. Facing difficulties, including conflicts with environmental
protection, the plan was stalled, however, and finally revised into the “high level
plan”, which started to be slowly implemented in the mid-80s and was considered
to be between 60 and 90 percent completed when Katrina struck in 2005. The com-
plete failure of the protection system in 2005 demonstrates that both construction
and maintenance have not been adequately supervised and monitored.
What is striking in this series of disasters is the systematic implementation of am-
bitious protection upgrades after each disaster, but the absence of long term action
about risk management.
Source: Hallegatte, 2010
Land-use is therefore a crucial component of adaptation and risk management policies,
in order to contain new developments in areas where flooding risk is too high (that is a
decrease in the exposure, if we follow the definition given in introduction).
However it is impossible to stop all new building in flood-prone areas, and a zero
risk does not exist. In addition, the impact of restrictions on building would lead to
an increase in the price of land which would be a problem for ordinary people and
especially the less well off. Intermediate solutions therefore need to be found for areas
where flooding is a possibility but would be exceptional. In these areas building would
need to meet certain standards which would limit the risks and so reduce vulnerability
as defined in the introduction. This would require; avoiding one storey buildings that
do not allow people to take refuge on an upper floor if there is a flash flood, placing
services (such as electricity) above homes so that they would not be affected by a
flood, use building materials that are more waterproof or even put homes on stilts or
make evacuation mandatory in case of a flood alert.
As a general rule, encouraging greater density allows to concentrate development in
safer areas and therefore avoids building in areas at risk. Planning regulations in safer
areas will have an impact on the risk of flooding, which demonstrates the importance
of a systemic approach to the management of risk and spatial planning.
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Planning regulations do not just concern areas at risk from flooding; they also in-
fluence, for example, the permeability of the soil which has an influence on flooding
risk.
2.4.3 Defensive infrastructure and other direct investment
As has already been mentioned, defensive infrastructure - like seawalls and dykes - are
important for the prevention of risk and therefore climate change adaptation. In partic-
ular, seawalls and dykes are vital for the protection of densely populated and urbanised
areas, at a relatively low cost. However building defenses implies (1) regular mainte-
nance, the absence of which may lead the defense to increase vulnerability, and lead
to dramatic loss of life (ii) a planning document which clearly highlights the protected
areas, to ensure that the defence does not attract investment and people to an area at
risk (iiii) an alarm and evacuation system, since a defence can always be breached or
overcome by the intensity of a natural disaster.
The construction of defenses should only be considered when it is one of the com-
ponents of a larger risk management plan that includes the maintenance of the defense
system, building restrictions in the non-protected area and a warning and evacuation
plan.
In addition, the defense approach is not necessarily the best and it is important to
take into account its negative impacts. First defenses lead to an artificialization of the
structure and shape of a coast or riverbed, with consequences for the landscape and
biodiversity. For example sea wall and dykes which protect the coast against flooding
may, in some cases, contribute to the exhaustion of fish stocks by destroying their
ecosystem (Clark, 1996), 90% of fish species depend on coastal areas at one moment or
another in their life cycle (this secondary impact leads also to monetary losses because
of its impact on the fishing industry). Attractiveness of altered areas may be decreased
with an impact on recreation and tourism. Finally protection of an area might increase
risk on another part of the coast or downstream of a river. It is therefore important to
be careful not to simply transfer the risk, and to work at a sufficiently high spatial level
to be able to take in all the effects of protection.
Defences are not the only investments that might potentially be required when fac-
ing climate change. The upgrading of water management systems - and especially
drainage and water treatment - will equally be necessary; in particular in areas that are
subject to high rainfall (the South of France is included in this). Other infrastructure
may also require direct investment; improvement of roads and transport infrastructures,
moving and/or burying of electric cables etc.
2.4.4 Adapting the built environment to higher temperatures
Changing climate conditions will probably call for changes in town planning and ar-
chitecture. In a number of towns and cities in southern Europe and the Maghreb, tradi-
tional buildings are suited to high temperatures with narrow and shady lanes which stay
cool, patios etc. Climate change impacts may create an incentive to use these skills, and
to export them to other parts of the world. For instance, the traditional practices that
we find in Spain and in North Africa may be found to be useful for France at the end
of this century. Recent studies have tended to demonstrate scientifically the beneficial
effects of the traditional house in the fight against those risks caused by heat waves (for
example Shashua-Bar et al. 2009).
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In warmer climates modern extensions to towns and cities are often more sensitive
to heat stress like: building blocks built in the nineteen seventies, air-conditioned office
towers, wide avenues that allow traffic to circulate. This "loss" of traditional skills often
has a cultural as well as economic basis; the need to allow cars to flow through the city,
standardised construction techniques used on modern buildings that are cheaper than
traditional techniques etc. It is therefore not easy to use again the traditional techniques.
Adaptation of the built environment poses new questions because of the cost of this
adaptation and the time required for a transformation to be significant and have a visible
impact. We need therefore to ask ourselves whether we should change standards for
new buildings only or insist on the refurbishment of existing buildings. In the case of
refurbishment, timescales will be important; the quicker the adaptation is undertaken
the costlier it will be (and pose manpower and training problems); we will definitely
need to start as soon as possible so as to be able to undertake this transformation at a
sufficiently slow pace to make it possible economically.
If this adaptation is undertaken correctly it could also provide some important side-
benefits; accelerated refurbishment of homes in a poor state of repair, reduction in
energy use from heating, improvements in the quality of life of the population.
2.4.5 Increase in urban resilience
Towns are likely to have to face a number of shocks linked to climate change, whether
they are extreme events like storms or job losses due to changes in tourist flows. In
addition to strategies that aim to reduce the vulnerability of these shocks (adaptation of
the built environment, modification of infrastructure etc.) it should be possible to try
and increase the overall resilience of the area.
This might be done by diversifying the local economy; for example a town that is
dependent on tourists or fishing might try to create additional job opportunities which
do not have the same vulnerability as existing activities, in order to lessen the risk that
all local jobs will be affected by the same shock at the same time. In addition towns
and cities, being very vulnerable to an interruption in networked services (transport,
communications, energy), could work on the redundancy of these networks.
Towns and cities could also put in place specific tools which aim to help local
people and businesses face up to shocks whether they are regular or spread over time.
These may be bodies giving information on those local impacts that might be expected
from climate change to local deciders, or mutual support systems or insurance.
One of the strengths of strategies that aim to increase resilience is that they bring
benefits,that may go way beyond adapting to climate change, by reducing the general
vulnerability of a region.
2.5 Conclusion: vulnerability reduction in practice
Today it is impossible to calculate the future costs of climate change for cities or to
guess the sums we will need to invest in adaptation. However, the scientific literature
makes it clear that adequate adaptation policies, put in place sufficiently early, would
be able to very significantly limit the total impact of climate change.
This chapter has several conclusions. First, towns and cities are vulnerable to cli-
mate change, but climate change impacts are often an amplification of already existing
problems (for example flooding, or local pollution). This suggests starting with imple-
menting no regrets adaptive measures. They enable to improve the existing situation
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in towns and also generate interesting side benefits at the same time by reducing future
vulnerability to climate change.
Other measures could nevertheless become necessary when changes to the climate
become larger or when long term measures become necessary. The review of existing
vulnerabilities will become insufficient to construct an adaptation strategy and specific
measures will need to be put in place to counter new potential threats.
Because of cities evolution inertia, some of these measures will have to be en-
forced early enough, which is especially the case for measures involving large planning
schemes which have irreversible long-term implications. For policies which anticipate
events, taking into account uncertainty about future climate change is vital and there
will need to be coordination between the various players.
Second, the present vulnerability of cities can be explained by unfavourable socio-
economic and demographic changes (migration towards areas at risk, lack of available
land, overconsumption of water etc.) to which specific responses need to be made;
rather than just looking to reduce risk, we need to consider the factors that explain the
increase in risk and attack their original causes.
Finally, one of the particularities of cities is the way they function as systems, which
means that adaptation strategies need to be designed in an integrated way that takes into
account combined impacts in the various sectors and areas as well as other political and
economic objectives (Bulkeley et al., 2005).
When drawing up a policy to reduce vulnerability it will be necessary to work on a
very large canvas, which takes into account multiple factors and objectives. Adaptation
can only take place on a case by case basis for each area, taking into account the
secondary effects of the measures, whether positive or negative, their costs and local
political choices.
Issues surrounding the design of adaptation strategies are to some extent similar to
issues surrounding mitigation (cf. Section 1.5) : city evolution inertia will play a major
role, with a choice among short-term and long-term policies, among which urban plan-
ning. The choice between policies is made extremely difficult by side-effects, which
are in some case rather obscure, and make a cost-benefit analysis difficult. Long-term
policies appear potentially very efficient, but uncertain, because related to unknown
future evolutions. Another issue should be added : adaptation and mitigation poli-
cies often rely on the same tools (the best example being urban planning), leading to
synergies, and to conflicts, and should therefore be drawn up in a consistent way.
These issues will be studied in more details in the following chapter, and in Part III
we will show that integrated city modelling can help address these issues.
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Chapter 3
Research problem
Urban areas, home to more than half of the world’s people, are emerging
as the ’first responders’ in adapting to and mitigating climate change.
Rosenzweig et al., 2010
As presented in chapters 1 and 2, cities are important actors of two different issues
global greenhouse gases emissions and climate change vulnerability. Many key drivers
of both issues are similar, and driven at the municipal level, such as land use planning,
urban transport, housing or urban disaster risks policies. Our thesis in this work is
that three obstacles, at least, make using these tools extremely difficult for both issues.
Following boxes present practical examples of choices which illustrate them.
First, because of high inertia of city built structure, anticipation is required if one
wants cities to be adapted to the climate of the end of the century and to contribute less
to global CO2 emissions within a few decades: it is necessary to start now to change
building design and urban planning habits (Section 3.1).
Second, anticipating is difficult, because the impacts of policies depend on several
external factors: demographic, socio-economic, cultural, political and technological
changes will play a major role (Section 3.2). For instance, success of strategies aiming
at reducing transport energy consumption is dependent on future transport prices and
technologies.
Third, as adaptation and emission reduction policies often rely on the same tools,
synergies and conflicts exist. Urban climate policies are also not developed or imple-
mented in a vacuum; they interact with other policy goals, such as economic competi-
tiveness or social issues, making their design more difficult (Section 3.3).
This chapter will present the relevant results found in the literature on these issues.
We will develop a tool in Part II which will enable us to further investigate into these
problems, and in Part III we will use this tool to draw some conclusions.
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Should we favor compact or spread-out cities?
Urban shape plays an important role in GHG emissions (cf. Section 1.4.1 in Chap-
ter 1), however in practice, no clear advice can be given to urban decision-makers
concerning this issue.
It is a good illustration of the three obstacles we will present :
• First, urban shape evolve very slowly, and immediate action is required
for the cities to have climate-friendly forms within a few decades. This is
especially the case in rapidly-growing developing country cities.
• However, there is no clear indication whether high-density or low-density
development should be favored. Dense and compact cities are generally
considered as more environmentally-friendly than low-density spread-out
cities, especially because of potentially lower transport-related GHG emis-
sions and loss of arable land. However, low-density cities may enable
larger decentralized renewable energy production in the city (e.g. pho-
tovoltaic panels on roofs), which may counterbalance transport-related in-
creased energy need (Section 1.4.1.1 in Chapter 1). Future transport and
renewable energy production technologies, future lifestyles (e.g. massive
development of telecommuting) may decide what will be the best solution,
but their potential are so far unknown.
• Dense cities might also increase incentive to live in flood-prone areas and
make heat-island effect stronger because of the lack of vegetation. Ur-
ban sprawl containment may also increase real estate prices and, in some
transport technology evolution scenarios, pollution level. Interactions with
climate change impacts vulnerability, and with non-climate policy goals
cannot be neglected in reflexions about optimal urban forms.
The model we present on Part II, and the analysis we carry out in Part III is a
first step in addressing these issues, and understanding which policies impacting
urban shape should be implemented, according to decision-makers goals.
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Should we favor renovation or destruction?
Cities GHG emission and vulnerability to climate change are greatly determined
by infrastructures (cf. Section 3.1): residential, commercial and publics buildings,
transport, water and energy infrastructures etc.
When existing infrastructures are not "climate-fiendly", i.e. not adapted either
to low-emission lifestyle or to future climate change impacts, one question exist
whether they should be retrofitted, or simply destroyed or abandoned to build new
ones. This is for instance the case with residential buildings with bad insulation,
or with buildings in flood-risk zones, or with low-density neighborhood where
public transport would not be possible to develop.
Cost plays an important role regarding this issue, but it is not the only important
factor. This is another good illustration of the three points of our thesis:
• Capital lifetime will be a key element, as shortening live-time of an infras-
tructure to build later a new, more adapted one may be more cost-effective
than early retrofitting
• This decision will depend on future technological change: it may be worth
waiting for cheaper technologies than retrofitting now.
• Finally, side-effects of existing infrastructure are important: promoting
home renovation to reduce heating related GHG emissions enables to de-
crease energy bill for poor households. Low-density neighborhood may be
related to decreased quality of life (e.g. Brueckner and Largey, 2008; Re-
nard, 2010), so active urban densification may be useful. Here also, the
tools we propose can help decide about urban choices.
3.1 Inertia and cost of delays
Although climate change mitigation and adaptation policies demand a high level of
investment, the costs will be even higher, the longer the decision to act is delayed.
Climate policies (adaptation and mitigation) differ by their implementation speed
and easiness. As highlighted in previous chapters, some measures can be implemented
rather quickly (energy efficiency measures in transport systems, installation of photo-
voltaic panels) but others cannot. As shown in chapters 1 and 2 (especially in Sec-
tions 1.3 and 2.4.1), many adaptation and mitigation policies rely on the development
or change of urban infrastructure: buildings insulation or renovation (Sections 1.3.2,
2.4.4 and 2.2.3), public transport development (Section 1.3.3), construction of dikes
(Section 2.4.3), water treatment plants and water networks (Section 2.1.3), etc. These
urban buildings have generally a long lifetime, from 50 to more than 100 years, and
their cost is extremely high.
The right choice of urban policies is particularly important to ensure that long-
lived infrastructure — commercial and residential buildings, roads and ports, water
and transport networks — is designed to withstand the expected increase in climate
hazards while simultaneously improving the energy and emission performance of the
built environment. Taking into account climate issues during the design and building
of new infrastructure enables to prevent future retrofitting of replacement, and, hence,
enables considerable long-term savings (cf. for instance Hallegatte, 2009).
Similar idea holds for the broader concept of urban forms:1 as was studied in Hal-
legatte et al. (2007a); Gusdorf and Hallegatte (2007a,b); Gusdorf et al. (2008), one of
1The uses of land and spatial distribution of population and activities within an urban area, as defined in
Section 1.4.1.1.
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the biggest challenges for cities is the tendency to lock-in the form that they grow into2.
The consequence is that, even if urban shape is an important determinant of GHG emis-
sions (Section 1.4.1) and flood and heatwave vulnerability (Section2.4.2 and 2.4.4), it
is a difficult to act on it: structural modifications in cities occur slowly, over a long time
horizon. Early action is therefore required to ensure that cities will be adapted to the
climate of the end of the century and to limit their future GHG emissions. The trans-
portation system that a city develops is of particular importance, as it largely defines
the final shape of the city.
This is a critical lesson for developing-country cities that still have an opportu-
nity to influence the final shape of their cities. Rapidly growing cities are of special
concern: they will need to take urgent actions to guide building codes and practices,
density, and connectivity infrastructure. In such cities, as those in China, a more com-
pact urban form is still possible; however, the current development charges and local
revenue generation do not readily encourage this (Hoornweg et al., 2011a). Delay will
result in a path that will and make mitigation and adaptation increasingly expensive
and inaccessible.
In many cases in urban areas, the focus is on investment in major infrastructure
that lasts for a number of decades: transportation systems; commercial, residential and
government buildings; and industrial development. These investments can profoundly
shape both urban mitigation and adaptation not only in the short term, but for as long
as half a century or more.
Taking into account inertia is therefore an important element of climate policies
assessment: it must take into account both short, medium and long-term consequences.
However, as highlighted in the conclusion of Chapter 1 (Section 1.5), it is difficult to
anticipate long-term consequences of urban policies, because it is often hard to find
a fully comparable historical example, and because it is impossible to conduct exper-
iments for such a time scale. Modelling is a way to address this issue, and Chapter
7 will present how the different impacts of an urban climate policy (a carbon tax),
can be assessed for different time-periods. It will also highlight to what extent inertia
makes these impacts different from each other, and how it is possible to analyze these
differences.
3.2 Uncertainties
As was already noted in previous chapters (cf. Section 1.5 and 2.5), urban policies can
generally only try to influence urban shape and household choices, but cannot directly
control them. For instance, transport policies can only try to influence modal share by
varying transport modes price, ease of use, and efficiency, but cannot oblige people to
use one specific mode. Similarly, city planners do generally not have an entire control
on the future shape of their cities; planning has to compose with households aggregated
choices or with market forces. Town planners and decision makers have to cooperate
with operators that actually build the city (See also Lefèvre and Renard, 2011).
As explained in Giraud et al. (2010), this is especially true with the move toward
deregulation and flexible planning implemented in most OECD countries and in many
developing countries. Planners have essentially three types of tools : land planning,
infrastructure investments and property taxes, which act indirectly. "The real estate
2cf. also Section 1.4.1.3.
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market, which reacts to the constraints and opportunities provided by regulations, in-
frastructure, and taxation, will shape the city; the designs and blueprints of planners
will not have much direct influence." (Giraud et al., 2010). To make cities more sus-
tainable, reflexions about what could be an ideal city are not sufficient : the issue is
rather how to redesign existing cities through anticipation, encouragement and support
of "spontaneous urban development".
This makes using urban planning as a tool for mitigation and adaptation extremely
difficult. Indeed, anticipated action is required, but the long term impacts of today’s
policies are not clearly known. "Spontaneous urban development" is driven by several
factors on which urban decision-makers have influence (e.g. transport infrastructures,
amenities such as parks, schools etc.) and factors on which they generally cannot act
directly: demographic, socio-economic, cultural, political and technological changes
play for instance a major role. For instance socio-economic effects of urban sprawl
mitigation policies differ completely in a context of population growth or in a context
of demographic decline. Their impact on climate is dependent on future transport and
renewable technology production technologies, as low-density cities may enable larger
decentralized renewable electricity production (cf. Section 1.4.1.1). Similarly, success
of strategies aiming at reducing transport energy consumption is dependent on future
transport prices. Prospective studies that explore various possible evolutions of these
variables are thus an essential tool to design the best policies.
Robustness against this uncertainty should therefore be a key element in urban
climate policies appraisal. In Chapter 8, we will show a first assessment of such a
robustness analysis for several climate policies in Paris urban area. To achieve this,
we will explain how it is possible to downscale global world evolution scenarios until
2100 (such as SRES scenarios, cf. Nakicenovic et al., 2000) at city scale, and design
possible and coherent scenarios, which represent conceivable futures. The analysis of
several contrasted scenarios will then enable to assess which future global evolutions
appear to impact urban policies, and which do not.
3.3 Tradeoffs in climate policies
A third important issue comes from the fact that, as cities are integrated systems, all
urban policies have side-effects, which sometimes may be an important obstacle or an
additional incentive.
First category of side-effects, urban adaptation strategies do not always support
mitigation policies: in some cases both can be complementary but in other cases they
may conflict (cf. for instance McEvoy et al., 2006; Hamin and Gurran, 2009).3 Path-
ways to mitigation and adaptation can be complementary and reinforce each other. For
instance, building insulation, which can reduce the need for burning fossil fuels, may
enable adaptation to increased temperatures and mitigate heatwave vulnerability.
But adaptation and mitigation can also conflict. Generally, the easiest way to adapt
to most of climate change impacts is through an increase in energy consumption (e.g.
water desalinization to reduce water resource decrease, air conditioning to reduce heat
wave impacts etc.). Such a spontaneous energy intensive adaptation is in contradiction
with efforts to reduce energy consumption, and, hence, GHG emissions. Anticipated
adaptation may enable to prevent such a "maladaptation", and to reach an adaptation
pathway compatible with low GHG emission levels.
3This is generally true for adaptation and mitigation in general, but it is especially noticeable in urban
areas, as urban adaptation and mitigation policies often rely on the same tools.
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Using city planning as a tool for adaptation and mitigation raises such issues. For
instance, strategies to limit urban sprawl to enable lifestyles that reduce per capita
GHG emissions (Section 1.4.1) may increase UHI effect (Section 2.1.1), and therefore
increase heatwave vulnerability (Section 2.1.1).
Another example, as explained (and empirically measured) in Burby et al., 2001
and Burby et al., 2006, comes from the fact that they may also increase vulnerability to
natural disasters. Urban containment may indeed make more attractive areas that are
particularly dangerous or may increase the value of land and encourage residential and
commercial development in these places.4 This will be even more true when vacant de-
velopment land becomes scarce, the land situated in areas at risk may be the only land
available. Since the constraints on construction, such as risks of natural disasters, are
generally expressed in the price of land, dangerous land may be the cheapest land avail-
able, all other things being equal, which is another incentive to build in these places
if developers are myopic (Lall and Deichmann, 2010). This problem may be coun-
tered if programs for the containment of urban spread are accompanied by complete
and integrated plans to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters, but such programs are
expensive, either financially or politically (cf. Section 2.4.2). These interactions will
be studied in more details in Chapter 9.
If urban adaptation and mitigation policies interact, they also interact with other
urban policy goals. Environmental policies can result in positive feedback with respect
to economic and social issues. For instance, a decrease in car congestion increases
residents’ quality of life, enhances economic competitiveness, reduces accessibility
inequalities among neighborhoods, and decreases air pollution and GHG emissions.
Conversely, while enlarging parks and introducing more vegetation in cities can be
a useful way to adapt cities to higher temperatures and can improve the quality of life,
such actions may also reduce population density and lead to increased GHG emissions
from transportation. Similarly, protecting urban coastlines with dikes and seawalls de-
creases cities’ vulnerability to floods, but can reduce recreational amenities and a city’s
attractiveness to tourists, thereby reducing inhabitants’ incomes and slowing down de-
velopment.
All policies have consequences for property values, which in turn influence the
attractiveness of an urban area for potential residents, professionals, and businesses.
These effects can vary by community or location, for example, impact in the suburbs
versus that in the city center, leading to unintended redistributions of wealth or ameni-
ties that may or may not be consistent with policy goals.
Such conflicts among different policy goals create implementation problems, while
synergies offer opportunities for win-win solutions, suggesting the utility of assessing
all urban policies within a unified framework (Munasinghe, 2011).
However, in practice, such an integrated approach is not often developed. Only a
few city-wide initiatives (for instance London, Durban and New York) have addressed
some of the linkages between mitigation and adaptation (UN-Habitat, 2011). So far,
only qualitative analysis of these interactions have been developed, and knowledge is
lacking on the relative importance of these interactions, and on the effectiveness of
policies aiming at counter-balancing side-effects. To achieve such a quantification,
4Sydney, in Australia, can be used as an example. Urban consolidation was introduced by the Sydney
Regional Plan 1970-2000 and the updates that followed, as well as by the related plans which encouraged
a re-visiting of development in areas of high density. This program of consolidation and the high price of
land contributed to a substantial increase in occupation of land liable to flood, occupation which government
policies allowed by leaving decisions on where to allow development in these areas to local deciders. (Burby
et al., 2001, 2006)
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a modeling taking into account these different effects is required. One of the main
issue comes from the fact that building such a framework requires aggregating results
from different research fields in an interdisciplinary analysis. Moreover, because urban
management implies political choices and value judgments, urban climate policies have
to be judged using multiple criteria.
In Part II, we will show how it is possible to develop such a model, and we will use
it to provide a first quantitative analysis of some of these interactions in Chapter 9.
3.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, to design best urban climate policies,
• anticipated action is required, and short, medium and long-term effects have to
be taken into account
• the influence of various external socio-economic factors on the city is a major
source of uncertainty, and makes it necessary to follow a scenario-based ap-
proach that takes into account the uncertainty on urban dynamics drivers
• beyond direct cost and effectiveness, side-effects of policies are of great im-
portance, and their taking into account allows for more efficient and acceptable
urban climate policies.
Most of these issues have been already described qualitatively or theoretically in the
literature, but practical quantitative analysis is lacking. We will go in that direction in
following parts.
Integrated city models (ICMs) are pertinent tools do carry out such a study (Halle-
gatte et al., 2010). they are highly simplified representations of reality that describe the
most important drivers of city change over time and the most important interactions
between various urban variables. ICMs can provide decision makers and stakehold-
ers with useful information and can help them understand the main mechanisms and
linkages at work.
Part II describes the design and calibration of such a model: NEDUM-2D, and Part
III will show how it can inform on the issues we have highlighted.
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Chapter 4
Urban modelling
"Cities have always been shaped by transportation technologies."
Glaeser and Kahn (2004)
How are cities organized? What are the main factors which influence their structure? It
has long been recognized that if policy action plays a definite role in shaping a city, it
has to compose with the city’s own evolution forces, which result from the sometimes
obscure aggregation of various city stakeholders preferences (cf. Section 3.2 in Chap-
ter 3). Urban studies have historically mostly followed a normative approach, looking
at what would be an ideal city. It is not until the beginning of the XXth century that
some researchers began consider city structure as a research object by itself, and not
only as an imperfect state which should be corrected would the proper policy road-map
be found. If social scientists were among the first to systematically inquire into cities
structures, economists and transport engineers have later developed theories and anal-
ysis frameworks of great interest. Mapping all this research would be too ambitious,
and we will limit ourselves here to a brief presentation of some main concepts and
questions (Section 4.1), before looking at how this theory has been employed to build
quantitative models which have been a help to policy-making (Section 4.2). Finally,
Section 4.3 concludes and discusses to what extent a new modeling can be of interest
to deal specifically with the climatic issues we have highlighted in Part I.
4.1 Theories of urban spatial organization
Following Wegener and Fürst (2004), let us divide main theories of urban organization
in three broad groups : social theories (Section 4.1.1), economic theories (Section
4.1.2) and finally frameworks developed by transport engineers (Section 4.1.3).
4.1.1 Social theories1
4.1.1.1 The Chicago school
The first studies of time evolution of the structure of cities were made by historians,
like Mumford (1938, 1961) or Gutkind (1972). However, their method was essentially
1This section draws extensively on Wegener and Fürst (2004) and Lefèvre (2007).
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Figure 4.1: Three Models of Urban Structure. Source: Rubenstein, 1996.
hermeneutic, i.e. aimed at "understanding individual processes as unique constella-
tions of specific causes and effects. Beyond the observation of similarities in different
places at different times, no regularities or law-like covariations of variables were
sought." (Wegener and Fürst, 2004).
The first determinant theory for the spatial and temporal analysis of urban devel-
opment was developed between the two world wars in Chicago. The Chicago school
looked closely into processes of social change at the neighbourhood and urban lev-
els. They interpreted cities as multi-species ecosystems, in which social and economic
groups fight for "ecological positions", i.e. a neighbourhood or a region (Park et al.,
1925; Park, 1936). Concepts of ecology such as "invasion", "succession" or "domi-
nance" were used to describe the appropriation of space, seen as an invasion of different
ethnic or income groups or tertiary activities in a residential neighbourhood.
Several qualitative theories were put forward to explain the spatial structure expan-
sion of American cities |(Fig. 4.1), such as the concentric model (Burgess, 1925), the
sector model (Hoyt, 1939), or the mutiple nuclei, or polycentric, model (Harris and
Ullman, 1945). Concepts from social ecology continue to be useful for understanding
the mechanisms of social change in cities beyond the economic processes on the land
market, such as "gentrification" processes2 (Smith and Williams, 1986).
4.1.1.2 Social geography theories
In the 1960’s, new theories went beyond the perspective of the Chicago school mod-
els by referring to age-, gender- or social-group specific activity patterns which lead to
characteristic spatio-temporal behaviour, and hence to permanent localisations. "Action-
2That is the invasion of upper-middle-class households into inner-city or suburban working-class neigh-
bourhoods.
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space analyses" identified the frequency of performance of activities as a function of
distance to other activities. It enabled to draw conclusions for the optimum allocation
of work-places, housing, shopping and recreation facilities or the optimum level of
most appropriate division of labour in cities (Wegener and Fürst, 2004).
These ideas were made operational by the introduction of "time budgets" (Häger-
strand, 1970), in which individuals, according to their social role, income and level of
technology (e.g. car ownership) — subject to various types of constraints3 — com-
mand different action spaces.
On the basis of Hägerstrand’s action-space theory, Zahavi (Zahavi, 1974, 1979;
Zahavi et al., 1981) proposed the hypothesis that individuals maximise activities or
opportunities that can be reached within their travel time and money budgets4. Za-
havi’s theory of fixed travel budgets has been extended by the concept of flexible time
and money budgets responding to external constraints (Downes, 1985). This theory
allows to model also the variation in time and money budgets across socio-economic
groups and different parts of an urban area and has proved to be more plausible and
theoretically sound (Wegener and Fürst, 2004).
Zahavi hypothesis
Zahavi (Zahavi, 1974, 1979; Zahavi et al., 1981) studied a large number of cities
all over the world and found that the time and money budgets devoted to transport
vary within urban regions as a function of age, income and residential location,
but that they showed a remarkable stability over time when averaged across whole
urban regions. It was found that in developed countries the average time spent in
travel by an active person per day is approximately 1.1 h per person per day, and
the average travel expenditure accounts for about 15% of disposable household
income.
His results were updated in a study by Schafer and Victor (2000): As can be
seen on Fig. 4.2(a), travel time budget is stable over a wide range of income
levels, geographical and cultural settings: residents of African villages devote
similar time for travel as those of Japan, Singapore, Western Europe or North
America. Figure 4.2(b) shows that similar conclusion holds, to a lesser extent, for
proportion of income devoted to traveling.
This temporal stability of time and money budgets for transport explain why in the
past gains in travel speed have generally rather been used for more and longer
trips than for time savings. It therefore explains that over the last forty years
transport prices decrease in most developed countries has not led to a reduction in
travel expenditure and time, but has led more and more people to chose residential
locations on the far periphery of urbanized areas.
4.1.2 Economic theories
In the 1950’s the role of transport on the spatial development of cities began to be
regarded as essential (cf. Clark, 1958), and "the recognition that trip and location de-
cisions co-determine each other and that therefore transport and land-use planning
needed to be coordinated, quickly spread among American planners" (Wegener and
3There are three types of constraints : capacity constraints (personal, non-spatial restrictions on mobility,
such as monetary budget, time budget, availability of transport modes and ability to use them), coupling
constraints (restrictions on the coupling of activities by location and time schedules of facilities and other
individual) and institutional constraints (restrictions of access to facilities by public or private regulations
such as property, opening hours, entrance fees or prices). (Wegener and Fürst, 2004)
4Instead of minimizing travel time or travel cost needed to perform a given set of activities, as the con-
ventional theory of travel behaviour assumes.
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(a) Average per-capita travel time budget from African villages, 44 city and 20 national
surveys.
(b) Travel money budget in 13 industrialized countries, 1970 to 1992. Also shown are
data from household expenditure surveys in three developing countries.
Figure 4.2: Time and money budgets devoted to transport vary within urban regions as a function of age,
income and residential location, but that show a remarkable stability. Source: Schafer and Victor, 2000.
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Fürst, 2004). For instance,Hansen (1959) demonstrated that, in Washington, DC, loca-
tions with good accessibility had a higher chance of being developed, and at a higher
density, than remote locations.
Economic theories of city organization are based on the idea that locations with
good accessibility are more attractive and have a higher market value than peripheral
locations. This fundamental assumption goes back to Von Thünen (1826) and has since
been varied and refined in many ways (Wegener and Fürst, 2004). The most influential
model is probably the urban land market model by Alonso (1964), and its developments
by Mills (1967) and Muth (1969). It aims at explaining the spatial distribution - across
the city - of the costs of land and of real estate, housing surface, population density and
buildings heights and density. It is based on two main mechanisms.
First, households choose their accommodation location and size by making a trade-
off between the proximity to the city center (i.e. to the jobs) and the real estate price
level (or, equivalently, between the proximity to the city center and the housing surface
they can afford).
Second, land owners choose to build more or less housing (i.e. larger or smaller
building) at a specific location, depending on the local level of real estate prices. When
these prices are low, developers tend to build low density buildings, and when these
prices are high, they tend to build high density buildings.
Using these two mechanisms, it is possible to determine the structure of the city
from information on the population size, the households’ income, transport network
locations, building construction costs and developers behavior parameters. An imme-
diate consequence of this model is for example the fact that, if the price of transporta-
tion increases, households will have less incentive to live in the suburbs and the city
density will increase close to the center. A more detailed description of this model and
of its main properties is in the following box. One of the main success of this model
is its ability to explain the regular broad exponentially decrease in population density
empirically observed in several cities across the world (cf. the original study by Clark
(1951) or Bertaud (2002) for updated figures).
Several developments have been made to this model (see for instance Fujita, 1989
for a review). One first direction aimed at taking into account the possibility of mul-
tiple interest centers in the city : multiple location of jobs across the city (cf below),
or "amenities" (security vs. insecurity, good schools, parks, beaches, public infrastruc-
tures etc.) either exogenous or endogenous (e.g. negative amenities linked to pollution,
or positive amenities linked to low population densities (see for instance Papageorgiou,
1973).
Another direction looked at better descriptions of transport systems (e.g. endoge-
nous congestion) or of building construction (cf. Masson, 2000a for a review). Finally,
a last direction aimed to take into account the coexistence of several types of house-
holds with different behaviors (cf. among many other, Brueckner et al., 1999). These
studies allowed to improve to some extent the model coherence with population and
real estate variations empirically observed in cities, beyond the broad exponential de-
crease when one moves away from city center (Richardson, 1977).
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Two classical urban economics results
Let us present briefly two classical results of urban economics which are of rele-
vance for Part III.a The first is that variation of real estate prices across the urban
area is uniquely determined by transport generalized prices. An increase in trans-
port price or a decrease in transport speed results in a steeper decrease in real
estate prices along transport lines. Developers react to this change, and popula-
tion density tends to increase, or decrease, where real estate prices respectively
increase or decrease. Conversely, when transport prices soar, real estate prices
tend to become more homogeneous, as do population density.
Secondly, if transport generalized price enables to compute variation of real es-
tate prices across the urban area, the overall level of real estate prices is mostly
determined by available ground space and by the number of inhabitants. Let us
suppose for instance that available ground space decreases, or that the city pop-
ulation increases. In this case, according to urban economic theory, real estate
prices will increase everywhere. Because of this increase, developers will build
more, and population density will increase everywhere (until all the population
can be accommodated). It should be highlighted that, in this case, if transport
generalized prices do not change, the variations of real estate prices across the
urban area do not change. In this case, all real estate prices increase or decrease
by the same amount, everywhere in the urban area.
A combination of transport prices increase and available ground space decrease
leads both to an increase of average real estate prices level, and to more homoge-
neous real estate prices. Real estate price variation in the center of the city can
therefore be either positive or negative, according to the relative magnitude of the
price decrease and the ground space decrease.
aFor a detailed analysis of urban economic framework see Fujita (1989).
4.1.3 Transport engineers frameworks
Simultaneously to urban economic theory development, several operational models of
land-use transport interaction were developed to inform policy-making. These models
also used transport as a main factor explaining cities shapes, but were developed after
observed regularities of certain parameters of human mobility and city development,
with no theoretically founded explanation for the spatial behavior. For instance, the first
determinant model of this sort, Lowry’s (1964) Model Metropolis was based on famous
observations by Ravenstein (1885) and Zipf (1949) that, in an obvious analogy to the
law of gravitation in physics, the frequency of human interactions such as messages,
trips or migrations between two locations (cities or regions) is proportional to their size,
but inversely proportional to their distance (Wegener and Fürst, 2004). This enabled
to define a global attractivity associated to each location, which determined population
density through an ad-hoc function.
Contrary to contemporary urban economic models, these models were able to de-
scribe cities with multiple job locations instead of a unique city center, and the em-
pirically good results of this type of modeling led to efforts to provide a theoretical
foundation. Formulations derived from statistical mechanics (Wilson, 1967) or infor-
mation theory (Snickars and Weibull, 1976), both of which led to functional forms
close to gravity models, were therefore designed. However, they still did not provide
any explanation for the spatial behavior (Wegener and Fürst, 2004). Such an expla-
nation finally came through Anas (1983), which proved the mathematical equivalence
between such models and random utility theory (McFadden, 1978), itself related to
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psychological models of human decision behaviour (Luce, 1959).
4.2 A brief review of urban evolution prospective mod-
eling
Since the middle of the XXth century, several numerical models have been designed
to forecast urban development, and inform policy-making. These models are based on
very different mechanisms, which are sometimes directly derived from the theoretical
results presented above, and sometimes based on similar ideas but with several simpli-
fications. Extensive reviews of land use change models exist, and we will only present
here a brief overview (see for example Pagliara and Wilson, 2010; Haase and Schwarz,
2009; Verburg et al., 2004). 5
Models can be broadly divided in two groups : geographic models, based on an ex-
trapolation of past tendencies (Section 4.2.1), and land-use transport interaction (LUTI)
models (Section 4.2.2).
4.2.1 Geographic models
Geographic models are based on the extrapolation of past tendencies: they study past
evolution of a city to anticipate its future. There are several ways to do it, character-
ized by their higher or smaller complexity. This kind of method has been being widely
used since the 1980s when access to satellite images became relatively easy. Various
methods and algorithms enable to detect and analyze land-use in terms of its nature,
its extension and its spatial structure. Impermeable surface detection is often used as
an indicator of urban sprawl (Epstein et al., 2002), to represent build surfaces, trans-
port axes, industrialized spaces etc. Models can rely on statistical regressions (see for
instance Jat et al., 2008), Markov chains or cellular automata (see for instance Solecki
and Oliveri, 2004).
This approach allows for precise and rich projections. It enables to take into account
urban development in its diversity. However, it is only valid over the short-term. In-
deed, as a simple extrapolation from the past, it does not take into account the changes
in the factors explaining these variations. For instance, these models cannot analyze
consequences of an abrupt change in oil prices. Such models also cannot assess the
consequences of non-urban planning policies, such as a carbon tax, on the city struc-
ture. They are therefore not suited to address the issues raised in Chapter 3.
4.2.2 Land-use transport interaction models
A second set of methods proposes to model main evolution drivers, especially land-
use transport interaction (see Iacono et al., 2008, for a review) : it tries to understand the
logic of main past evolutions. Relating these variations to external changes enable to
deduce their future foreseeable consequences. In such a method, only a small number
of factors have to be chosen: the ones which seem to have the biggest influence on
urban form. Then, this influence has to be studied and modeled. To do a scenario,
the impact of the evolution of these factors is computed, supposing everything else
remains constant. The main disadvantage of this method is that many phenomena are
5Older reviews include Batty, 1976; Bertuglia, 1987; De la Barra, 1989; Batty, 1994; Wegener, 1994;
Verburg et al., 2004; Wegener, 2004...
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neglected : the outcome is only an approximation of reality. The main advantage is
that the simulations are easily understandable, as is the influence of each parameter,
and that these models are based on mechanisms that are supposed to remain valid in
the future, while past-trends extrapolation is always questionable.
Most models of this type take transport as the main determinant of city structure.
As explained in Section 4.1.3, the first determinant model of this kind, Lowry’s (1964)
Model Metropolis, was linking a measure of transport accessibility to population den-
sity. This model stimulated a large number of increasingly complex modelling ap-
proaches such as the work by Goldner (1971), Geraldes et al. (1978), Putman (1983,
1991), Mackett (1983) and Webster et al. (1988). Boyce et al. (1981) developed com-
bined equilibrium models of residential location, mode and route choice.
However, these models assumed equilibrium between transport and location, whereas
urban processes have very different speeds and response times. For instance, although
activity location and households houses evolve slowly, behavior of transport users ad-
justs quickly to changing conditions in the transport system. Secondly, these models
also lacked economic content, which made the model incapable of considering wider
choices than between transport modes or destinations (for instance choices involving
trade-offs between transport and location or between housing and work-place location).
After Anas’s work (Anas, 1983), non-equilibrium models including urban eco-
nomic based mechanisms were produced, among which MEPLAN (Echenique and
Williams, 1980), TRANUS (De la Barra, 1982), METROSIM (Anas, 1982), IRPUD
(Wegener, 1982), URBANSIM (Waddell et al., 2003) etc. A main difference between
them lay in the level of complexity and details.
To deal with issues raised in Chapter 3, these last models appear more appropriate
than geographic models, as they enable to do projections to the longer term, and to
assess the impact of more policies and events (e.g. changes in oil prices or transport
technologies). They are and have been used in some research projects to assess urban
climate policies (for instance in Bangalore Lefèvre (2009) and Grenoble Criqui et al.
(2010)).
However, another drawback prevents us from directly using such models here.
These models, even the most simple ones, are indeed extremely complex. They all take
into account a great number of mechanisms and require detailed data to be calibrated.
The question of models optimal complexity is difficult. If an increased complexity
leads to a more detailed depiction of reality, it also leads to a loss of comprehension of
the processes involved and of the results robustness (the “black box” problem). Sec-
ondly, the higher the complexity, the more important is calibration on present day urban
area, and the more constrained is model evolution dynamic. Indeed, all the parameters
which have to be set to describe as exactly as possible present-day city constrain the
simulation. Most detailed models can do very good projections of city evolution over
ten or twenty years, but are not designed to do long-term projections, or to study deep
changes in a city structure6.
4.3 Conclusion : optimal model complexity
Models can be used to answer different questions, at different steps in the decision-
making process. They can be helpful to design broad strategies, or to design finer scale
policies. When the aim is to frame a broad strategy under the context of uncertain fu-
6Another advantage is that simpler models are easier and quicker to calibrate, and require less data.
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tures, as is the case with climate issues, simple models can be of greater interest than
more complex ones. As said in Hardy (2012), there is "an unmet need for a simplified
modeling tool that could be used to support transportation and land use policy assess-
ment. [...] Model development should not focus on more complex computer modeling
tools that may accurately predict the future (which significant evidence shows they
cannot), but less complex tools that can assist decision makers in knowing which data
elements cause the most uncertainty to enable more robust decision making." This is
what we propose to do.
Between urban economic theory models, which describe theoretical cities (equilib-
rium, simple transport network, optimal investments...) and high-complexity models,
there is a gap which has not been filled. We need here a model, simple enough to
remain tractable and based on general and fundamental economic principles, but with-
out the most unrealistic assumptions of theoretical models (equilibrium, optimality of
investments, perfect foresight and rationality, simplified representation of urban space
and transport system), so that it can describe quantitatively actual cities, following the
work began by Gusdorf (2008).
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Chapter 5
A first static model
In this chapter, we present a simple modeling of household location, of urban area size
and of real estate prices. It is based on the urban economics framework, which has
been described in Section 4.1.2 in Chapter 4. Urban economics standard model has
been modified and interpreted to be able to quantitatively describe average behavior of
households and developers (Section 5.1). As a case study, we present here a calibration
of this model on Paris urban area1, using a broad range of detailed socio-economic data
(Section 5.2 presents the data and Section 5.3 the calibration process). We find that the
model reproduces fairly faithfully the available data on the Paris area (5.4), suggesting
that this tool can be used to inform policy decisions. A rigorous validation is however
only possible by calibrating the model on several cities with different characteristics.
As a first step, calibration of the model on London and on other French cities is also
presented in Sections 5.5 and 5.6.
5.1 Principle of the model
5.1.1 Equations
We model the household trade-off using the following utility function :
U(r) = Z(r)αh(r)β (5.1)
where r is the location in the city, α and β are coefficients (α + β = 1), q(r) the
surface of the households’ dwelling and Z(r) the money remaining after the household
has paid its rent and a commuting round-trip per day to the center of Paris. The cost
of transportation includes the monetary cost of transportation and the cost associated
with the trip duration2. Such a functional form is consistent with the fact that the share
of household income devoted to housing expenditures is relatively constant over time
and space (Davis and Ortalo-Magne, 2010). Households’ income constraint reads :
Y = Z(r)+q(r).R(r)+T (r) (5.2)
where Y is household income and is constant (∀r,Y (r) = Y ), R is the rent per square
meter, and T (r) transportation costs (monetary cost added with time cost).
1A modeling of Paris urban area using such a framework but different data and assumptions has been
proposed by Rouchaud and Sauvant, 2004.
2We consider the cost associated with the trip duration as an actual loss of income
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We assume that absentee landowners own the land, and that they combine land
L′(r) with capital K′(r) to produce housing H ′(r). The housing production function
reads, in a classical way (Muth, 1969; Thorsnes, 1997) :
H ′(r) = AL′(r)aK′(r)b (5.3)
where A, a and b are coefficients (a+ b = 1), H ′(r) the housing surface built, L′(r)
the ground surface occupied by the buildings and K′(r) the financial capital used for
construction. The benefit of land owners reads therefore :
Π = (R−R0)H
′(r)− (δ +ρ)K′(r) (5.4)
Π is the profit, ρ represents the joined effect of real estate capital depreciation and
annual taxes payed by land owners on the real estate capital, and δ the interest rate.
Developers build to maximize their profit : at each point of the metropolitan area they
construct, i.e. choose K′(r), to maximize Π(r) under the constraint that H
′(r)
L′(r) ratio is
limited by an urbanism constraint (see details below). The metropolitan area boundary
is defined by a rent R0, below which it is not profitable to build housing building (this
value corresponds both to other use of the land like agriculture and to transaction costs
in the building and renting process).
As for the other equations that we have presented, let us reason per unit of land :
because a+b= 1, we get :
H ′(r)
L′(r)
= A
(
K′(r)
L′(r)
)b
(5.5)
So if we define H(r) = H
′(r)
L′(r) and K(r) =
K′(r)
L′(r) , we have :
H(r) = A(K(r))b (5.6)
5.1.2 Hypotheses of the model
5.1.2.1 Monocentric city
We suppose that there exist a unique city center. If, rigorously speaking, recent trends in
Paris urban area development seem to contradict this assumption, it is still reasonable
to accept it, at least in first approximation, as can be seen in as can be seen in Fig.
5.1 : rents and population density reach a peak at a point that corresponds to the center
of Paris and decrease in all directions on a regular basis when one moves away. High
job density near the center of Paris and Paris urban area star-shaped public transport
network also contribute to the relevance of the monocentric approach.
For a question of simplicity and clarity, we have therefore put aside the issue of
polycentrism, to develop only scenarios in which urban area keep evolving in a mono-
centric way.3 Results presented below confirm that the monocentric assumption is still
able to explain the major characteristics of the Paris urban area. We come back to this
question in the conclusion of this document.
3Polycentrism could be modelled by using slightly more complex equations and random utilities, cf. for
instance Anas and Kim, 1996.
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(a) Rents in Paris administrative region (Ile-de-
France) (source : Clameur).
(b) Population density in Paris administrative re-
gion (Ile-de-France) (source : INSEE).
FIGURE 5.1 – Rents and population density in Paris administrative region (Ile-de-France).
5.1.2.2 Market mechanisms
Second, this model only describes market mechanisms related to urbanism. In practice,
because of urbanism constraints (e.g. limits to building heights) and of direct public
investment (e.g. in public housing or infrastructure) the structure of the Paris urban
area does not directly correspond to the resulting balance of the free play of market.
We introduce explicitly constraints of this type in the model. For instance, we limit
the height of buildings in Paris. Indeed the model tells us that, otherwise, real estate
developers would build much higher buildings than what is observed, in response to
the high rent level in Paris. We also forbid to build in some areas (natural parks, public
gardens...). In the policy analyses, we introduce additional land-use regulations (cf.
Chapter 8 and 9).
We do not describe direct public investment aiming at changing the urban shape.
For instance, "Villes nouvelles" ("new towns")4 are an historic example of a planned
urban development that the model is not able to anticipate, and which could renew
itself in this century. Thus, it can be considered that the model provides spontaneous
urbanization trends, that urban policy course may alter.
We also exclude social housing from our field of study, because it is strongly re-
gulated and do not follow free market forces. Since the access to social housing is
constrained in practice5, we assume that the existence of social housing has a limited
influence on the private market. More precisely, this means that we assume that house-
holds cannot make social housing and private housing compete, which would result in
a reduction of private real estate prices until they become comparable to social housing
prices.
5.1.2.3 One household type
Given the level of abstraction and the exploratory nature of this work, we have here
neglected the influence of local distribution of household income. One obvious de-
velopment is the introduction of the heterogeneity of households (including income
4These new towns were created from scratch in France in the mid-1960s to try to control the expansion
of several cities. For example Cergy-Pontoise, Marne-la-Vallée, Sénart, Évry and Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines
were created around Paris.
5In 2007, for instance, only about 7% of demand for social housing in Île de France was fulfilled (OLS,
2008).
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FIGURE 5.2 – Average income per “tax household” (Source : INSEE).
differences) in the analysis. As can be seen in Fig. 5.2, excluding the center of Paris,
average income6 per "tax household"7 as a function of the distance to the center of Pa-
ris varies less than 16 % in the first 30 km. Hence this simplification seems reasonable,
at least as a first order approximation. We come back to this question in the conclusion
of this document.
5.2 Data
5.2.1 Land-use
Computations are done on a 100×100km grid, with square 1km cells. Each cell is made
up of free and restricted land, each of which use a fraction of the grid area. Restricted
land is land where house building is forbidden, such as forests, parks, rivers, lakes,
airports etc. Free land is land where building is authorized8. A detailed explanation of
data used to determine restricted land and free land can be found in Appendix 5.A.
In a city, the ground surface is not only devoted to housing, but also to transpor-
tation infrastructures : roads, sidewalks, railways, etc. The surface devoted to these
infrastructures is far from negligible, so we had to take them into account and to intro-
duce a constraint on the maximum ground surface devoted to housing construction. We
based our constraint on data gathered by the Paris urbanism institute (APUR) for the
EPICEA research project. According to pictures taken by airplane, roofs cover 62%
of ground surface in most dense areas in Paris, public parks excluded ; we therefore
suppose that, in free land, only 62% of ground surface is available for building.
5.2.2 Demographic data and urban structure
There are different definitions of what is commonly known as an “urban area." Here
we use the definition corresponding to the concept of “aire urbaine " as defined by
6Data are provided by INSEE (French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Stu-
dies), and are available online at http://www.insee.fr/en/methodes/default.asp?page=
definitions/unite-consommation.htm
7"tax household" refers to all the people included on the same income tax declaration. About the exact
definition see http://www.insee.fr/en/methodes/default.asp?pageefinitions/
foyer-fiscal.htm.
8But its height might be limited by land use planning constraint, cf. Section 5.1.2.2.
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FIGURE 5.3 – Map of Paris urban area. Source : INSEE, IGN.
INSEE (“aire urbaine" literally translates as urban area, so we will use these two wor-
dings interchangeably) : "An urban area is a group of municipalities, all adjoining and
without enclaves, made up of an urban hub and rural municipalities or urban units
(suburban rim), of which at least 40% of the resident working population works in the
hub or in municipalities attracted by the hub." The “aire urbaine" definition is close
to the concept of urban area as described by our model. Indeed, a location belongs to
our model urban area if localization choices of its inhabitants are primarily driven by
proximity to Paris center.
The urban area of Paris does not exactly match geographically Paris administrative
Region (“Ile-de-France") (Fig. 5.3). However, in 2001, 97 % of Paris “aire urbaine"
inhabitants live in Ile-de-France and 99 % of the population of Ile-de-France lives in
Paris “aire urbaine" (Hassan, 2001). When we do not have data specific to Paris “aire
urbaine", therefore, we use data describing Ile-de-France.
In terms of demographic data, we use the sum of the populations of Paris urban
area municipalities, 11 768 725 inhabitants, established by INSEE through the natio-
nal population census for the year 2006. We also used the average size of households
in 2005 for Paris urban area9 , namely 2.3 people per household. The median dispo-
sable income of households10 was determined by INSEE for the region Ile-de-France
in 200611 , and is equal to 56,098e per year per household.
There are several databases listing rent levels in Ile-de-France. In our study, we
used the database provided by CLAMEUR12 , an association of several public and pri-
vate organizations that studies the evolution of rents in France. This database includes
9http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?ref_id=12006&page=
alapage/alap292/alap292_graph.htm
10Income resulting from the distribution of added value, the distribution of income from property and
redistribution operations.
11http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=99&ref_id=
CMRSOS04238
12http://www.clameur.fr/lmecv_regvil.htm
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observed rents (excluding social housing) for many districts in Ile-de-France.
For dwelling size, we used data collected by INSEE13 on the size of households’
main homes in Paris and its suburbs in 2006. Unfortunately, these data were limited :
we do not have the complete description of the spatial repartition of dwelling sizes
in the agglomeration but only an average for Paris, an average for near suburbs and
an average for the whole Ile-de-France. This limitation had implications in our model
calibration (section 5.4.2).
5.2.3 Interest and depreciation rates
An accurate value for interest rate is not very important in our study. Indeed, it only
affects construction costs obtained during the calibration of the model, and it is difficult
to verify the compatibility of these costs with reality (cf. section 5.3.2). We therefore
use a reasonable approximation of interest rates of 5 %.
It is difficult to assess the depreciation rate of Paris buildings. According to the
2008 Observatory of co-ownership expenses14 , co-ownership expenses which are de-
voted to local taxes and maintenance of the building were about 7.3e/m2/year in 2008,
with exceptional burden of the order of 3.6e/m2/year, which were to be paid exceptio-
nally for some years15 . Taking an average construction cost of 1400 e/m2 (cf. Section
5.3.2), this corresponds to between 0.8 % and 0.5 % of the original construction price
of the building, depending on the frequency of these exceptional loads, i.e. a deprecia-
tion time ranging from 130 years to 190 years. The costs associated with depreciation
of built capital are very low compared to financing costs due to interest rate, so a choice
of a 0.8 % or 0.5 % rate has in practice no influence on the results of our model (which
we can also see retrospectively in the sensitivity analysis that we conduct in Section
5.4.3). In the following, a rate ρ = 0.5% is used.
5.2.4 Transport
In terms of transportation costs and trip duration, we relied on a study by D. Rouchaud
and A. Sauvant (Rouchaud and Sauvant, 2004). They have built a database of transport
times to reach the center of Paris from different municipalities of Ile-de-France, by
public and individual transport during morning and evening peak hours.
We used for the year 2008 a fuel cost of 1.1 euro per liter, and fuel consumption
for individual cars of 7 liters for 100 km. We only deal here with perceived travel cost,
and not with real travel cost, so we only use the cost of fuel and do not add costs due
to vehicle amortization (we followed the same approach as Coulombel, 2010). Public
transport costs were estimated based on monthly public transportation system passes
prices in 2008.
5.3 Calibration
Table 5.1 presents the numerical data we used in our simulations. In absence of ade-
quate data for some parameters, for instance the cost of time and construction costs,
13http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/document.asp?reg_id=20&ref_id=
13321&page=alapage/alap301/alap301_graph.htm
14http://www.unis-immo.fr/actualites-immobilieres.htm?lang=fr&idtexte=
1168
1572% of Paris urban area main accommodations are collective accommodation in 2006, according to the
2006 Census population of INSEE
88
these parameters have been calibrated on the Paris structure in 2008 (Tab. 5.2). A de-
tailed comparison of model results with available data is provided below, and shows a
good agreement on the model with observed urban evolutions.
Input data Value
Urban area population 5,101,300 households
Fraction of ground surface devoted to hou-
sing
0.62
Households average income 56,098 e
Transport times and costs in Paris urban area cf. Section 5.2
Interest rate δ = 5%
Built capital depreciation time ρ = 0.5%
TABLE 5.1 – Summary of input data
Calibrated parameters Value
Households utility function parameter (cf.
Section 5.1.1)
α = 0.7
Coefficients of construction cost function
(cf. Section 5.1.1)
A= 2.0140 and a= 0.36
Cost associated with travel time cf. Section 5.3.3
Rent determining city border R0 = 11e/m2
Maximum floor-area ratio 1.5 (cf. Section 5.3.1)
TABLE 5.2 – Summary of calibration parameters
5.3.1 Maximum floor-area ratio in the center of Paris
Data lead to 1.5 as the value of the maximum floor-area ratio in the center of Paris.
This value may seem low as most buildings in Paris have approximately 6 floors, which
would induce a ratio of about 6 at the center of Paris. However, our ratio is only taking
into account housing surface, and not the total built surface, and the discrepancy is
simply caused by built surface intended for purposes other than housing (it includes, on
the one hand, corridors and lobbies in buildings dedicated to housing and, on the other
hand, all buildings not dedicated to housing : offices, shops, museums, train stations,
office buildings, schools, universities, etc.).
5.3.2 Construction costs
The calibration process provides construction costs between 1173e/m2 for a housing-
surface/land-surface ratio of 2 and 794e/m2 for a ratio of 1. We compare in Fig. 5.4
the calibrated costs to construction cost estimates from the Centre Scientifique et Tech-
nique du Bâtiment (CSTB), a French public institution providing analysis and research
on construction and housing issues. These data are partial, since they are prices announ-
ced by developers in several public procurement documents and in various estimates
of building construction costs, as well as technical documents. What emerges from
CSTB data is an average cost of construction of 1200 e/m2 before tax, or approxima-
tely 1400 e/m2 including all taxes, which increases slightly as the building becomes
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FIGURE 5.4 – Construction costs
higher. However, these estimates are quite uncertain : because of the diversity of types
of buildings that it is possible to build, it is difficult to obtain a cost that can be used as
a reference cost. The order of magnitude of the calibrated cost seems to agree with the
order of magnitude of the data.
These data present however a less convex profile than calibrated data. An explana-
tion of the discrepancy may be that the so-called “actual" costs in CSTB data are direct
construction costs, while in reality developers consider also additional costs when the
height of buildings increases (Castel, 2007). These additional costs include adminis-
trative costs (building permits etc.), financial costs (the risk associated with a larger
investment cost), and technical costs (duration and technical difficulty of the works),
which may introduce more convexity in the real cost curve. Another complementary
explanation if a preference for detached housing, which would transcribe in our cali-
bration as a lower cost for low-density buildings construction.
5.3.3 Cost of time
In the model, rents (per surface unit) decrease when moving away from the center
of Paris because households have to pay a generalized transportation cost, which is
the sum of a perceived monetary cost (interpreted here as the cost of fuel) and of the
cost associated with transport time, assuming that households do a round-trip per day
towards the center of Paris. In the simulation, cost associated with transport time repre-
sents generally the bigger part of generalized cost, and the way we assess this cost has
an important role in our results.
Numerous studies have dealt with this issue, but no conclusive result exists on this
complex subject. In Ile-de-France, French Government’s Strategic Analysis Center pro-
posed to use net hourly wage as an estimate for commuting time cost, but explained
that the value of actual commuting time cost depends greatly on several factors such as
households characteristics or modal choice (Boiteux and Baumstark, 2001).
Due to the importance of time cost choice in the simulation, we calibrated time
cost instead of using an a priori fixed value. We computed this cost using our data
on rent spatial distribution : out of these data, assuming our model perfectly exact, it
is indeed possible to estimate a theoretical generalized transportation cost. Assuming
that this generalized cost reflects the sum of the direct cost of transport and of the
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FIGURE 5.5 – Transport time cost as a function of journey time.
cost associated with transport time, and assuming that households do a round-trip per
day towards the center of Paris, the transport time cost was estimated as a function of
journey time.
Marginal time cost seems to decrease with travel time, and we chose to model
simply this decrease using a piecewise affine function. This representation leads us to
use a cost time worth 105% of the net hourly wage when the travel time is less than 25
min (or, equivalently, when the distance to the center of Paris is less than 15 km), then
a very low cost (6.6% of the net hourly wage) for portions of journey in excess of this
limit. The value of time for journeys during less than 25 min is therefore very close
to commuting time cost in Ile-de-France according to French Government’s Strategic
Analysis Center.
This observed decrease in marginal time cost can be attributed to the limits of our
approach, in particular to the monocentric framework and to the hypothesis that hou-
seholds do a round-trip per day towards the center of Paris. In the real world, in places
where travel time exceeds 25 minutes, a large fraction of households do not commute to
the center of Paris. This leads to a shorter average trip length than in the mono-centric
case, and using actual average trip length would enable to use more realistic time cost
values and smaller total fuel costs for locations far from Paris city center. In absence
of needed data, we did not take into account explicitly this variation in trip length, and
modeled it with a non-linear time cost.
5.4 Analysis of the simulations
5.4.1 Urbanized surface
As can be seen on Sup. Fig. 5.6, the model reproduces well Paris urban area general
shape. The main mismatch is in the north of Paris, near Charles-De-Gaulle airport : in
model simulations, this area is urbanized, whereas in reality it is not. This can be partly
explained by the airport noise zone, which limits city expansion, and which is not taken
into account by the model. The same phenomenon can be observed near Orly airport,
in the south of the urban area. Conversely, in the west (Mantes la Jolie) and in the
south of the urban area (Melun), the model does not capture observed urbanized areas.
These two zones correspond to cities which were built long before being included in
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FIGURE 5.6 – Simulated urbanized area in 2006. Actual urban area appears in black (Source: Corinne Land
Cover), whereas model simulation appears in transparent green.
Paris urban area, whereas the model only represents built areas due to Paris urban area
sprawl.
5.4.2 City structure
As shown in Fig. 5.7(a), the model describes the distribution of rents across the city
in 2008 quite satisfactorily. In two dimensions, the model explains 51.8% of the va-
riance in rents. When all areas at a given distance from the center are averaged, the
model explains 89.5% of the uni-dimensional variance. Indeed, doing so cancels out
other characteristics of the area (e.g., amenities, quality of public services), and the
proximity from city center is the major driver of housing prices. Figures 5.9 shows the
comparison between model results and rent data on a map. A broad pattern emerges :
the model appears to under-evaluate rents in rich districts, and to over-evaluate them in
poor districts : introducing several household classes would enable to investigate more
into this discrepancy.
Figure 5.7(b) shows that there is also a good agreement between the model and
data in terms of population density. The model explains 77.2% of the two-dimensional
variance in population density, and 95.9% of the uni-dimensional variance. Fig. 5.10
shows these comparisons on a map : the model appears to over-evaluate population
density far from public transport axes, until a certain distance after which it under-
evaluates it. This may be a limitation due to the monocentric assumption : there are
people everywhere over the territory, even outside Paris urban area, whereas the model
only simulates population strongly linked to Paris city center.
Similarly, Fig. 5.8(a) shows a reasonable agreement in terms of dwelling size, even
though we have little data on this aspect and the curve representing “interpolation of
INSEE data" should be considered carefully.
Figure 5.8(b) compares the ratio between inhabited surface and ground surface de-
dicated to housing as calculated by our model and as computed from our data on po-
pulation density and on accommodation sizes. The curve representing model results
grows when moving towards the center of Paris, and saturates at a ratio of 2, driven by
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land-use constraints in Paris downtown. This value may seem low as most buildings in
Paris have approximately 6 floors, which would induce a ratio of about 6 at the cen-
ter of Paris. However, our ratio is only taking into account housing surface, and not
the total built surface, and the discrepancy is simply caused by built surface intended
for purposes other than housing (it includes, on the one hand, corridors and lobbies
in buildings dedicated to housing and, on the other hand, all buildings not dedicated
to housing : offices, shops, museums, train stations, office buildings, schools, univer-
sities, etc.). As we had little data on accommodation sizes, the data points should be
considered more as orders of magnitude than as a specific value.
Model and data seem to match well on the urban area scale, even if local differences
can be large, due to the lack of several locally important mechanisms (e.g., public
services supply and local amenities).
5.4.3 Sensitivity analysis
We are well aware of the limits of our model, a very simplified vision of reality, and
of the limits of our calibration. To estimate the robustness of our model, a systematic
analysis of the sensitivity of different outputs to different inputs has been carried out.
Tab. 5.3 summarizes the elasticities of model output with respect to model inputs.
Apart from those relating to construction costs, all these percentages are close to
0.5% or 1%, which means that numerical uncertainty on urban shape caused by a
change in our parameters is equivalent to the uncertainty on the variation of our pa-
rameters. There is no parameter for which a small uncertainty can translate into a large
uncertainty in model result, which is comforting and suggest that our model results are
rather robust.
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(a) Rents (Data source : CLAMEUR). The model explains 55.1% of the two-
dimensional variance of the data.
(b) Population density (Data source : INSEE). The model explains 74.7% of the two-
dimensional variance of the data.
FIGURE 5.7 – Rents and population density computed by the model (green area) and from data. Dots
represent data for individual localities. The dotted line represents the average value of data at a given distance
from Paris center.
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(a) Dwelling size in 2006 (Data source : INSEE and IAU).
(b) Housing surface over ground surface ratio, computed by the model (plain line) and
from data (dots). The dotted line represents the average value at a given distance from
Paris center.
FIGURE 5.8 – Dwelling size and housing surface over ground surface ratio, computed by the model (green
area) and from data. The dotted line represents the average value of data at a given distance from Paris center.
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FIGURE 5.9 – Difference between simulated rents and actual ones.
FIGURE 5.10 – Difference between simulated densities and actual ones.
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Popula-
tion
Income
ratio ground
surface de-
cicated to
housing/total
ground sur-
face
Rent
deter-
mining
city
border
Fuel
price
Time
cost
near
Paris
Duration
of the
journey
when
time cost
changes
Time
cost far
from
Paris
Coefficient
A in
construc-
tion costs
function
Coefficient
b in
construc-
tion costs
function
Coef-
ficient β
in utility
function
Built
capital
depre-
ciation
time
Interest
rate
Rent in the cen-
ter
0.10 0.90 -0.10 0.74 0.10 0.11 0.38 0.05 -0.26 -1.24 -0.50 0.04 0.13
Average rent 0.01 0.90 -0.01 0.94 0.11 -0.27 0.46 0.06 -0.09 -0.26 -0.31 0.01 0.04
Dwelling size
in the center
-0.10 0.10 0.10 -0.74 -0.10 -0.11 -0.38 -0.05 0.26 1.24 1.50 -0.04 -0.13
Average ac-
commodation
size
-0.04 0.11 0.04 -0.88 -0.10 0.14 -0.40 -0.06 0.13 0.51 1.18 -0.02 -0.06
Density in the
center
0.10 -0.10 -0.10 0.74 0.10 0.11 0.38 0.05 -0.26 -1.24 -1.50 0.04 0.13
Average dis-
tance to city
center
0.43 0.46 -0.43 -1.06 -0.46 1.02 -1.59 -0.26 -0.99 -5.60 1.49 0.14 0.49
Average
construc-
tion cost per
sqm
0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.56 -21.79 0.00 0.00 0.00
TABLE 5.3 – Sensitivity analysis. Elasticities of model outputs with respect to model inputs : in each cell is written the percentage of change of the quantity of y-axis when the quantity of
x-axis varies by 1%.
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5.5 Calibration on London
Results suggest a satisfying correspondence between model results and data points,
prompting us to believe that the model is able to represent the main determinants of the
urban structure. A rigorous validation will however be only possible by calibrating the
model on several cities with different characteristics. This Section presents a calibra-
tion on London metropolitan area, and Section 5.6 preliminary tests on other French
cities.
5.5.1 Approximations and hypotheses
In our simulations, we make several simplifying assumptions. They are similar to the
assumptions which are made when the model is applied to Paris urban area (Section
5.1.2).
First, we suppose that there exists a unique city center, in the geographical center of
London, in which all jobs are supposed to be located. Indeed, like in Paris, real estate
prices and population density reach a peak at a point that corresponds to the center
of London and decrease on a regular basis when one moves away (Fig. 5.11(a) and
5.11(b)).
Second, the city structure must be freely driven by market forces. We explicitly
introduce urban constraints in the model, in the form of a limited building height in
London. Like in Paris, we also exclude social housing from our field of study, because
it is strongly regulated and do not follow market forces.
For the sake of simplification, we also assume that all households have the same
size and the same income.
5.5.2 Data and model calibration
As all input data were not available, some input coefficients had to be calibrated, i.e.
their value was optimized in a realistic range to make model simulation as close as
possible to reality. Table 5.4 lists input data and Tab. 5.5 calibrated parameters.
Urban area population The total population of the urban area is a critical input of
our simulations: this population should encompass all people who commute to Lon-
don. The best approximation I found was given by European Community’s ESPON
project16: 13,709,000 people.
Transport We used public transport times computed by Alistair Ford in Newcastle
University, taking into account long-distance suburban trains but not underground net-
work (Fig. 5.12)17, and private car travel times assessed using Google Map © online
tool.
I used French private car travel costs (per km) as a proxy of English ones. As a
proxy of public transport costs, I used 50% of private car travel costs (per km). I added
to private car travel costs a daily £ 10 congestion charge. I added a uniform 15 minutes
parking time to private car travel, a 10 minutes waiting time to travels by walking only,
16http://www.espon.eu/main/Menu_Projects/Menu_ESPON2006Projects/Menu_
StudiesScientificSupportProjects/urbanfunctions.html
17This is due to data availability. At the time of the redaction of this document, subway transport times
were in process and could not be used in our analysis.
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(a) Median house price as a function of distance.
(b) Population density as a function of distance
Figure 5.11: House price and population density in Greater London.
Input data Value Source/Comments
Urban area population 13,709,000 people EPSON, cf. below
Household size 2.3 people per household UK statistics
Fraction of urbanized
ground surface devoted to
62% Value used for Paris urban
area
housing
Households income 21,259 £ UK statistics*
Transport times and costs in
London
cf. below Cf. below
urban area
Cost associated with travel
time
Non constant cost, Section
5.3.3
Value used for Paris urban
area
Building capital cost δ = 5% Value used for Paris urban
area
Built capital depreciation
rate
ρ = 0.5% Value used for Paris urban
area
Urbanism constraints cf . above Cf. below
* Median gross household income: 26,910 £ per year. In London, the average disposable
income/gross income ratio is 79%, so in our simulations we use 21,259 £ as disposable
median income. (Source: UK statistics)
Table 5.4: Summary of input data
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Calibrated parameters Value Source/Comments
Share of household income
devoted to housing expenses
(parameter β in utility func-
tion)
50% Seems high, but reasonable
Coefficients of construction
cost function
A=83,242 and b=0.1024 Quite different from the val-
ues used for Paris urban area
(A=2.0140 and a=0.64)
Rent determining city border 1.9604 £/m2/month Much lower than the value
used for Paris urban area
(12e/m2/month)
Price-to-rent ratio 66.6667
Number of commuting trips
per household per day
1.5723
Parking time and waiting
time
15 minutes for private car,
40 minutes for public trans-
port and 10 minutes for
walking
Maximum floor-area ratio 0.5 Much lower than the value
used for Paris urban area
(which was 2)
Table 5.5: Summary of calibration parameters
and a 40 minutes waiting time to public transport travels. This last figure seems large,
but was chosen to reflect also the walking time between the final public transport station
and the employment location.
Land use and urbanism constraints Urban development is not possible everywhere:
due to physical constraints or regulations, some places cannot be urbanized. As in
Paris, we use existing activity zones (airports, ports and railways), forests, parks and
water surfaces are a proxy of places where city development was forbidden or impos-
sible. On the contrary, we considered that agricultural land was not a constraint on city
development (cf. Appendix 5.A).
Since 1938, London is surrounded by the Metropolitan Green Belt, where building
is strictly controlled. This green belt is not fully taken into account by previous con-
straint, as it encompasses both forests and agricultural land18. I designed and used a
rough approximation of the green belt area (Fig. 5.13) and I supposed that building
was forbidden in this zone too.
Finally, we used 62% as the maximum fraction of housing surface over total ground
surface in places where city development is possible. This value is the floor to ground
surface ratio in the center of Paris (cf Section 5.2.1); we used the same value for Lon-
don.
5.5.3 Simulation results
As shown in Fig. 5.14, the model describes the distribution of housing prices across the
city in 2009 quite satisfactorily, when all locations at the same distance from city center
18For instance, the Green Belt does not clearly appear on Fig. 5.23(b) in Appendix 5.A
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Figure 5.12: Public transport times used in the simulation.
Figure 5.13: Approximation of the Metropolitan Green Belt.
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Figure 5.14: Comparison between some data and model simulation. Data source: UK statistics.
are averaged. Doing so cancels out other characteristics of the area (e.g., amenities,
quality of public services), and the proximity from city center is the major driver of
housing prices. There is also a good agreement between the model and data in terms
of population density. Similarly, Fig. 5.14 shows a reasonable agreement in terms of
dwelling size, even though we have little data on this aspect and the curve representing
the data should be considered carefully.
Model and data seem to match well on the urban area scale, even if local differences
can be large, due to the lack of several locally important mechanisms (e.g., public
services supply and local amenities).
Figure 5.16 presents spatially the difference between simulated population density
and actual one. No clear pattern emerges.
In some places, the model highly over evaluates population density. This can be
explained by several factors. First, in the simulations, there is no competition between
households and firms for land use, leading to a high population density in the City,
whereas in reality firms use most of available space there. Second, public transport
times we used in our simulations do not take subway into account, leading to reduced
differences between places with high subway accessibility and places with low subway
accessibility. This could explain the population density over evaluation in Thamesmead
East, which is not very populated because it is difficultly reached by subway, whereas
adjacent neighborhoods are not.
Figure 5.16 presents spatially the difference between simulated housing prices and
actual ones. The model tends to over evaluate housing prices in poor districts and
to under evaluate them in rich districts: as shown in Fig. 5.17, there is a correlation
between this difference and district average income, showing the importance of devel-
oping the model to take into account household heterogeneity (see the Conclusion of
this document).
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Figure 5.15: Difference between simulated density and actual one.
Figure 5.16: Difference between simulated house prices and actual house prices.
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Figure 5.17: Correlation between the difference between simulated house prices and actual house prices, and
average weekly income.
Urbanized area As can be seen on Fig. 5.18, the model reproduces well London
urban area general shape. The main mismatch is close to the border of the greenbelt,
in the north and in the east of the city: in model simulations, this area is urbanized,
whereas in reality it is not. Conversely, in several places located close to the green belt
border, the model does not capture observed urbanized areas.
Places where the model falsely predicts urbanization are not very well connected to
public transport, whereas actual urbanized places tend to be close to train stations: the
discrepancy can be explained by the fact that in the simulations long distance public
transport costs are too high compared to private car transport costs, leading to city
extension in places difficult to reach in public transport, but easy to reach with a private
car.
In many urbanized places outside the Green Belt but close to London, like for in-
stance Luton, the model does not predict urbanization. This is related to the broader
issue of London metropolitan area limit: in EPSON study, these places were not in-
cluded in London metropolitan area. Figure 5.19 shows a map of a simulation with a
population increased by 25%: in this case, most of Luton is urbanized.
5.6 Calibration on other French cities
To assess to what extent our modeling is valid, we used the model to simulate the 30
biggest French urban areas. Results are shown on Fig. 5.20, 5.21 and 5.22. These are
rough estimates, computed using same transport times, costs and land-use constraints
as in Paris urban areas. Only urban areas populations, average income and rent deter-
mining city border19 were varied. Rents data come from CLAMEUR database, and, for
each municipality, population densities are computed as the total population (source:
INSEE) divided by the total area of the municipality, including water areas, forests
parks etc. (Source: IGN).
Agreement between model and data is good for several cities (Paris, Lyon, Clermont-
Ferrand, Genoble, Rouen, Nancy, Tours, Caen, Orleans, Angers, Dijon, Le Havre) and
weak for several others (Saint-Etienne, Metz, Douai, Nice, Nantes, Toulon). However,
order of magnitude appears to be correct most of the times.
19Rent determining city border was set equal to the lowest rent inside a circle with a 50km radius, and
with its center on the geographical center of the city.
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Figure 5.18: Simulated urbanized area in 2000. Actual urban area appears in black (Source: Corinne Land
Cover), whereas model simulation appears in transparent green.
Figure 5.19: Simulated urbanized area in 2000, with 25% more inhabitants than in EPSON study. Actual
urban area appears in black (Source: Corinne Land Cover), whereas model simulation appears in transparent
green.
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A more detailed study, taking into account local transport networks, land-use con-
straints (e.g. the sea for coastal cities) and city characteristics (e.g. the strong poly-
centrism of several cities, or the important role played by amenities in coastal cities) is
required to refine this analysis, which nevertheless confirms the ability of the model to
represent the major mechanisms of urban economics.
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Figure 5.20: Rents and population density for 30 French cities (1/3). Blue point are actual data (Source for
rents: CLAMEUR. Source for population densities: INSEE and IGN) and green curve model results. Data
points have to be understood as averages over a whole metropolitan area, which can in some cases be large.
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Figure 5.21: Rents and population density for 30 French cities (2/3). Blue point are actual data (Source for
rents: CLAMEUR. Source for population densities: INSEE and IGN) and green curve model results. Data
points have to be understood as averages over a whole metropolitan area, which can in some cases be large.
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Figure 5.22: Rents and population density for 30 French cities (3/3). Blue point are actual data (Source for
rents: CLAMEUR. Source for population densities: INSEE and IGN) and green curve model results. Data
points have to be understood as averages over a whole metropolitan area, which can in some cases be large.
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Appendix 5.A Restricted Land
Restricted land is computed after actual land-use, and is used as a constraint of simu-
lations. We used Corine Land Cover 2006 data (cf. Tab. 5.6 and resulting Fig. 5.23(a)
and 5.23(b)).
Free Restricted Code clc Label
Free
111 Continuous urban fabric
112 Discontinuous urban fabric
121 Industrial or commercial units
Activity (black)
122 Road and rail networks and associated land
123 Port areas
124 Airports
Free
131 Mineral extraction sites
132 Dump sites
133 Construction sites
Low vegetation
(light green)
141 Green urban areas
142 Sport and leisure facilities
Free
211 Non-irrigated arable land
212 Permanently irrigated land
213 Rice fields
221 Vineyards
222 Fruit trees and berry plantations
223 Olive groves
231 Pastures
241 Annual crops associated with permanent crops
242 Complex cultivation patterns
243 Land principally occupied by agriculture, with significant
areas of natural vegetation
244 Agro-forestry areas
Forest (dark green)
311 Broad-leaved forest
312 Coniferous forest
313 Mixed forest
Low vegetation
(light green)
321 Natural grasslands
322 Moors and heathland
323 Sclerophyllous vegetation
324 Transitional woodland-shrub
331 Beaches, dunes, sands
332 Bare rocks
333 Sparsely vegetated areas
334 Burnt areas
Water (blue)
335 Glaciers and perpetual snow
411 Inland marshes
412 Peat bogs
421 Salt marshes
422 Salines
423 Intertidal flats
511 Water courses
512 Water bodies
521 Coastal lagoons
522 Estuaries
523 Sea and ocean
Table 5.6: Summary of calibration parameters
111
(a) Map of restricted areas in Ile de France. Black areas are airports, Gennevilliers port
and railways. Source: Corine Land Cover 2006.
(b) Map of restricted areas in Greater London. Source: Corine Land Cover 2000.
Figure 5.23: Map of restricted areas in Ile de France and Greater London (legend: cf. Tab. 5.6).
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Chapter 6
A dynamical model to
understand city evolution
We can use the model we have presented in Chapter 5 to simulate a city in the past or in
the future, and to study its evolution. However, this model is computing an equilibrium,
an hypothesis which is questionable: when population, transport prices, or income
vary, housing infrastructure cannot adapt rapidly to changing conditions (Gusdorf et al.,
2008).
A first possibility is to separate built environment adjustment from rents and popu-
lation density adjustment. When analyzing a policy, since buildings adjust much more
slowly than rents, we can first compute what a pseudo-equilibrium state where build-
ings have not changed, but where rents and population density have adjusted (we call it
"medium-term"). This state will be different from the equilibrium state when buildings
have also been adjusted (we call it "long-term"). This approach, initiated by Gusdorf
and Hallegatte (2007a), enables to analyze some transitory effects created by the policy,
before equilibrium is reached, and Chapter 7 shows an example of such an analysis.
However, how much time is exactly involved in the definition of "medium-term"
and "long-term" remains unclear, and it is not possible to study the effect of a continu-
ous evolving variable such as transport prices evolution, or policy, such as a carbon tax
increasing over time. To address this issue, we have developed another model which
takes explicitly into account this dynamics and describes cities as non-equilibrium sys-
tems. It is based on the same philosophy as the macroeconomic model NEDyM (Halle-
gatte et al., 2007b): each equilibrium (e.g. housing supply equals demand) is replaced
by dynamic equations describing the adjustment process (e.g. rents increase when
housing demand exceeds supply).
Section 6.1 first presents this model, and Section 6.2 analyzes the simulation of
Paris urban area evolution, since 1900. Finally, Section 6.3 compares the simulation
made by the two models.
6.1 NEDUM-2D
6.1.1 Principle of the model
NEDUM-2D (Non-Equilibrium Dynamic Urban Model) has been designed to cap-
ture the dynamics of urban systems, and the importance of inertia, while relying on
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the mechanisms of urban economics. It is based on the model "NEDUM" devel-
oped in CIRED by François Gusdorf and Stéphane Hallegatte (Gusdorf and Hallegatte,
2007a,b; Gusdorf et al., 2008), but differs on several important aspects, especially be-
cause it had to be able to take into account the effect of a global change in income or
population. It also had to be able to describe an actual city, and be coherent with our
calibration in Chapter 5.
This model describes the evolution of 4 state variables (defined everywhere in the
city): population density, dwelling size, rents and floor-area ratio. the evolution of each
of these variables is described by a differential equation, with its own time constant.
All the other variables of the city (e.g. owner’s income, vacancy rate of dwellings etc.)
are computed at each time according to these 4 state variables: no other variable than
the 4 state variables evolves with its own inertia.
The logic behind the model is the following: at each time step, a "pseudo-equilibrium"
value is computed for the 4 state variables. This "pseudo-equilibrium" value is the value
toward which each state variable will evolve. It depends on the model input, but also
on the value of the state variables. Between this time-step and the following, state vari-
ables will evolve towards their "pseudo-equilibrium" value (each state variable has its
own inertia, and they may not converge at the same speed). At the following time step,
new "pseudo-equilibrium" values are computed. They can be identical to the last ones,
or can be different because the value of the state variables has changed, or because
model inputs are different (e.g. the total population of the city has changed). State
variables will now evolve towards these new "pseudo-equilibrium" values etc.
Pseudo-equilibrium values are computed such that, if model inputs do not evolve
any more, state variables converge towards the actual equilibrium values.
6.1.2 brief presentation of NEDUM-2D
Here is a brief presentation of the model mechanism. A complete description with the
full set of equations, is available in Appendix 6.A.
6.1.2.1 Households behavior
We assume that households earn an income Y , and choose their housing consumption
and location depending on the rents R(r), as described hereafter:
• Households living at location r adjust their housing service consumption per
capita q so as to increase their utility level u(r)=U(z(r),q(r)) (Appendix 6.A.1):
taking rent level R(r) as given, households increase or decrease the size of their
flats so as to maximize their utility (Appendix 6.A.2). Adjustment in housing
service consumption per capita is also attained through changes in the size and
composition of households, for example through changes in collocation prac-
tices, or changes in the age at which children leave their parents’ home.
• Households can change locations: the ones living at location r may choose to
stay or move to another location (Appendix 6.A.3). We assume they are willing
to move when their local utility level u(r) is under the average utility level u¯
throughout the city: households living at locations where u(r) ≤ u¯ source are
attracted to places where u(r)≥ u¯.
Of course, the processes considered here are active in parallel: changes in flat sizes oc-
cur simultaneously with location changes, when households leave one flat to another.
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The changes are physically constrained by the characteristics of housing service sup-
ply: households can move only if there are unoccupied flats at their target location;
they can increase their flat size only if there is a local excess of housing service supply.
Moves of households and changes in flat sizes cannot happen instantaneously, for
instance because it takes previous "time" to find a new place to live. The respective
inertias of these mechanisms are accounted for by specific characteristics timescales τq
and τn (see Eqs. 6.5 and 6.9). The intensity of these mechanisms depends in each case
on the increase in utility level that households expect from these evolutions: the higher
is the relative difference between u(r) and u¯ source for instance, the more households
are willing to move to location r.
6.1.2.2 Rent curve dynamics
Rent level R(r) evolves in reaction to local supply and demand of housing service H(r)
(Appendix 6.A.4): demand is expressed by the number of householdsn(r) living at
this location and consuming an amount of housing service q(r), and by the number of
households willing to move to or from this location:
• Rent level decreases if demand is lower than local supply, that is, if existing
buildings are not fully occupied.
• If buildings at location r are fully occupied, rent levels increase if inhabitants
want to increase their consumption of housing service, or if there are outside
households willing to move to this location.
The orders of magnitude of these evolutions are determined by the relative difference
between local demand and supply of housing service. Moreover, we assume that, for
institutional reasons, housing rents do not clear the housing market instantaneously.
The inertia of rent levels evolution is characterized in the model by the timescale τR.
6.1.2.3 Housing production
Buildings depreciate in urban systems, and are renewed or rebuilt by developers in
reaction to rental profitability. We suppose that half of them have a myopic behavior
(they make investment decisions as if they were at a stationary state of equilibrium), and
that the others make anticipations, and compares rents to rents that households would
pay in an equilibrium state where all would have the same utility u¯. Since construction
takes time, financial investments are transformed into buildings with a time lag τH (see
Eq. 6.26).
6.2 Calibration on Paris urban area
It is possible to calibrate this model on a city: this lead to some specific issues, coming
from data availability, from some theoretical questions, as well as from some technical
issues due to the structure of NEDUM-2D.
6.2.1 Data and calibration
To calibrate this model, we need same data as in Chapter 5, but over a wide time-period
instead of at a single moment in time. We also need to calibrate time constants, which
is particularly difficult. All data used in the simulations are summed up Tab. 6.1.
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To compute generalized transport prices, we used data about walking times, actual
transport times and prices in public transport (underground, regional trains and sub-
urban trains) and private transport (during rush hours, for an average car). At each
location, the generalized transport cost is computed for each transport mode, and a
logit weighting is used to compute the modal shares.1 In the simulations, changes in
public and private transport prices lead therefore to modal shifts.
We suppose in the simulations that construction costs and value of time evolve,
over time, proportionally to households average income. This a strong hypothesis,
with important implications on model results (cf. Chapter 8).
Concerning the cost of time, our hypothesis is coherent with the relevant literature
(see for instance Zamparini and Reggiani, 2007). However, it should be noted that tech-
nological innovations that make travel more comfortable reduce the cost of time (i.e.
the monetary equivalent of spending one minute in traveling, expressed as a fraction of
the hourly net wage). Therefore, a constant trend towards more comfortable means of
transport would result in a cost of time increasing less than proportionally to income.
Empirical studies have captured this phenomenon (Shires and de Jong, 2009). Here,
we neglect this phenomenon (cf. Chapter 8 for a discussion of the consequences).
It proves difficult to find analyses of long term evolution of construction costs over
time. To the authors’ knowledge, no data exist in the relevant literature. If construc-
tion price indexes are measured in many countries, they are generally measured for
constant-quality dwelling, and do not take into account the evolution of preferences
and construction norms. It is therefore difficult to assess how construction costs have
evolved in the past. We suppose that these costs evolve proportionally to households
income.
6.2.2 Calibration
Table 6.2 present the numerical coefficients we used in our simulations. In absence
of adequate data for some parameters, for instance the cost of time and construction
costs, these parameters have been calibrated on the Paris structure in 2008 (Viguié and
Hallegatte, 2011).
The calibration of parameters τH , τn, τR and τq is particularly difficult. In this
analysis, we assume that the timescale of population density and rents evolution is 3
year, whereas for dwelling size evolution it is 20 years. We also assume that building
construction takes approximately 2 years. We have therefore chosen τR = τn = 3 years,
τq = 20 years and τH = 2 years.
Similarly, it is difficult to assess the depreciation rate τdH of Paris buildings. We
use here a depreciation timescale of 100 years (consistent with Wilhelmsson (2008),
for instance).
Considering the uncertainty in these parameters, we carried out a sensitivity analy-
sis, varying each parameter independently, or simultaneously. We found that the qual-
itative results and order of magnitude presented in this paper are unchanged within a
broad range of values (e.g., from 1 month to 20 years for τH , τn and τR, from 1 month
to 100 years for τq , and from 50 to 200 years for τdH ).
We have chosen 1.5 as the value of the maximum floor-area ratio in the center
of Paris. This value may seem low as most buildings in Paris have approximately 6
floors, which would induce a ratio of about 6 at the center of Paris. However, our ratio
1More rigorously, at each location, the logit weighting is computed on each price divided by the minimum
price at this location.
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Input data
Urban area population French census figures for Paris urban area
until 2008 and demographic scenario for
2009-2100 (Section 8.1.2).
Households average income Households disposable income (Source: IN-
SEE and J. Friggit) until 2008 and techno-
economic scenario for 2009-2100 (Section
8.1.1).
Fraction of ground surface devoted to hous-
ing
Source: Corine Land Cover and airport noise
zones (Source: IAU). In places where build-
ing is possible, the maximum fraction of
ground surface devoted to housing is 62%
Maximum floor-area ratio in the center of
Paris
1.5 (cf. Section 6.2.2)
Transport times in Paris urban area Data used in Rouchaud and Sauvant, 2004
Public and private transport prices Data used in Nadaud and Hourcade, 2009
until 2008 and techno-economic scenario for
2009-2100 (Section 8.1.1). We only deal
here with perceived travel cost, and not with
real travel cost which would also include ve-
hicle amortization.
Interest rate δ = 5%
Built capital depreciation time τdH = 100 years
Dwelling size evolution time constant τq = 20 years
Rent evolution time constant τR = 3 years
Population density evolution time constant τn = 3 years
Housing stock evolution time constant τH = 2 years
Table 6.1: Summary of main input data
Calibrated parameters
Households utility function parameter (6.A) α = 0.7
Coefficients of construction cost function
(6.A)
A = 2.0140 and a = 0.36 in 2008 (6.2.1).
Coefficient A evolves proportionally to
(income)−(1−a)
Cost associated with travel time cf. 6.2.1 and 5.3.3
Rent determining city border R0 = 12e/m2 in 2008, and evolution pro-
portional to income.
Logit factor used to compare different trans-
port modes at each location
f actor = 4
Table 6.2: Summary of calibration parameters
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(a) 1900 (b) 1964
(c) 1983 (d) 2006
Figure 6.1: Simulated urbanized area compared to actual urbanized area. Actual urban area appears in black
(Source: Corinne Land Cover and IAU), whereas model simulation appears in transparent green.
is only taking into account housing surface, and not the total built surface, and the
discrepancy is simply caused by built surface intended for purposes other than housing
(it includes, on the one hand, corridors and lobbies in buildings dedicated to housing
and, on the other hand, all buildings not dedicated to housing: offices, shops, museums,
train stations, office buildings, schools, universities, etc.).
6.2.3 Analysis of the simulations
6.2.3.1 Urban area evolution
As can be seen on Fig. 6.1(d), the model reproduces well the current Paris urban area.
The main mismatch is in the west (Mantes la Jolie) and in the south of the urban area
(Melun), where the model does not capture observed urbanized areas. These two zones
correspond to cities which were built long before being included in Paris urban area,
and are important employment centers on their own, whereas the model only represents
built areas due to Paris urban area sprawl.
Contrary to simulation presented in 5.4.1, airport noise zone (source: IAU) have
been taken into account: building is possible in these zones until 1985. After this year,
new constructions are forbidden, but existing buildings remain in place.
It is possible to use this model to simulate city evolution from 1900 to 2008. For
instance, Fig. 6.1(a), Fig. 6.1(b) and Fig. 6.1(c) compare simulated urban area with
actual urbanized area, in 1900, 1964 and 1982, respectively. Because of the lack of
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data, we used the same transport network as in 2008 to do these three simulations, and
the description of the city in 1900 is not as good as for the following years2. However,
large-scale trends between 1900 and 2008 are well described, suggesting that the model
captures the main determinants of city shape evolution.
6.2.3.2 Internal city structure
The urban structure in dynamical simulations appears to be very close to the urban
structure computed with the equilibrium model (Section 5.4.2). Indded, since Paris
urban area has a regularly growing population, it is never very far from its equilibrium
state (i.e. the state simulated when the input parameters are held constant). A cali-
bration on a shrinking city, with a decreasing population, would therefore be of great
interest (cf. the conclusion of this document).
As shown in Fig. 6.2(a) the model describes the distribution of rents across the city
in 2008 satisfactorily. In two dimensions, the model explains 51.8% of the variance in
rents. When all areas at a given distance from the center are averaged, the odel explains
89.5% of the uni-dimensional variance. Figure 6.2(b) shows that there is also a good
agreement between the model and data in terms of population density. The model
explains 77.2% of the two-dimensional variance in population density, and 95.9% of
the uni-dimensional variance. Similarly, Fig. 6.3(a) shows a reasonable agreement in
terms of dwelling size, even though we have little data on this aspect. Finally, Fig.
6.3(b) shows that this agreement holds over time, at least since the 1980’s.
Model and data seem to match well on the urban area scale, even if local differences
can be large, due to the lack of several locally-important characteristics (e.g., public
services supply and local amenities), like for the static model.
6.2.3.3 Transport
Data on past transport times and costs are difficult to find, and we therefore had to
use rough estimates for transport before the 1960’s. As can be seen on Fig. 6.4, after
1960, simulated average daily commuting transport time is close 1.1 hour, i.e. Zahavi’s
estimate (cf. Section 4.1.1.2 in Chapter 4). Before 1960, commuting time is much
higher, because in our simulations, a large fraction of commuters walks to go to work,
due to the high price of private car and subway transport. We have not included in
our model bus and tramway networks, which were of great importance at that time:
including these two transport means would enable to get more realistic results.
Simulated value for present-day public transport modal share is very close to actual
one (cf. Fig. 6.5). We have found no reliable value for past modal shares, but it can be
expected that, as for transport times, results before the 1960’s could be improved by a
better description of past transport networks.
Finally, Fig. 6.6 shows the evolution of average home-work distance in Île de
France. Our simulation overestimates this distance (by roughly 15%), but order of
magnitude and evolution tendency seem right.
6.2.3.4 Rents and real estate prices
Figure 6.7 shows the simulated evolution of rents in Île-de-France compared to na-
tional rent evolution index, both divided by income evolution. Our simulation does not
2For instance, bus and tramway networks are not modeled, whereas they were of great importance at the
beginning of the 20th century.
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(a) Rents (Data source: CLAMEUR). The model explains 42.2% of the variance of the
data.
(b) Population density (Data source: INSEE). The model explains 67.4% of the variance
of the data.
Figure 6.2: Rents and population density computed by the model (plain line) and from data. Dots represent
data for individual localities. The dotted line represents the average value at a given distance from Paris
center.
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(a) Dwelling size in 2006 (Data source: INSEE and IAU)
(b) Dwelling size Evolution (Data source: INSEE and IAU).
Figure 6.3: Dwelling size computed by the model (plain line) and from data.
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Figure 6.4: Average daily commuting transport time, to be compared to Zahavi’s estimate (1.1 hour).
Figure 6.5: Public transport modal share for commuting trips. Actual data for 2002 is 46.63 % (Source:
DREIF).
Figure 6.6: Average home-work distance in Île de France. Source of historic data: INSEE, figure computed
after population census data.
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Figure 6.7: French rent index divided by income per household. Source of historic data: J. Friggit, after rent
component of the consumer price index, INSEE.
Figure 6.8: Home price index divided by income per household, in Paris. Source of historic data: J. Friggit,
after Notaires-INSEE French existing-home price index.
reproduces the oscillations of this ratio, but the overall tendency of to remain close to
1 is captured.
Figure 6.8 presents a similar comparison using real estate prices in Paris, instead
of rents level. Simulated "real-estate index" has been computed by dividing simulated
rents by historical long-term interest-rates (Source: J. Friggit)3. Here, again, model
does not reproduces historical oscillations, but evolution tendencies are correct. It
should be noted that before 1950, rents in France were largely constrained and not
market driven. The apparent good coherence between model simulation and real estate
prices evolutions before 1950 should therefore be considered with caution.
3All data provided by J. Friggit can be freely downloaded on http://www.cgedd.
developpement-durable.gouv.fr/home-prices-in-france-1200-2011-r137.
html.
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6.3 Conclusion
As explained in Chapter 3, prospective studies that explore various possible future
evolutions of cities are required to design the best climate policies. City scenarios
designed to support urban planning do exist, but these scenarios are not connected to
global scenarios, in which global environmental change can be represented. Moreover,
they usually consider time horizons of 30 years or less (cf. for instance Lefèvre, 2009,
or studies listed in Haase and Schwarz, 2009; a noticeable exception is Solecki and
Oliveri, 2004).
Using, as far as possible, only the most fundamental economic principles, which
remain valid over the long term, our NEDUM-2D model appears to be able to repro-
duce the main tendencies of past Paris urban area evolution, suggesting that this tool
can be used to simulate such long-term scenarios: such an exercise will be carried out
in Chapter 8. This model also remains tractable and coherent with requirements of
Section 4.3 in Chapter 4.
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Appendix 6.A Equations of NEDUM-2D model
This appendix sets up the formal representation of the mechanisms described in Section
6.1.2.
6.A.1 Utility function
As in Viguié and Hallegatte, 2011, we model the household trade-off using the follow-
ing utility function:
U(r) = Z(r)αq(r)β (6.1)
where r is the location in the city, α and β are coefficients (α + β = 1), q(r) the
surface of the households’ dwelling and Z(r) the money remaining after the household
has paid its rent and a commuting round-trip per day to the center of Paris. The cost of
transportation includes the monetary cost of transportation and the cost associated with
the trip duration4. Such a functional form is consistent with the fact that the share of
households’ income devoted to housing expenditures is relatively constant (Davis and
Ortalo-Magne, 2010). Households’ income constraint reads:
Y = Z(r)+q(r) ·R(r)+T (r) (6.2)
where Y is household income and is constant (∀r,Y (r) =Y ), R(r) is the rent per square
meter, and T (r) transportation costs (monetary cost added with time cost).
6.A.2 Housing service per household
We assume that households permanently adapt their housing-service consumption to
prices so as to increase their utility level to prices. Given the location r, the amount
of composite goods consumed is strictly dependent on housing choices: Z(r) = Y −
T (r)−q(r) ·R(r). We have, therefore:
U(r) = [Y −T (r)−q(r) ·R(r)]α ·q(r)β (6.3)
Using this function, we consider that households can adjust their level of housing
service consumption so as to improve their utility level: taking rent level R(r) as given,
households increase or decrease the size of their flats so as to maximize their utility.
Adjustment in housing service consumption per capita can also include changes in
the size and composition of households, for example through changes in flat-sharing
practices, or changes in the age at which children leave their parents’ home.
A household maximizes its utility if and only if:
• Its share of income devoted to housing service is equal to β : q∗(r) · R(r) =
β (Y −T (r))
• Its share of income devoted to composite good is equal to α: Z∗(r) = α(Y −
T (r))
It is rational for the inhabitants to make their consumption of housing service tend to
q∗(r). Of course, an increase in housing consumption is authorized if and only if such
an increase is physically possible, i.e. if there is available housing at this location.
4We consider the cost associated with the trip duration as an actual loss of income.
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Changes in flat sizes cannot happen instantaneously, for instance because it takes
"time" to find a new place to live. The inertia of this mechanism is accounted for by
the timescale τq.
Let Ψ(r) be the number of unoccupied dwellings at each location:
Ψ(r) = H(r)−q(r) ·n(r) (6.4)
The dynamics of q(r) is given by:
dq(r)
dt
=
{
1
τq
(q∗(r)−q(r)) = 1τq
(
β (Y−T (r))
R(r) −q(r)
)
if Ψ(r)> 0 or q∗(r)< q(r)
0 if Ψ(r) = 0 and q∗(r)> q(r)
(6.5)
6.A.3 Moving throughout the city
Households can change locations: the ones living at location r may choose to stay or
move to another location. We assume they are willing to move when their local utility
level u(r) is under the average utility level u¯ throughout the city: households living at
locations where u(r)≤ u¯ source are attracted to places where u(r)≥ u¯.
Let w(r) be a weighting function5, which compares utility level u(r) to u¯. We can
define:
• if u(r)≤ u¯, m−(r) = w(r) ·n(r) is the number of households willing to leave
• if u(r)≥ u¯,m+(r) =w(r) ·Ψ(r) is the number of attractive unoccupied dwellings
We have now to take into account city population variation. We know at every time
step the population that the city should be POPexo , and the population in the simulated
city is POP. Let us define ∆ as the difference between the two populations: ∆ =
POPexo−POP . Let us suppose now that newcomers only choose to locate in areas
where utility is bigger than u¯: the total aggregated demand of dwellings is equal to:
D=
ˆ
u(r)<u¯
m−(r)dr+max(∆,0) (6.6)
and the aggregated supply of dwellings:
S=
ˆ
u(r)<u¯
m+(r)dr−min(∆,0) (6.7)
There is a priori no reason why the demand for moves should equal the supply
of available housing. The relationships giving the moves µ(r) meet these physical
constraints:
µ(r) =
{
m+(r) ·min(1,D/S) if u(r)> u
m−(r) ·min(1,S/D) if u(r)≤ u
(6.8)
As for changes in flat sizes, moves of households cannot happen instantaneously.
The inertia of this mechanism is accounted for by the timescale τn.
5We have chosen w(u) = 2pi arctan(α|
u−u¯
u¯ |) where α =
1
5% tan(
pi
2 .95%), so that w(u) ≥ 95% when the
difference between u and u¯ is bigger than 5% of u¯.
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The number of households living at location r evolves according to the moves:
dn(r)
dt
=
1
τn
µ(r) (6.9)
6.A.4 Rent curve dynamics
Rent level R(r) evolves in reaction to local supply and demand of housing service
H(r). Demand is expressed by the number of households n(r) living at this location
and consuming an amount of housing service q(r), and by the number of households
willing to move to or from this location:
• Rent level decreases if demand is lower than local supply, that is, if existing
buildings are not fully occupied.
• If buildings at location r are fully occupied, rent levels increase if inhabitants
want to increase their consumption of housing service, or if there are outside
households willing to move to this location.
The orders of magnitude of these evolutions are determined by the relative difference
between local demand and supply of housing service. Moreover, we assume that, for
institutional reasons6, housing rents do not clear the housing market instantaneously.
The inertia of rent levels evolution is characterized in the model by the timescale τR.
Landlords decrease their rents when all dwellings are not occupied, and increase
them when demand is bigger than dwelling supply. Let
n∗(r) = n(r)+max(µ(r),0)+nvirtual(r) (6.10)
be the number of households living or willing to leave at a certain location in the
city. It is the sum of the number of inhabitants living at this location n(r), the number of
households about to move to this locationmax(µ(r),0), and the number of households,
nvirtual(r), who would like to live in this location, but cannot because there are not
enough available dwellings.
Let us define the number of dwellings in the attractive locations by:
m+rent(r) =
{
w(r) · H(r)
q(r) when u(r)> u¯
0 when u(r)≤ u¯
(6.11)
and its aggregated sum over the whole city:
Srent =
ˆ
u(r)>u¯
m+rent(r)dr (6.12)
To calculate the pressure on the housing market, we have to distribute, over the
various locations, households who would like to move but cannot. We spread them
over all attractive locations, in proportion to the number of dwellings at each place, we
get:
nvirtual(r) = m
+
rent(r).max(1,
D−S
Srent
) (6.13)
and then:
6For instance in France, when there is no tenant change, rent can only change significantly every three
years.
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n∗(r) = n(r)+max(µ(r),0)+m+rent(r) ·max(1,
D−S
Srent
) (6.14)
n∗(r) can be different from the actual number of dwellings H(r)
q(r) . Anticipating that
rents have an impact on dwelling size q(r), but taking n∗(r) and H(r) as given, we can
compute the rent R∗(r) which adjusts dwelling size so that the number of dwellings
becomes equal to n∗(r):
R∗(r) = β
(Y −T (r))
H(r)
n∗(r) (6.15)
If a location is attractive, and more people want to live there, R∗(r) will be bigger
than R(r). On the contrary, if some dwellings are empty, R∗(r) will be lower than
R(r). We suppose that landowners vary their rents to set them equal to R∗(r), with the
timescale τR:
dR(r)
dt
=
R∗(r)−R(r)
τR
=
1
τR
(
β
(Y −T (r))
H(r)
n∗(r)−R(r)
)
(6.16)
6.A.5 Housing production function
Buildings depreciate, and are renewed or rebuilt by land owners in reaction to rental
profitability. We suppose that some of them have a myopic behavior: they make in-
vestment decisions as if they were at a stationary state of equilibrium, and that some
others make anticipations, and compares rents to rents that households would pay in an
equilibrium state where all locations would have the same utility u¯.
Housing H ′(r) is produced using land L′(r) and capital K′(r). The housing produc-
tion function reads, in a classic way (Muth, 1969; Thorsnes, 1997):
H ′(r) = AL′(r)aK′(r)b (6.17)
where A, a and b are coefficients (a+ b = 1), H ′(r) the housing surface built, L′(r)
the ground surface occupied by the buildings and K′(r) the financial capital used for
construction. The benefit of land owners reads therefore:
Π(r) = (R(r)−R0)H(r)
′−δK(r)′ (6.18)
Π(r) is the profit, δ represents the joined effect of real estate capital depreciation,
annual taxes payed by landowners on the real estate capital, and interest rate. Develop-
ers build to maximize their profit: at each point of the metropolitan area they construct,
i.e. choose K′(r), to maximize Π(r) under the constraint that H
′(r)
L′(r) ratio is limited by
an urbanism constraint (see detail in Section 5.1.2.2). The metropolitan area boundary
is defined by a rent R0, below which it is not profitable to build housing building (this
value corresponds both to other use of the land like agriculture and to the transaction
cost in the building and renting process).
As for the other equations that we have presented, let us reason per unit of land:
because a+b= 1, we get
H ′(r)
L′(r)
= A
(
K′(r)
L′(r)
)b
(6.19)
So if we define H(r) = H ′(r)/L′(r) and K(r) = K′(r)/L′(r), we have:
H(r) = A(K(r))b (6.20)
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Developers seek to maximize their profits. Some of them have a myopic behavior:
they make investment decisions as if they were at a stationary state of equilibrium. This
leads to the optimal capital:
K∗myopic(r) = argmax
K(r)
(H(r)R(r)−δK(r)) (6.21)
= argmax
K(r)
(A(K(r))bR(r)−δK(r)) (6.22)
Some city landowners make anticipations, and compares current rents to rents that
households would pay in an equilibrium state where all would have the same utility u¯:
Ranticipate(r) = α
α β β
(
Y −T (r)
u¯
) 1
β
(6.23)
This leads to the optimal capital:
K∗anticipate(r) = argmax
K(r)
(A(K(r))bRanticipate(r)−δK(r)) (6.24)
We suppose that half of the the land owners are myopic, and half make anticipa-
tions, which leads to an amount of capital:
K∗(r) =
K∗myopic(r)+K
∗
anticipate(r)
2
(6.25)
Let us define H∗(r) = A ·K∗(r)b the corresponding optimal housing quantity.
Construction and building depreciation take time. We suppose that financial in-
vestments are transformed into buildings with a time lag τH , which corresponds to the
time required to achieve the construction. We also suppose that a decrease in H(r) can
happen through depreciation only, with the timescale τdH . Housing quantity dynamics
is therefore given by:
dH(r)
dt
=
{
H∗(r)−H(r)
τH
= AK
∗(r)b−H(r)
τH
if H∗(r)≥ H(r)
−H(r)τdH
if H∗(r)< H(r)
(6.26)
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Chapter 7
The impact of a carbon tax on
Paris metropolitan area and its
population
This chapter is based on an article: "The impact of a carbon tax on Paris metropolitan
area and its population" (Viguié and Hallegatte, 2011).
After decades of urban sprawl, many voices advocate for a densification or re-
densification of cities. The usual arguments refer to reduced energy consumption,
based for instance on the hardly-consensual results from Newman and Kenworthy
(Newman and Kenworthy, 1989), and to improved health (see for instance Ewing et al.,
2003; Eid et al., 2008) and quality of life (see for instance Brueckner and Largey, 2008).
Here, we do not enter the debate surrounding the need or benefits from densification
(on this debate, see Gordon and Richardson, 1997; Ewing, 1997). Instead of investigat-
ing why we should increase urban density, we focus on how to increase urban density
and how much it would cost, assuming there is a political will to do so. A prerequisite
to design density-increase policies is indeed to understand the cause of observed urban
sprawl, and to explore various policy tools to curb it.
Different economic policy tools were shown to have a possible impact on urban
density, from fiscal policy to land-use regulation. In the context of climate change miti-
gation, however, one often-discussed tool is a tax on transportation, through congestion
toll, gasoline tax, or reduced transport speed (see for example Wheaton, 1974; Fujita,
1989; Brueckner, 1981). A specific form of transport tax is the carbon tax, and this
approach has been regularly discussed in the public and policy debate in the last years,
in particular in France. This article aims at informing public-policy decision-making
on this issue.
We used NEDUM-2D-static (chapter 5) model to assess the impact of a 100 C/tCO2
carbon tax on the urban area, and especially on its population densification. This tax
level has been picked because it corresponds to the level recommended for 2030 by
the French Government’s Strategic Analysis Center (Quinet 2009). We analyze the tax
impact over three timescales, all other things being equal: the immediate impact, the
medium term impact after rents and household location have adjusted, and the long-
term impact after the urban structure has adjusted. We find that the 100 /eCO2 carbon
tax would reduce by up to 10 % the average distance of households from the center of
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Paris, but only over the long term. Over the medium term, i.e. from a few years to a few
decades, this distance would only decrease by 2.5 %. Moreover, the tax has significant
redistributive impacts on households and landowners, but these impacts vary with the
considered timescale. The fact that a significant carbon tax has only moderate results
on densification is not valid on Paris only, and can be transposed to other major cities
facing same issues.
Section 7.1 explains the framework of this study, and main hypotheses of our com-
putations. Section 7.2 presents results over the medium-term and Section 7.3 over the
long-term. Our model is by nature a simplification of reality, so several precautions
must be taken when one wants to draw practical conclusions from it. We discuss these
caveats in Section 7.4.
7.1 Framework of the study
Carbon tax acts on households through different channels: heating price change, con-
sumption goods price change, transport price change, etc. The transport price change
itself is divided into different subcategories: commuting trips price, shopping trips
price, etc. In the present analysis, we are only considering the impacts of commuting
trips price change, and we take journeys towards downtown as a proxy of commut-
ing trips. Indeed, it is assumed that commuting trips play a key role in the choice of
households’ location, even when such trips constitute only a limited fraction of their
journeys.
Since commuting trips are taken here as journeys towards downtown, willingness
to reduce the distance of these trips will be equivalent to a willingness to reduce the
average distance of households to the center of Paris, and a reduction in these trips will
correspond to a densification of the metropolitan area.
For simplicity, we suppose that all households are tenants, and that owners live
outside the urban area. This assumption simply means that, when rents vary, we do
not take into account the resulting variation of owners’ income effects on the economy
of the city. These effects can indeed be taken as second-order effects. We verify this
assumption ex post by noting that, when rents vary in following computations, aggre-
gated changes in owners’ income are relatively low compared to overall aggregated
owners’ income.
We also assume that owners and real estate developers are the same people, i.e.
there is no conflict of interest between real estate developers that determine the amount
of available habitable surface and owners that determine the level of rents. A detailed
examination of the consequences of this hypothesis is carried out at the beginning of
Section 7.4 when we examine the inequalities created by the carbon tax among owners
and developers.
In all that follows, we assume that the carbon tax is fully given back to households,
and equally divided so that each household receives the same amount. We examine
the effects of a 100e per ton of carbon emission tax, i.e. a 18 eurocents/liter pump
price tax. It is assumed that public transportation prices are increased in a similar way.
We thus focus on redensification, not on modal shift, energy consumption and CO2
emissions.
This tax creates an inequality between households: those living far from Paris cen-
ter pay a higher charge (385 e/year for a household living 25 km from the center) than
those living close to the center (who do not pay any tax if they live exactly in the center
of Paris). This tax causes on average a 220e increase in households annual transport
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expenditures (it corresponds to 0.4% of total income), and this is the amount that is
given back to each household, regardless of its location.
The inequality generated by the tax will cause a response of the various actors in
the city (households, owners and real estate developers), each trying to improve its
condition: households will move, owners will adjust rents, and real estate developers
will change the built environment until the urban area reaches a new state of equilib-
rium, assuming that, after the introduction of the tax and the associated transport price
change, transport price do not vary again. Responses of various actors will not however
occur all at the same speed (here we follow the approach of Gusdorf and Hallegatte,
2007a,b). On the one hand, households’ moving, rents change, and dwellings size
change take place on a timescale of a few years, and on the other hand changes in the
built environment occur on a much longer time scale (Mayer and Somerville, 2000).
Hence, we analyze successively the state reached when only households and owners
have responded and the built environment remains identical (the “medium term"); and
secondly the state reached when changes in the built environment have taken place (the
“long-term")1.
7.2 Medium-term adjustments
Households living far from city center are hit harder by fuel price increase than those
living close to city center, and therefore the former will try to move closer to downtown.
This pressure will push downtown rents upwards. Because of the increase in rents,
households living near downtown will tend on average to live in smaller flats, which
will make room for a few people from the suburb. Conversely, to stop their tenants
running away, the owners in the suburb will have to lower the rents, until suburb rents
are low enough and downtown rents high enough so that living in the suburb will be
attractive again. We find that this decrease is bigger than a simple compensation of
transport costs increase, and flat sizes in the suburbs increase.
When a steady state is reached, rents as well as population density have therefore
increased in the center and declined in the suburbs. Dwellings have become smaller in
the center and have slightly increased in size in the suburbs. Quantitatively, households
average distance to city center decreases by 1.5%, i.e. 250 m. If the available income
after having paid housing, transport and receiving tax compensation do not vary much
(there is a slight 0.35e gain per year), the average size of dwellings decreases by 0.5%
(40 cm²) due to city densification, and households utility decrease by 0.12%, i.e. 57e
per year in monetary equivalent.
This adjustment cancels the inequalities between tenants that the carbon tax intro-
duction had caused. However, it creates inequalities among owners: whereas down-
town owners rent increase (rents in the center of Paris increase for example by 2%),
suburban owners rent decrease (rents 25 km from the center decrease for example by
0.5%). Suburban owners are therefore net losers over the medium term.
1It must be noticed that, apart from the application of the carbon tax, we reason at constant fuel prices.
It is likely that in reality fuel prices will significantly vary during the urban area adjustments, resulting in
changes going in the same direction that we described if fuel prices increase, or in the opposite direction if
fuel prices decrease. These effects will be added to carbon tax effects, and may even hide them it if they are
too large.
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Figure 7.1: Built surface over ground surface ratio variation between medium term and long term
7.3 Long term adjustment
In the long run, the built environment adjusts: because of rent changes and house-
holds moving, it becomes profitable to construct more or higher buildings in the center
of the urban area, while some suburban dwellings are not profitable any more. We
can then assume that constructions and destructions of buildings occur so that own-
ers/developers profits are maximized. It is therefore expected to find new dense and
high buildings in the near suburbs, where additional building is allowed (in our model,
because of constraint on the height of buildings, their adjustment cannot be done in-
side Paris). In the distant suburbs, old buildings are not renovated or replaced due to
insufficient rents. This can be seen in Fig. 7.1, which shows built surface over ground
surface ratio change between the initial and final situations.
In the end, the city is more concentrated than before: households average distance
from city center is reduced by 10% (i.e. 1700m) compared to initial state without tax,
i.e. reduced from approximately 17 km to 15.3 km. Annual housing rental income
increases by 7.7% (in average 3.59e per square meter) compared to the initial state.
Compared to initial state, rents increase by 2.7% in average, i.e. 0.4 /em2/month, and
average dwelling surface decreases by 2% (i.e. 1.7 m2). As a result, utility is reduced
by 0.3% (i.e. 140e in monetary equivalent) in spite of the increase by 170e (0.3% of
the income) of household disposable income after paying tax, housing and transport.
It should be noticed that this adjustment corresponds to a net gain for owners/developers
as a whole, i.e. to a transfer from tenants to owners/developers. Indeed, the medium
term corresponds to a situation in which tenants have the flexibility to move while
owners/developers have fixed properties. The long term allows the latter to adjust their
properties, improving their situation at the expense of tenants (especially in far suburbs,
in which housing over-capacity disappears over the long term).
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Short-term Medium-term Long-term
Variation, compared to initial state : Center
Weighted
average*
25km from
the center
Center
Weighted
average*
25km from
the center
Center
Weighted
average*
25km from
the center
of households average distance to city
center
- + 0 - - -253 m - - -1694 m -
percentage (+ 0%) (-1.49%) (-9.98%)
of monthly rent (/em2) + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0.48 + 0.11 -0.07 + 0.59 + 0.41 -0.02
percentage (+ 0%) (+ 0%) (+ 0%) (+1.94%) (+0.70%) (-0.53%) (+2.39%) (+2.71%) (-0.12%)
of dwelling size (m2) + 0 + 0 + 0 -0.82 -0.41 + 0.23 -1.09 -1.66 -0.18
percentage (+ 0%) (+ 0%) (+ 0%) (-1.45%) (-0.50%) (0.26%) (-1.92%) (-2.05%) (-0.20%)
of households’ disposable income ()e + 262.56 + 0 -123.91 + 181.05 + 0.35 -89.48 + 165.46 + 168.99 -105.07
as a fraction of total income (+0.47%) (+ 0%) (-0.22%) (+0.32%) (+0.00%) (-0.16%) (+0.29%) (+0.30%) (-0.19%)
of households’ utility ()e** + 262.56 + 0.00 -123.91 - -56.27 - - -138.91 -
as a fraction of total income (+0.47%) (+ 0%) (-0.22%) (-0.10 %) (-0.25 %)
of annual owners’ rental income per
square meter (/em2)***
+ 0 + 0 + 0 + 5.78 + 0.66 -0.83 + 7.12 + 3.59 -0.71
percentage (+ 0 %) (+ 0 %) (+ 0 %) (+3.49%) (+1.43%) (-3.32%) (+4.30%) (+7.74%) (-2.81%)
* It is an average between all households (or, equivalently, it is an average between all locations weighted by the number of households). Since households are moving during
the adjustments, it does not correspond to a fixed location. For instance, dwelling size variation in the long-term is bigger averaged between all households, than computed
at any given location.
** The change in utility is expressed in monetary terms : it is the variation of composite good needed to obtain the same variation in utility. In the short-term, for instance, it
is strictly equal to the composite good variation.
*** Owner’s rental income is equal to rent minus charges ( 11 /em2/month cf Chapter 5).
Table 7.1: 100 e/tCO2 carbon tax impacts on Paris urban area, when no adjustment has taken place (“short term”), when households have moved and rents changed (“medium term”), and
when built environment has also adjusted (“long term”), compared to the initial state
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7.4 Practical conclusions for Paris and more generic
lessons
Our simulations compute that the 100 C/tCO2 carbon tax would reduce by by 2.5 %
the average distance of households from the center of Paris over the medium term, i.e.
from a few years to a few decades, and by up to 10 % over the long term.
What can we conclude from these results? First, it is possible to wonder about the
practical feasibility of the passage from the “medium" to the “long term". Indeed, if this
passage is optimal at the aggregate level, and creates a net gain for owners/developers
as a whole, actual profit actually depends on owned property location. For example,
as illustrated in Fig. 7.2, downtown owners’ rental revenue increases to 102.4% of its
initial value, compared to 97.8% (i.e. a loss of 2.2%) for owners of buildings located
at 25 km from the center. Optimal adjustment needs suburban owners to reduce the
dwelling surface they rent, which makes them lose income. This outcome may thus
appear unlikely, as already observed in shrinking cities (Reckien, 2007). This difficulty
may be lifted in the case of a growing city: indeed in this case it is possible to see the
reduced housing area not as an absolute decrease, but as a relative decline compared
to the rest of the city. This is a slower development instead of a net reduction, which
poses fewer problems of acceptability. A generic lesson from this exercise is thus that
it is much easier to influence the development of a growing city than to modify a city
with stable population. This is an incentive to act rapidly in developping countries,
where most wities are rapidly growing.
These problems suggest that the decrease in Paris average radius will not be 10% as
computed for long term equilibrium, but will rather be between 1.5% for the medium
term equilibrium and 10% for the long term.
Secondly, the technological changes that carbon tax may induce, such as the pro-
duction of electric vehicles or the development of more efficient vehicles, will also
limit households sensitivity to the fuel price increase. As already mentioned, we do not
model modal shift, and assume that both public and individual transport prices increase
in parallel, with the aim of increasing urban density. A differentiated price policy for
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there were 5,100,000 households)
these two modes could influence results (see for instance, Berg (2007), and Schmutzler
(2010), for modeled and empirical results on the effect of carbon tax and transport tax
on modal shift and greenhouse gases emissions).
Our model is a monocentric modeling of Paris urban area, whereas more and more
studies now recommend polycentric framework to describe cities. It is interesting to
observe that a monocentric model is however able to reproduce the main characteris-
tics of the Paris urban area, when averaged as a function of the distance to the center
of Paris. Here, a polycentric approach would mean assuming that, under the effect of
the tax, households will not move closer to the center of Paris, but rather closer to sec-
ondary centers of the urban area. Part of the households would therefore move towards
Paris and the others towards several different secondary centers. For each of these
centers the framework of the present study remains valid, as long as for each center
we restrict the computation to the households who depend directly on it. Therefore,
it is possible to take into account the possibility of a polycentric development simply
by using the model again, but several times on different centers, where each one will
have a population which is a fraction of the total Paris urban area population. But,
as computed by our model, the bigger the total population of the city, the bigger the
densification caused by the carbon tax (Fig. 7.3). Hence, a polycentric response of the
urban area would lead to a set of densifications all below the 10% of the monocentric
case, resulting in an overall lower total densification.
Finally, we can therefore estimate that our computation corresponds to an ideal
case, which is rather optimistic. Even in this case, this reduction is not very high
(1700 m), so our calculation suggests that in practice a carbon tax of 100 C/tCO2will
produce a limited effect on the densification of the metropolitan area. A 100e tax
seems already quite difficult to be accepted in France, so our calculations encourage us
to think that a transport tax is not sufficient to get a denser Paris urban area, and must
be combined with other measures (see for instance Banzhaf and Lavery, 2010b) if ones
wants to achieve this objective. This conclusion, here reached on the specific case of
Paris, would remain valid in other urban area. A carbon tax -even with a significant
141
level- would be unable to influence urban densities in a significant manner. If urban
(re)densification is a policy goal, other tools will need to be used, including land-use
regulation and taxes, or direct investments in transport or service infrastructure.
Two important limits of the analysis we have done are related to the fact that we
have not taken into account actual city evolution dynamics. First, it is possible to
wonder about what are exactly short-term, medium-term and long-term, and how much
time will be required to reach them. This issue will be addressed in Chapter 8, by using
the dynamical model we have described in Chapter 6.
Second, no city evolution was taken into account (population, transport technology,
economy...), therefore limiting our conclusions. To address this issue, we need to base
our analysis on prospective evolution scenarios of these variables. This issue will also
be addressed in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 8
Downscaling long term
socio-economic scenarios at city
scale
This chapter is based on an article: "Downscaling long term socio-economic scenarios
at city scale: a case study on Paris" (Viguié et al., 2011).
This Chapter is in the continuity of Chapter 7, and uses the dynamical version
of NEDUM-2D to quantify evolution timescales. It goes further by introducing in
the analysis the idea of prospective scenarios, which are required to take into account
uncertainty on future city evolutions.
The NEDUM-2D model is used to downscale 32 global socio-economic scenar-
ios at a city scale and simulate the evolution of the Paris urban area between 1900
and 2100. Four technico-economic, 2 demographic and four local scenarios are used
as inputs to explore various possible future evolutions. Main drivers of urban sprawl
and climate and flood vulnerability appear to be demographic growth and local poli-
cies; energy and transport prices, even including possible peak-oil and carbon taxes,
have only a limited influence on them when assuming prolonged economic growth.
Conversely, transport-related greenhouse gases emissions are mainly driven by vehicle
efficiency changes. These scenarios are a useful input for the design and assessment of
mitigation and adaptation policies.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the simulations. Concerning climate change
mitigation, the main conclusion is that urban sprawl seems to be only moderately af-
fected by technico-economic considerations: main drivers appear to be demographic
growth, and local policies (urban planning, local taxes, and investment in transport
infrastructures). Energy and transport prices, even including possible peak-oil and car-
bon taxes, have only a limited influence on them when assuming prolonged economic
growth. Conversely, transport-related greenhouse gases emissions are mainly driven
by vehicle efficiency changes.
Concerning climate change adaptation, flood exposure increases with overall ur-
banized area extension, through an increase in inhabited flooding-prone areas. On the
other hand a decrease in population density, cuts on the flooding exposure because pop-
ulation living in each flooding-prone area diminishes. The overall outcome depends
heavily on demographic scenarios and local policies, as is the case for mitigation is-
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Figure 8.1: Techno-economic scenarios
sues. Heat wave vulnerability might be increased, through an increased urban heat
island effect caused by urban extension; increase in the artificialized area might also
lead to an increase in floods’ intensity, if no appropriate policy is carried out.
Section 8.1 describes the hypotheses that have been used in our scenarios. Section
8.2 investigates the results of our simulations, and draw general conclusions regarding
climate change mitigation and adaptation. Finally, section 8.3 concludes.
8.1 Scenario hypotheses
Our aim here is to illustrate how NEDUM-2D can be used to downscale global sce-
narios. Therefore, we use a simple example of global scenarios. Such an exercise has
no claim to predict the future: its goal is only to help structure thinking about some
important determinants of urban structure evolution and identify the potential orders of
magnitude of their impacts.
8.1.1 World evolution scenarios
We use a set of four contrasted scenarios on world evolutions, based on several hy-
potheses on world population growth, fossil fuel reserves, technology availability and
climate policies (Figure 8.1). These hypotheses are used as input by Imaclim-R model
(Rozenberg et al., 2010) to compute coherent quantitative techno-economic scenarios
on income, transport prices and technologies over the 2010-2100 period.
Imaclim-R is a global hybrid general equilibrium model with endogeneous tech-
nical change. It represents the world economy, disaggregated into 12 regions and 12
sectors. The model is hybrid in the sense that it combines macroeconomic consis-
tency with technology explicitness. Moreover, this framework encompasses second
best features: the possible underutilization of production factors (labour and capital),
the interplay between technological inertia and imperfect foresight (the price signals
incorporated in adaptive expectations is a function of current prices and past trends),
and the rigidities of labor markets. It simulates for instance energy prices, technology
market penetrations, energy production, and transport technology prices.
Main determinants of these variables include future fossil fuel availability and fu-
ture climate policies. The four scenarios were computed by combining (1) two as-
sumptions on future tensions on fossil fuel markets and (2) two assumptions on future
world climate policies (see a detailed presentation of the model and of the scenarios in
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Rozenberg et al., 2010; these two worlds are part of the 576 worlds designed for this
article).
Assumptions on future tensions on fossil fuel markets result from a combinaison of
hypothesis on exogenous parameters of the model describing natural resources, tech-
nologies and international economic trends. They include parameters describing oil
and gas markets, the Middle-East strategy, coal markets, the availability of alternative
liquid fuel supply, carbon free options for power generation and end-use technologies,
and development patterns.
These parameters have been combined to maximize the difference in energy and
transport prices in 2050 in these two worlds. In scenarios LN and LY (cf. Fig. 8.1),
fossil fuels are largely available until 2040 (for instance the amount of ultimately re-
coverable oil resources is 3.6 Tb) while demand is high and locked in carbon-intensive
pathways (development pathways are energy-intensive and the potential for low-carbon
technologies is low; for instance electric vehicles cannot significantly penetrate the
market). In scenarios SN and SY, the peak oil happens before 2030 (the amount of
ultimately recoverable oil resources is 3.1 Tb) while the potential for low-carbon tech-
nologies is high (e.g. electric vehicles can penetrate the market as soon as 2010) and
demand is less carbon-intensive. 8.A gives a full description of all parameters values
used in these two assumptions.
For climate policies, the model simulates either (i) a “Business As Usual” (BAU)
world with no constraint on emissions (scenarios SN and LN), or (ii) a “stabilization”
world in which a global carbon price reduces emissions such that CO2 concentration is
stabilized at 450 ppm in the long run (corresponding to a 550 ppm CO2eq. stabiliza-
tion)(scenarios LY and SY).
Figure 8.3 shows some variables of the resulting techno-economic scenarios, and
Fig. 8.2 shows the associated oil prices and carbon tax1. Imaclim-R computes the
evolution of vehicles usage costs. In our scenarios, we suppose that public transport
prices evolve proportionally to public transport usage cost, i.e. that the fraction of
subsidy in public transport cost remains constant.
In the Imaclim-R model the oil price is endogenous. As the model is calibrated on
the 2001 GTAP database and disregards some of the mechanisms driving market oil
price (especially geopolitical tensions, the impact of changes in exchange rates, and
market speculation), the steep increase of oil prices which happened before 2008 is not
reproduced, and the oil price remains around 80$/bl until 2015 (see Fig. 8.2(a)).
In techno-economic scenarios LN and LY, fossil fuels are largely available until
2040, and there is a limited potential for low-carbon technologies. The large avail-
ability of oil maintains low prices for the first thirteen years of the projected period.
Then, a steep twenty-year-long surge in oil prices begins just before oil production
starts to decrease (i.e., before the peak oil; see Fig. 8.2(a)) and brings the oil price up
to 450$/bl. This surge is triggered by a tension between high demand, which cannot
be reduced overnight, and constraints on the deployment of oil substitutes (e.g. vehi-
cles electrification). This is the logical outcome of a small potential for low-carbon
technologies combined with low energy prices in the first period. These low prices (a)
induce intensive energy consumption, (b) cause faster exhaustion and a sharper decline
of conventional oil, and (c) deter investment in non-conventional production capacities
and limit their availability in the post-Peak Oil period. From 2040 on, the surge in oil
prices is sufficient to trigger energy efficiency and technical change towards low-carbon
1Oil prices and carbon tax are not directly used as inputs by NEDUM-2D. Only transport prices for
individual car and public transport (Fig. 8.3(a) and 8.3(b)), income evolution (Fig. 8.3(c)) and average
vehicle fuel consumption (Fig. 8.10(d)) are used in our simulations.
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(a) Oil price (excluding carbon tax). (b) Carbon tax in scenarios SY and LY.
Figure 8.2: Oil price and carbon tax computed by Imaclim-R model in the four scenarios. The carbon tax is
applied everywhere around the world, and is computed so that CO2 concentration is stabilized at 450 ppm in
the long run (corresponding to a 550 ppm CO2eq. stabilization). There is no carbon tax in Techno-economic
scenarios SN and LN.
technologies, so that oil demand starts declining and the oil price goes back down to
around 350$/bl. In scenario LY, this technical change is sufficient to meet the climate
target with a relatively low carbon tax until 2080. After 2080 though, the climate target
becomes more stringent and the carbon tax has to increase steeply so as to tackle the
most inert sectors of the Imaclim-R model (see Fig. 8.2(b)). As a consequence, the oil
price drops to about 200$/bl because oil demand decreases in the transportation sector.
The steep increase in oil price between 2040 and 2080, in scenarios LN and LY, is
translated into the cost of private vehicles transport and public transport (see Fig. 8.3),
but to a lesser extent. This is due to a rapid turnover in the stock of private vehicles,
which can be replaced in ten years by more efficient vehicles and hybrids, and to the
fact that public transports include a large part of electric technologies.
In techno-economic scenarios SN and SY, a weak Peak oil happens before 2030 and
the potential for low-carbon technologies is high. In that case, oil demand is lower in
the short-run than in scenarios LN and LY, preventing a strong peak oil in the 2040’s.
But from 2040 on, oil price increases continuously in scenario SN, until it reaches
500$/bl in 2100 (see Fig. 8.2(a)). This regular increase is due to the decrease in
oil production, combined with high potential for technical change towards low-carbon
technologies. This high potential prevents the economies from being locked in very
oil-intensive technologies (as in scenario LN), so that there is no surge in oil price
when Peak Oil is reached. However this regular increase in oil price is not sufficient
to meet the climate target, so in scenario SY the carbon tax rises sharply to tackle the
most inert sectors of the model (see Fig. 8.2(b)). As a consequence of this high carbon
price, the oil price falls below 50$/bl after 2060 in this scenario.
The high potential for decarbonisation in the scenarios SN and SY (e.g. in terms
of electrification of vehicles) is translated into constant costs for private and public
transportation in scenario SN, and a decreasing cost in scenario SY (see Fig. 8.3). This
decreasing cost is due to a high penetration of electric vehicles in the park, as well
as electricity decarbonisation, which are triggered by the carbon tax sharp and regular
increase.
8.1.2 Local scenarios
These global inputs are not sufficient to create local-scale scenarios, which depend on
many other factors. In particular, several local inputs are also needed.
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(a) Average cost to drive 1km in private vehicle,
including electric vehicles and carbon tax (Source
for historical data: F. Nadaud (Nadaud and Hour-
cade, 2009), after CPDP)
(b) Monthly cost of basic public transport pass
(or equivalent), including carbon tax (Source for
historical data: F. Nadaud (Nadaud and Hour-
cade, 2009), after RATP)
(c) Average annual household disposable in-
come. The curves for scenarios SY and LY are
almost identical. Source for historical data: J.
Friggit, CGEDD after INSEE∗.
Figure 8.3: Example of inputs from Imaclim-R model. Scenarios SN and SY represent a world with high
resilience against fossil fuel tensions. Scenarios LN and LY represent a world with high peak oil, happening
in 2040. Scenarios SN and LN represent a world without any global climatic policy, contrary to scenarios
LY and SY.
∗Series downloadable on
www.cgedd.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/rubrique.php3?idrubrique=138.
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Figure 8.4: Demographic scenarios. Source for historical data: INSEE.
Paris urban area population evolution and households size As inputs for popula-
tion evolution and households size, we used two demographic scenarios (Fig. 8.4). The
Low one is based, for the 2010-2030 period, on a scenario produced by the French na-
tional statistical institute (INSEE) and by the urbanism institute of Ile de France (IAU)
for Paris urban area (Louchart, 2010b). For the 2030-2050 period, it is based on a
scenario produced by INSEE for France (Robert-Bobée, 2006), and for the 2050-2100
period by a scenario produced by the UN for Europe (UNPD, 2011). The High scenario
is the same as the Low scenario until 2050, and is then constant.
Development of transport infrastructure Many different assumptions about the fu-
ture development of transport infrastructure can be tested with the model. For simplic-
ity, we suppose here that infrastructure pattern remains unchanged between 2010 and
2100, and that congestion on roads and public transport remains at current levels, i.e.
future investments in the transportation network are assumed to maintain the same ser-
vice level in spite of population growth, without developing new lines.
Urbanism policies We use four different scenarios for local urban policies. In the
first one, we suppose that the extension of the city is entirely guided by the market:
we introduce no policy or regulation limiting the extension of the city or preferentially
developing certain areas. The idea is to study the "natural" trend of development of the
city; this trend does not necessarily match the development that will occur in practice,
but it allows understanding and anticipating land pressures, and therefore future local
challenges.
In the second one, we suppose that an efficient “Green Belt policy” is enacted in
2020 to control urban sprawl and protect natural areas and agriculture activity. From
that year on, building is only possible through a densification of existing built spaces,
but is prohibited elsewhere.
In the third one, we suppose that a zoning policy to reduce the risk of flooding is
implemented in 2020. This policy prohibits new constructions in flood-prone areas, but
do not act on existing buildings.
Finally, in the fourth one, we suppose that both a flood-risk zoning policy and a
green-belt policy are implemented together, in a policy that combines adaptation and
mitigation objectives.
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Figure 8.5: Example of simulated urban area extension, using techno-economic scenario 1 and high demo-
graphic scenario.
8.2 Results
Model results can be analyzed in view of three policy goals: reducing urban sprawl,
mitigating climate change, and adapting to it.
8.2.1 Urban sprawl
Figure 8.5 presents an example of projected Paris urban area extension between 2010
and 2100. This example corresponds to a techno-economic scenario with a limited
and early peak oil, no global climate policy to curb world greenhouse gas emissions
(techno-economic scenario SN) and a demographic scenario where Paris urban area
population grows until 2050, and then remains constant (high demographic scenario).
In this scenario, Paris urban area expands greatly, especially between 2010 and 2030.
Changing these hypotheses changes the simulated expansion, but all factors do not
have the same impact. Figure 8.6 shows a simulation with the same techno-economic
hypotheses, but with a decreasing population between 2050 and 2100 (the low demo-
graphic scenario). In this case, some urban locations are abandonned (which could lead
to city management problems, as observed for instance in eastern european shrinking
cities, see Bontje (2005)). However, other locations continue to be developped between
2050 and 2100, in spite of the decrease in population. This is due to the decrease in
transport costs relative to income, and the subsequent population density decrease.
Techno-economic considerations seem to affect only moderately urban sprawl when
compared with the impact of urbanism policies, and population changes (see Fig. 8.7).
Even the presence of a carbon tax (at the value needed to stabilize CO2 concentration
at 450 ppm, i.e. about $1000) does not influence significantly urban sprawl.
This result has two origins. Firstly, it is caused by our world scenarios: in these
scenarios, an important "peak oil" and a high carbon tax impact moderately transport
prices (the maximum increase is about 20%) , because they are compensated by vehicle
energy consumption decrease and alternative energy use (especially electric vehicles
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Figure 8.6: Example of simulated urban area extension, using techno-economic scenario 1 and low demo-
graphic scenario.
Figure 8.7: Urban area extension as simulated by NEDUM-2D. Plain green curves correspond to scenarios
with a high population, and blue ones to scenarios with low population, with no green belt policy in both
cases. The dashed curve correspond to scenarios with the green belt policy.
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and decarbonized electricity in the case of scenarios with a climate policy and liquefied
coal in the other scenarios).
Secondly, in our model, households respond to a generalized cost of transport,
which is the sum of the actual monetary cost of transportation, plus a cost associated
to travel time. To compute the latter, as explained in Section 5.2, we use a cost of time
which increases proportionally to households income. In all the simulations computed
by the Imaclim-R model, households income increases strongly (almost exponentially)
over time (Fig. 8.3(c)), whereas transport monetary cost increases only moderately
(Fig. 8.3(a) and 8.3(b)). Therefore, in all scenarios, transport monetary cost becomes
gradually negligible compared to transport time cost (Tab. 8.1). As transportation times
are the same in all our scenarios, the differences between scenarios tend to decrease.
Year 2010 2050 2100
Monetary cost (e2000) 1,070 1,210 1,150
Fraction of generalized cost 9.79% 5.31% 2.15%
Time cost cost (e2000) 9,870 21,580 52,240
Fraction of generalized cost 90.21% 94.69% 97.85%
Table 8.1: Comparison between transport monetary cost and cost associated to transport time, in average,
20km from the center of Paris. Cost associated to transport time appears to be about 10 times higher than
transport monetary cost in 2010. This ratio increases over time.
As highlighted in Section 6.2.1 in Chapter 6, there are some empirical and theo-
retical evidences that time cost may not evolve proportionally to income , because of
technological innovations that make travel more comfortable.2 The elasticity of time
cost relative to income variation may be as low as 0.5 (Shires and de Jong, 2009). But it
should be noted that, even in this case, in the simulations, costs associated with trans-
portation times increase much more over the century than monetary transport costs,
and that urban sprawl remains marginally impacted by energy prices.
This result suggests especially that climate policies based on a carbon price aim-
ing at limiting global emissions3 would only have a marginal impact on urban shapes:
other policies are needed to slow down urban sprawl. Examples of these policies in-
clude specific land-use policies (urban planning regulations such as the green belt pol-
icy modelled here, but also other policies such as local taxes), or direct investments in
transport which would change travel times across the urban area. This result is con-
sistent with Chapter 7, which concluded that a 100C/tCO2carbon tax alone seemed
unsufficient to mitigate urban sprawl.
Of course, techno-economic scenarios with a lower income growth, or even with
an income stagnation or decrease could lead to different conclusions.
8.2.2 Mitigation
All scenarios predict a growth in dwelling size, coherent with historical trends (Fig.
8.8). This growth appears to be mainly impacted by the existence or not of a greenbelt
2It may also seem reasonable to imagine a scenario where an increasing transport congestion would make
travel less comfortable. In such a scenario, time cost would increase more rapidly than income.
3In the techno-economic scenario 3, the tax increases constantly over time reaches 2500 $/tC in 2100,
and in techno-economic scenario 4 it reaches 2500 $/tC in 2100.
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policy: when such a policy is implemented, increased land scarcity leads to an in-
crease in real estate prices, and hence to smaller dwellings4. However, in all scenarios,
transport cost decreases relatively to income. This enables people to locate more and
more uniformly in the urban area (cf. box in Section 4.1.2 in Chapter 4), thus reduc-
ing real estate pressure, and counterbalancing the former mechanism. Consequently,
even when a greenbelt policy is implemented, dwelling size appears to increase over
time (although less quickly than when no green belt policy is implemented). Such an
increase could have an impact on greenhouse gases emissions, through an increase in
energy consumption for heating or cooling.
The green belt enables also to mitigate public transport modal share decrease (Fig.
8.9). However, it does not appear sufficient to prevent this decrease, which happens for
all scenarios.
As shown in Fig. 8.10, if transport-related emissions are impacted by many vari-
ables, the main influence comes from techno-economic scenarios, i.e. fuel prices
and transport technologies evolution. The average distance traveled using private car
(strongly related in our modelling to city sprawl) is greatly impacted by the imple-
mentation of a greenbelt policy, because of a modal shift towards public transport5,
and because of the reduced length of trips. However, in terms of greenhouse gases
emissions, this has a much lower effect that the variation in vehicle efficiency and
technology from the socio-economic scenario (e.g. availability of electric vehicles and
decarbonized electricity).
In our downscaled scenarios, therefore, transport-related greenhouse gas emissions
in the city are mainly driven by technologies. With the urban policies we have tested,
urban planning plays a limited role in spite of its influence on the distance traveled by
car. It means that if technologies cannot contribute to emission reductions, then lim-
iting emissions from urban transportation would require the implementation of urban
planning options that are much stricter than what has been investigated in this article. In
practice, since a green belft would not be sufficient, it means that urban reconstruction,
i.e. a combination of building destruction and construction, would become necessary.
8.2.3 Adaptation
These scenarios are also useful for impact, adaptation and vulnerability analyzes. In
Paris, one of the main disaster risks is flooding, and climate change may increase this
risk, even though models still disagree. Fig. 8.11 shows how population living in
flood-prone areas6 can be expected to evolve in the future. This data is an essential
input to assess how changes in rainfall may translate into flood losses, and therefore to
assess climate change impacts. The simulated population living in flood-prone areas is
consistent with observations (empirical estimations for 1999 and 2006 are represented
on Fig. 8.11). In all scenarios, this population increases until 2030 before decreasing
slowly. This decrease is related to a diminishing population density in risk zones.
4In practice, this could also lead to a reduced city attractivity, and therefore to a smaller population than in
the scenarios with no greenbelt policy (in the line of Glaeser and Kahn, 2010). This could indirectly impact
average dwelling size. In our simulations, demographic scenarios are exogeneous, so we could not study
such phenomena.
5The densification of the urban area makes a larger fraction of the inhabitants live close to public transport
stations.
6We used present-day flood-prone areas (Source: CARTO RISQUE, French Ministry of environment
MEDDTL). This analysis could be made more refined by coupling the urban model with an hydrological
model to take into account the impacts of climate change on the frequency and intensity of floods.
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Figure 8.8: Average dwelling size evolution. Green curves correspond to scenarios with a high population,
and blue ones to scenarios with low population. The dotted black line corresponds to actual historic data
(Source : INSEE and IAU).
Figure 8.9: Public transport modal share for commuting trips. Actual data for 2002 is 46.63 % (Source :
DREIF).
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(a) Private car transport-related emissions per
household
(b) Total private car transport-related emissions
(c) Average yearly distance traveled using private
car,per household
(d) Average vehicle fuel consumption. Average
over all circulating private cars.
Figure 8.10: Private car transport-related emissions
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(a) Green curves correspond to scenarios with a
high population, and blue ones to scenarios with
low population. Dotted lines correspond to sce-
narios with no green belt policy, and plain ones
to scenarios with a green belt policy.
(b) Green curves correspond to scenarios with
flood risk zoning, and blue ones to scenarios
without.
Figure 8.11: Number of households living in flood-prone areas, as simulated by NEDUM-2D. The dot-
ted black line corresponds to actual historic data (Source: French Ministry of environment MEDDTL
(CGDD/SOeS), after Corine Land Cover and CARTO RISQUE databases).
It should be noted that a greenbelt policy appears to increase the number of house-
holds living in flood-prone areas (Fig. 8.11(a)), because it increases the population
density of the urban area. Such a phenomenon has been observed empirically (Burby
et al., 2001; Lall and Deichmann, 2010). This negative side-effect should be balanced
with the positive effect on urban sprawl and transport demand (cf. Chapter 9 for a more
detailed study of this idea).
This conclusion is true even when a flood-risk zoning is implemented (Fig. 8.11(b)):
even when new buildings in flood-exposed zones are forbidden, more people are living
in these zones when a greenbelt policy is implemented, because, as explained in section
8.2.2 dwelling size is smaller in these scenarios.
Heat wave vulnerability is another important topic strongly related to urban exten-
sion. To investigate this topic, three on-going research projects7 are coupling this urban
model with the urban microclimate model TEB (Masson, 2000b).
8.3 Conclusion
NEDUM-2D seems to capture main long-term determinants of city evolution: it is able
to reproduce main tendencies of past Paris urban area evolution. It enables to derive
scenarios for its long-term future. These scenarios appear useful to help decision-
making about emissions reduction policies and climate change adaptation. Such an
exercise do not predict the future: its goal is only to help structure thinking about
some important determinants of urban trajectory and identify the potential orders of
magnitude of their impacts.
The main conclusions of this study are not the quantitative figures computed in
the scenarios, but the relative orders of magnitude and the qualitative reason explain-
ing them. Firstly, transport price considerations seem to affect only moderately urban
sprawl when compared with the impact of population changes and urbanism policies.
7VURCA, MUSCADE and ACCLIMAT projects (http://www.cnrm.meteo.fr/ville.
climat/?lang=en).
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Even the presence of a carbon tax (at the value needed to stabilize CO2 concentration
at 450 ppm) does not influence it significantly. In other words, possible future fossil
fuel prices increase seems not sufficient to slow suburbanization, and other measures
are needed if one wants to slow down urban sprawl. Examples of these measures in-
clude specific land-use policies (urban planning regulations as has been , local taxes),
or direct investments in transport.
The reason behind that is double: first, an important "peak oil" and a high carbon
tax appear to impact moderately transport prices because of vehicle energy consump-
tion decrease and alternative energy use. Second, and independently from this first
reason, the importance on household location of transport prices decrease gradually
relatively to the importance of transport times. This is due to the monetary value of
time increasing similarly to the income, hence with a quasi-exponential trend due to
the economic growth, whereas transport prices increase much more slowly, if at all.
Such a phenomenon could be expected in every country where commuting transport
times make up already the main part of commuting generalized transport cost.
A second conclusion is that, conversely, techno-economic scenarios play the major
role concerning commuting transport-related greenhouse gases emissions. The reason
behind that is, that, in all scenarios, the variation in transport demand, when demog-
raphy changes or when a green belt policy is implemented appears to be smaller than
the expected variation in transport efficiency. Only a much stricter anti-sprawl urban-
ism policy or much more contrasted demographic scenarios would ultimately be able
to change this conclusion. The third conclusion is about climate change adaptation:
concerning flood-risk, population living in flood-prone areas can be expected to evolve
in the future. In all scenarios, this population increases until 2030 before decreasing
slowly. This decrease is related to a diminishing population density in risk zones. A
greenbelt policy appears to increase the number of households living in flood-prone
areas, because it increases the population density of the urban area. This is true even
when a flood-risk zoning is implemented: even when building in flood-exposed zones
is forbidden, more people are living in these zones when a green belt policy is imple-
mented, because, dwelling size is smaller in these scenarios.
Techno-economic scenarios with a lower income growth, or even with an income
stagnation or decrease would lead to different conclusions. We have only downscaled
in this study a small number of scenarios : to assess the robustness of the former results,
other scenarios should be downscaled.
As our modeling is monocentric, it was not possible to simulate the effect of an in-
creased development of other subcenters in the urban area. Such a development would
greatly change travel patterns and the urban form, resulting in alternative scenarios.
This is the subject of our present research. However, the mechanisms leading to the
main conclusions of this paper do not depend on the city being monocentric or not,
and should remain valid in the new model. A more complex, polycentric model will be
useful to test the influence of other new variables, and especially investment in services
supply (schools, health, leisure...) across the urban area.
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Appendix 8.A The IMACLIM-R parameters
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Assumption 1 Assumption 2
Oil and gas
markets
Oil
Amount of ultimately recoverable resources (total conventional and
non conventional)***
3.6 Tb 3.1Tb
Inertia in the deployment of non conventionals (spread of the bell-
shaped curve for each field)
no inertia (b=0.061) inertia (b=0.041)
Maximum growth rate of Middle-East capacities 0.8Mbd/year 0.7Mbd/year
Remaining resources before depletion starts 25% 50%
Gas Indexation of gas price on oil price Until 80$/bl Always indexed
OPEC behavior Target oil price 40$/bl 80$/bl
Coal
Price growth elasticity to production decrease 1.5 1
Price growth elasticity to production increase 1 4
Production growth rate which cancels out price growth rate 2% 0,05%
Power
generation
decarbonization
Nuclear Maximum market shares [min - max]** [2.5% - 20%] [5% - 40%]
Renewables
Maximum market share of renewables 15% 25%
Learning rate for renewables investment costs 3% 7%
Carbon
capture and
storage
CCS learning rate 7% 13%
CCS start date 2015 2010
CCS “bottleneck phase” 10 years 7 years
CCS maximum market share at the end of the bottleneck phase 3.5% 5%
CCS growth phase 8 years 8 years
CCS maximum market share at the end of the growth phase 63% 90%
CCS maturation phase 8 years 8 years
CCS maximum market share at the end of the maturation phase 70% 100%
Low carbon
end-use
technologies
Electric
vehicles
EV start No significant market penetra-
tion
EV "bottleneck phase" 3 years
EV maximum market share at the end of the phase 2.5%
EV growth phase 15 years
EV maximum market share at the end of the phase 45%
EV maturation phase 16 years
EV maximum market share 50%
Industry Capital lifetime in the industry 30 years 20 years
Energy
efficiency
Freight energy consumption 1 Trend extracted from POLES
data: starts at 1 reaches 1.1 in
2030 and stays at 1.1 until 2100
Freight fuel consumption elasticity to fuel prices -0.35 -0.4
Buildings energy consumption per m2* Trend which starts at 1, reaches
1.2 in 2030 and stays at 1.2 until
2100
1
The parameters in bold are multiple parameters.
* different parameters according to the region.
** different parameters according to the region and horizontal slice in the annual monotonous load curve (between base load and peak load).
*** different parameters according to the region and category of oil.
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Assumption 1 Assumption 2
Alternative
liquid fuel
supply
Biofuels
Time scale of reactive anticipation for biofuels production 6 years 4 years
Biofuels supply: multiplier coefficient of the supply curves for the de-
fault value)
Value from IEA curves 50% increase w.r.t Assumption 1
value
Coal-to-
liquids
Oil price threshold for CTL production start 200 $/bl 120 $/bl
Time scale of reactive anticipation for CTL production 8 years 0
Maximum production growth in 2030, 2035 and in 2050 0.05 Mbd - 0.10 Mbd -
0.10 Mbd
0.20 Mbd - 1.5 Mbd - 3 Mbd
Development
patterns
Transport Motorization rate growth with GDP per capita* 50% increase w.r.t Assumption
2 value
Value from IEA data
Buildings
Income elasticity of buildings stock growth 1 0.7
Asymptote to surface per capita in China and India 60 40
Start year and fuel price for a forced decline of oil consumption in this
sector
2020 - 1300$/tep 2010 - 1000$/tep
Industrial
goods
households industrial goods consumption saturation level [min-
max]*(multiplier factor of the calibration year consumption volume)
[1.5-3] [1-2]
The parameters in bold are multiple parameters.
* different parameters according to the region.
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Chapter 9
Trade-Offs and Synergies in
Urban Climate Policies: a
quantitative analysis
This chapter is based on an article: "Trade-Offs and Synergies in Urban Climate Poli-
cies" (Viguié and Hallegatte, 2012).
As explained in chapter 3, urban climate policies are not developed or implemented
in a vacuum; they interact with other policy goals, such as economic competitiveness
or social issues. These interactions can lead to trade-offs and implementation obsta-
cles, or to synergies and win-win strategies. Despite a growing number of innovative
urban climate strategies, little analysis investigating their effectiveness exists, in part
because it requires a broad interdisciplinary approach that includes economics, urban-
ism, climate sciences, engineering and hydrology. Using NEDUM-2D-static (chapter
5), we provide here a first quantification of these trade-offs and synergies, to go beyond
the qualitative statements that have been published so far. We undertake a multicrite-
ria analysis of three urban policies: a greenbelt policy, a zoning policy to reduce the
risk of flooding, and a transportation subsidy. We show that each of these policies ap-
pears to be undesirable because it has negative consequences with respect to at least
one policy goal; however, in a policy mix, the consequences of each policy are not
simply additive. This nonlinearity permits building policy combinations that are win-
win strategies, contributes to mitigation and adaptation objectives that have co-benefits
for other policy goals. In particular, we show that flood zoning and greenbelt policies
are unlikely to be accepted if they are not combined with transportation policies. Our
results also show that stand-alone adaptation and mitigation policies are unlikely to
be politically acceptable and emphasize the need to mainstream climate policy within
urban planning.
9.1 Introduction
Adaptation and emission reduction policies rely on the same tools, giving rise to both
synergies and conflicts (McEvoy et al., 2006; Hamin and Gurran, 2009). Synergies and
conflicts with other policy goals also exist, and environmental policies can result in
positive feedback with respect to economic and social issues. For instance, a decrease
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in car congestion increases residents’ quality of life, enhances economic competitive-
ness, reduces accessibility inequalities among neighborhoods, and decreases air pol-
lution and GHG emissions. Conversely, while enlarging parks and introducing more
vegetation in cities can be a useful way to adapt cities to higher temperatures and can
improve the quality of life, such actions may also reduce population density and lead to
increased GHG emissions from transportation. Similarly, protecting urban coastlines
with dikes and seawalls decreases cities’ vulnerability to floods, but can reduce recre-
ational amenities and a city’s attractiveness to tourists, thereby reducing inhabitants’
incomes and slowing down development. All policies have consequences for property
values, which in turn influence the attractiveness of an urban area for potential resi-
dents, professionals, and businesses. These effects can vary by community or location,
for example, impact in the suburbs versus that in the city center, leading to unintended
redistributions of wealth or amenities that may or may not be consistent with policy
goals.
Such conflicts among different policy goals create implementation problems, while
synergies offer opportunities for win-win solutions, suggesting the utility of assessing
all urban policies within a unified framework (Munasinghe, 2011). Building such a
framework requires aggregating results from different research fields in an interdisci-
plinary analysis. Moreover, because urban management implies political choices and
value judgments, urban climate policies have to be judged using multiple criteria (Hal-
legatte et al., 2010).
In this context, a pertinent tool is integrated city models (ICMs) (for an example
see Solecki and Oliveri, 2004). ICMs are highly simplified representations of reality
that describe the most important drivers of city change over time and can assess the
consequences of various policy choices. ICMs can provide decision makers and stake-
holders with useful information and can help them understand the main mechanisms
and linkages at work.
We propose a multicriteria analysis of synergies and trade-offs with respect to urban
climate policies aimed at mitigation and adaptation using a simple ICM, NEDUM-2D,
which is described in the supplementary online material. Our analysis focuses on Paris,
but its results are generic and most of its conclusions are valid for many cities. Using
this model, we show that urban policies are best assessed by means of an integrated
framework using multiple criteria that correspond to numerous policy objectives. We
find that building a policy mix that has positive effects for all objectives is possible. In
other words, cities’ mitigation, adaptation, economic, and social policies can be made
synergetic if they are designed in such a way that each policy takes other policies into
account.
9.2 Policy goals and indicators
In this analysis, we assess urban policies with respect to five policy goals: climate
change mitigation, climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction, natural area
and biodiversity protection, housing affordability, and ease of implementation (includ-
ing affordability). These goals can be translated into quantitative indicators in many
ways. As an illustration, we suggest five possible and relevant ones that our ICM can
measure and model (Tab. 9.1). Indicator choice is a crucial issue that depends on
the objectives for a given policy and on decision makers’ priorities. Moreover, for all
practical purposes, indicators should be chosen in collaboration with stakeholders and
policy makers (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009).
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Policy goals Indicators
Climate change mitigation Average distance traveled by car
for commuting
Adaptation and natural risk reduc-
tion
Population living in flood-prone ar-
eas
Natural area and biodiversity pro-
tection
Total urbanized area
Housing affordability Average dwelling size in the center
of the urban area
Implementation easiness Gini index of real estate invest-
ments profitabilities
Table 9.1: List of policy goals and proposed indicators.
The indicators we utilize do not encompass all possible policy impacts on the five
policy goals, but are informative for the policies we will be considering as follows (See
Section 1 of Supplementary Information for a full description of the indicators), and
each can be directly measured:
• Climate change mitigation: Urban policies can influence GHG emissions result-
ing from transport, heating, and air conditioning. Here we focus on transporta-
tion emissions. Our proposed indicator, the average distance traveled by car for
commuting, is a simple proxy for GHG emissions in the absence of comprehen-
sive modeling of urban GHG emissions.
– In the model, we only consider commuting trips assimilated to trips towards the
center of Paris. These trips can be made either using public transport or using
private vehicles : transport mode choice is computed through an optimization of
generalized transport cost, comparing trip duration and trip price for public and
private transport. The indicator is the average distance traveled by car by house-
holds in the city.
• Climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction: In Paris, one of the main
disaster risks is flooding, and climate change may increase this risk, even though
models still disagree. We therefore use the population living in flood-prone areas
as an indicator. Heat wave vulnerability is another important topic, but it can only
be investigated by coupling the urban model with a urban microclimate model
(Masson, 2000b).
– Flood-prone areas are defined by the extent of extreme historical floods. In model
simulations, the total population living in these areas is in good agreement with
empirical measurements : in 2010, approximately 490 000 households live in such
areas in Ile de France (Paris administrative region) (Laporte, 2009), whereas in
model simulations this figure is 520 000. The indicator is the number of households
living in flood-prone areas.
• Natural area and biodiversity protection: The transformation of natural areas into
urbanized area has many environmental impacts, for example, on biodiversity
and water and flood management. For this policy goal we use the total urbanized
area as an indicator. We measure the total area where more than half of the
ground surface has been artificialized.
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• Housing affordability: Access to housing plays an important role in the quality
of life and the competitiveness of a city. Improving housing affordability can
therefore be both a social and an economic objective. This is particularly crucial
in most major cities and can be measured using either rents or average dwelling
size. Either of these two indicators can be used, because they are correlated:
everything else being equal, households live in larger dwellings when rents are
lower. Here we use average dwelling size in the center of the urban area as an
indicator.
• Ease of implementation (including affordability): Policy benefits need to be
compared with policy costs, especially for public finances, but even when the
cost-benefit analysis is positive, a policy can encounter other political or insti-
tutional implementation obstacles. In particular, even if a policy has a positive
impact as measured using aggregated indicators, it may have large unintended
redistributive effects or particularly large negative effects on one category of
residents or on one area of the city. Such redistributive effects often make imple-
mentation difficult or require corrective measures. To build a quantitative indica-
tor of these effects, we start with the spatial distribution of returns on real estate
investments in the city and calculate the spatial Gini index of the profitability
of real estate investments. A high value of this indicator means that the evolu-
tion of a city leads to large changes in relative land prices, causing unintended
wealth redistribution. A policy that increases this indicator is amplifying this
redistribution impact and is supposedly politically more difficult to implement.
– We measure real estate investments profitabilities as the relative increase in land
prices between 2010 and 2030. The indicator we measure is the Gini index of all
relative land price increase in the urban area, weighted by available ground sur-
face. If the Gini index is high, it means that land prices follow different trajectories
in different locations, creating wealth redistribution. Without any urban policy, the
natural evolution of the city leads to such a redistribution because of population
and technology changes. We consider as positive a policy that compensates these
unintended transfers, and as negative a policy that enhances them.
9.3 Modelling assumptions
The NEDUM-2D-static model is used to simulate the evolution of the Paris urban area
between 2010 and 2030. This model is described in chapter 5.The future of Paris ur-
ban area depends on several external factors, including demographic, socio-economic,
cultural and political changes. Future public transport and private vehicle travel costs
(which take into account variation in technologies, oil prices, taxes, etc.) and future
households income are extrapolated over the 2010–2030 period, from observed aver-
age growth rate in Paris urban area between 1988 and 2008. Future population and
households size are taken from the central demographic scenario for Paris urban area
developed by INSEE, the French statistical organization, and IAU, the Ile-de-France
urbanism agency. Our conclusions are robust to changes in these values, as shown by
a sensitivity analysis (see Supplementary Online Material).
Many different assumptions about the future development of transport infrastruc-
ture can be made and tested with the model. For simplicity, we suppose here that it
remains unchanged between 2010 and 2030, and that congestion on roads and pub-
lic transport remains constant, i.e. future investments in the transportation network
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Figure 9.1: Map of total urbanized area in 2010, and in 2030 in the do-nothing scenario.
are assumed to maintain the same service level in spite of population growth, without
developing new lines.
9.4 Urban Policies
We consider three policies that aim at different targets, but have consequences on the
aforementioned five goals: a greenbelt policy, a public transport subsidy, and a zoning
policy to reduce the risk of flooding. We compare theres policies to a do-nothing sce-
nario, whereby urbanization is driven only by market forces and the external drivers
(transport costs, population, etc.). These boundary conditions are described in Ap-
pendix 9.A.
Figure 9.1 illustrates the do-nothing scenario. The model projects a significant ex-
tension of the urbanized area between 2010 and 2030 as a result of increased population
and decreasing transportation costs relative to income.
The first policy is a greenbelt policy whereby land use regulations prohibit building
in areas that are not already densely inhabited.1 This policy aims at limiting urban
sprawl and at protecting natural areas. With this policy, the urbanized area in 2030 is
the same as in 2010, even though building and population densities are different. As
table 1 shows, this policy also limits the increase in private vehicle usage, increases real
estate prices, and reduces dwelling sizes by making land more scarce. This increased
land scarcity leads more people to live in flood-prone areas, which has been empirically
observed (Burby et al., 2001; Lall and Deichmann, 2010).
The second policy is a public transport subsidy financed by a lump sum tax.2 We
1We supposed in this policy that building is possible only in locations where more than half of ground
surface is already built-up in 2010. In other locations, new buildings are forbidden and existing buildings
cannot be enlarged.
2Differentiated public transport tariff, increasing with the distance from city center, is replaced by a
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Indicators Greenbelt Public
transport
subsidy
Flood risk
zoning
Policy mix Do-nothing
scenario
Variation in average daily dis-
tance driven in car (m)
+ 1570 -440 + 2550 -880 + 2560
Variation in population in
flood-prone areas (thousands of
households)
+ 39 -4 -6 -8 + 6
Variation in total urbanized area
(km2)
0 + 690 + 470 0 + 480
Redistributive impacts (Gini in-
dex)
+ 0.093 + 0.271 + 0.201 + 0.146 + 0.203
Variation in dwelling size in the
center of Paris (m2)
+ 0.17 + 1.73 + 0.79 + 0.95 + 0.82
Table 9.2: Multicriteria analysis of urban policies on Paris in 2030 with respect to the five policy goals.
Figure 9.2: Rents in the public transport subsidy scenario compared to rents in the “do-nothing” scenario.
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Figure 9.3: Consequences of a greenbelt policy, a public transport subsidy, and a zoning policy to reduce the
risk of flooding compared with the do-nothing scenario.
take the example of the recently proposed replacement of the differentiated public
transport tariff—which increases with distance from the city center—by a single tariff
for all destinations in the Paris urban area. Such a policy aims at promoting public
transport, as well as decreasing the burden of transport costs on suburban households,
which in Paris are, on average, poorer than those living in central Paris. The side effects
of such a policy are to increase the incentive to live farther out in the suburbs, leading
to an increase in the total urbanized area and to a decrease in real estate pressures in
the city center (cf. Fig. 9.2).
The third policy is a zoning policy to reduce the risk of flooding.3 This policy
prohibits new buildings in flood-prone areas. Such a policy reduces the available urban
ground surface, thereby increasing land scarcity, and causes a slight general increase
in housing prices, leading to smaller dwelling sizes in the city center.
Figure 2 presents the results graphically for the three policies. The impact of each
policy on each indicator has been assigned a score and is located along one of the five
axes of the figure. The -100 percent score is in the middle of the figure; the +100
percent score is at the extremity of each axis. All scores are measured relative to the
do-nothing scenario, which is assigned a 0 percent score. The +100 percent score goes
to the preferred outcome among all considered policies. Each policy is thus ranked best
when the corresponding colored area is biggest. For instance, Fig. 2 shows that a public
transport subsidy improves the situation compared with the do-nothing scenario for
three policy goals (climate change mitigation, housing affordability, and adaptation and
disaster risk reduction), and makes it worse with respect to two policy goals (natural
area and biodiversity protection and ease of implementation).
single tariff for all destinations in Paris urban area. This new tariff is equal to 20% of the lowest tarif for
all destinations in do-nothing scenario. The money needed to finance this policy is obtained through a flat
income tax.
3This policy prohibits new buildings and enlargement of existing ones in flood-prone areas, after 2010.
As in the measurement of population living in flood-prone areas, these areas are defined by the extent of
extreme historical floods.
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Figure 9.4: Consequences of a policy mix including all three policies.
9.5 Policy Mix
As Fig. 2 shows, each policy causes both positive and negative outcomes with re-
spect to different policy goals when compared with the do-nothing scenario. However,
as Fig. 3 shows, a policy mix that includes these three policies can mitigate the ad-
verse consequences of each individual policy. For instance, public transport subsidies
decrease the real estate pressures caused by a greenbelt policy, and banning building
in flood-prone areas limits the resulting increase in population in these areas. When
all three policies are applied together, the situation is improved as measured along all
policy goals compared with the do nothing scenario.
Note that in a policy mix, the consequences of each policy are not simply addi-
tive. For instance, when all three policies are implemented, the decrease in population
in flood-prone areas is smaller than the sum of the variation caused by each policy
taken separately. This nonlinearity and the complexity of policy interactions explain
why analyzing various urban policies together, in a consistent framework and with an
integrated modeling tool like NEDUM-2D, is useful.
Of course the preferred policy mix depends on the weight attributed to each crite-
rion, and a negative outcome for one policy goal can be more than compensated for
by an improvement for another. Also, other criteria may be necessary for a complete
analysis, for example, introducing differentiated criteria for the short term and the long
term. Regardless of these limitations, our analysis shows that building win-win solu-
tions by combining policies with different consequences is possible. Even though the
institutional fragmentation of urban policies does not always allow for such an inte-
grated decision-making process (OECD, 2006), this type of analysis may help identify
policies that are more efficient and have higher political acceptability.
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Appendix 9.A Scenario and boundary conditions
The scenario we simulate is not in any way a forecast of future evolution of the Paris
urban area. Instead, it represents a consistent and possible scenario, which can help
understand main drivers of urban evolution and the impact of various policies.
The model can be used to test many different assumptions about the future develop-
ment of transport infrastructure. For simplicity, we assume that it remains unchanged
between 2010 and 2030 and that congestion on the roads and public transport remains
constant, that is, we assume that future investments in the transportation network main-
tain the same level of service despite population growth.
Value in
2010
Low hy-
pothesis for
2030
Central hy-
pothesis for
2030
High hy-
pothesis for
2030
Private vehicle usage
cost (e/km)
7.1 5.8 7.6 9.8
Minimum monthly
public transport pass
price (e)
47.4 61.7 71.5 93.0
Households income
(e/year)
51 000 78 000 89 000 91 000
Urban area population
(number of households)
5 255 000 5 566 000 5 859 500 6 163 000
Table 9.3: Techno-economic and demographic scenarios data
The evolution of the Paris urban area depends on several external factors, including
demographic, socioeconomic, cultural, and political changes. The model thus requires
input assumptions on these factors. To provide these inputs, we extrapolate the future
costs of public transport and private vehicles (taking into account changes in technolo-
gies, oil prices, taxes, and so on) and of household incomes over the 2010-30 period
based on the average growth rate in the Paris urban area between 1988 and 2008. We
took future population and household sizes from the central demographic scenario for
the Paris urban area developed by the Institut national de la statistique et des études
économiques, the French statistical organization, and from the Institut d’aménagement
et d’urbanisme, the urbanism agency for the Ile-de-France area. The data we used are
listed in the “Central hypothesis for 2030” column of Tab.9.3.
Appendix 9.B Results and sensitivity analysis
Table 9.4 reproduces quantified results from the model, in the five scenarios (greenbelt
policy, public transport policy, flood risk zoning, policy mix, and do-nothing scenario),
for the five indicators. Of course, the model provides more detailed information, and
especially geographic information on the spatial impact of a given policy. For instance,
the impact of the public transport subsidy on rents and real estate prices is shown in
Fig. 9.2.
To test the sensitivity of our conclusions to scenario choice, we computed 81 sce-
narios by letting our scenario parameters vary. Alternatives for public transport prices,
private vehicle travel prices, and households income growth rate correspond to maxi-
mum and minimum observed growth rates (averaged over 5 years) in Paris urban area
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Indicators Greenbelt Public
transport
subsidy
Flood risk
zoning
Policy
mix
Do-
nothing
scenario
Variation in average
daily distance driven in
car (m)
+ 1570 -440 + 2550 -880 + 2560
(90/
3070)
(-2140/
900)
(290/
4860)
(-2180/ -
70)
(290/
4870)
Variation in population
in flood-prone areas
(thousands of
households)
+ 39 -4 -6 -8 + 6
(4/ 84) (-36/ 29) (-44/ 18) (-25/ 8) (-37/ 65)
Variation in total
urbanized area (km2)
0 + 690 + 470 0 + 480
(-30/ 0) (510/
880)
(90/ 750) (-20/ 0) (80/ 760)
Redistributive impacts
(Gini index)
+ 0.093 + 0.271 + 0.201 + 0.146 + 0.203
(0.043/
0.131)
(0.237/
0.326)
(0.049/
0.273)
(0.136/
0.174)
(0.042/
0.275)
Variation in dwelling
size in the center of Paris
(m2)
+ 0.17 + 1.73 + 0.79 + 0.95 + 0.82
(-1.47/
1.17)
(0.6/
2.55)
(-1.21/
1.94)
(-0.15/
1.73)
(-1.1/
1.96)
Table 9.4: Multicriteria analysis of urban policies on Paris in 2030 with respect to the five policy goals. The
numbers are the median value over all exogenous socio-economic scenarios (income, transport prices and
technologies). The number in parenthesis are the extreme values when changing scenarios.
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between 1988 and 2008. Alternatives for population and household size growth are
based on high and low demographic scenarios for Paris urban area developed by IN-
SEE, the French statistical organization and IAU, Ile-de-France urbanism agency. Al-
ternative scenario parameters are summarized in Tab.9.3.
As can be seen on Tab. 9.4 and Fig. 9.5(a), 9.5(b) and 9.5(c), policies outcomes
depend strongly on the selected world scenario. However, the relative impact of each
policy for the different policy goals is not sensitive to this scenario choice, making the
decision-making almost independent of this choice. The policy-mix improves the situ-
ation for all policy goals compared to the do-nothing policy in 65% of all scenarios. A
policy-mix with a stronger transport subsidy or a private vehicle tax enables to increase
this percentage.
174
(a) Best cases of all scenarios.
(b) Median of all scenario
(c) Worst cases of all scenarios
Figure 9.5: Consequences of a greenbelt policy, a public transport subsidy, and a zoning policy to reduce the
risk of flooding compared with the do-nothing scenario.
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Conclusion and perspectives
Cities play a key role climate change policies : firstly, land use planning and urban
transport and housing policies are major tools of climate change mitigation, and sec-
ondly, a high concentration of population and economic activity makes cities particu-
larly vulnerable to climate change impacts and requires specific adaptation measures.
Because of the long lifetimes of buildings and the high inertia of city structures, imme-
diate action is required if cities are to be adapted to a different climate or to help reduce
GHG emissions within a few decades.
Integrated city modeling can help address urban climate issues : it captures the
complex impact of global variables, such as oil prices and transport prices, on local
evolutions of a city. It enables also to capture the interactions between different city
parameters, and analyze the interdependency of various urban policy objectives.
The model NEDUM-2D, captures main long-term determinants of city evolution: it
reproduces the main tendencies of past Paris urban area evolution. It is simple enough
to enable testing deep changes in a city structure, takes into account the uncertainty
on a city future and keeps its processes and conclusions clear, avoiding a "black box"
effect.
In this work, we have analyzed three issues with which climate policies have to
deal. First, in line with the works of Gusdorf (2008), inertia is a key factor when
designing optimal climate policies. Indeed, various variables of a city evolution are
characterized by different evolution timescales. The long and short term impacts of
urban policies can therefore be very different. Our analysis, in Chapter 7, of the impact
of 100C /tCO2 a carbon tax on Paris urban over the short, medium, and long term
illustrates this phenomenon : whereas redistributive effects of this measure can happen
very quickly, effects on households location happens only over the long-term.
Second, uncertainty plays a key role in urban climate policies assessment. Urban
decision-makers generally do not have total control on household’s behaviour and on
the evolution of their city. They can only try to redesign their city through some con-
straints imposed on spontaneous urban development. This spontaneous development is
influenced by many external factors (lifestyles evolution, transport technologies etc.)
which future evolution is unknown. Robustness against this uncertainty should there-
fore be a key element in urban climate policies appraisal and prospective studies are
essential. In Chapter 8, we have shown how it is possible to downscale global world
evolution scenarios until 2100 (such as SRES scenarios, cf. Nakicenovic et al., 2000)
at city scale, and design possible and coherent scenarios, which represent conceivable
futures.
This enables to show, that, in Paris urban area, main drivers of urban sprawl and cli-
mate and flood vulnerability appear to be local demographic growth and local policies.
Global factors, such as energy and transport prices, even including possible peak-oil
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and carbon taxes, have only a limited influence on them. Conversely, transport-related
greenhouse gases emissions are mainly driven by global factors, namely vehicle ef-
ficiency changes, not by land use. As a consequence, very strict urban policies —
including reconstruction — would become necessary to control emissions from urban
transportation if technologies reveal unable to do so.
Finally, urban adaptation and mitigation policies interact with each others, and with
other policy goals, leading to synergies and conflicts. So far, only qualitative analysis
of these interactions have been developed, and knowledge is lacking on the relative
importance of these interactions, and on the effectiveness of policies aiming at counter-
balancing side-effects. In Chapter 9, we have done a first quantification of these inter-
actions. We have shown that urban policies are best assessed by means of an integrated
framework using multiple criteria that correspond to numerous policy objectives. We
find that building a policy mix that has positive effects for all objectives is possible. In
other words, cities’ mitigation, adaptation, economic, and social policies can be made
synergetic if they are designed in such a way that each policy takes other policies into
account.
If some first results were obtained through this work, many developments can be
done do deepen the analysis of the three issues we have presented. First, calibrating
the model on other cities, with characteristics as different as possible from French
cities (a rapidly-growing developing country city and an Eastern Europe shrinking city,
for instance), would also enable to better understand the validity of our model. For
instance, it would be especially interesting to calibrate the model on a fast growing
developing world city, and on a East European shrinking city.
Our analysis of inertia and of the consequences of climate policies over time could
be refined by making the model slightly more complex: For instance, as our modeling
is monocentric, it was not possible to simulate the effect of an increased development
of other subcenters in the urban area. Such a development would greatly change travel
patterns and the urban form, resulting in alternative scenarios. A more complex, poly-
centric model would be useful to test the influence of other new variables, and espe-
cially investment in services supply (schools, health, leisure...) across the urban area.
This is the subject of our present research. Jobs and activities localization dynamics
would also be of great interest and would enable to study the influence of urban climate
policies on the job market.
A better depiction of transport systems would also enable to refine our conclusions.
A better modelling of modal choices and of congestion would be especially useful to
be able to describe more accurately transport policies. Coupling the model with urban
transport models could be profitable.
Our analysis of uncertainty could also be improved. We have only considered here
a small number of scenarios; to assess the robustness of our results, other scenarios
could be downscaled. Our analysis might also gain from deeper analysis following
robust decision-making literature concepts and approaches.
The study of side-effects and tradeoffs, could benefit from a better integration with
risk models. To investigate this topic, three on-going research projects4 are coupling
this urban model with the urban microclimate model TEB. This model could be also
coupled with other models, for instance, with an hydrological model, to assess flood-
risk evolution because of climate change and of urban sprawl. Another possibility
4VURCA, MUSCADE and ACCLIMAT projects (http://www.cnrm.meteo.fr/ville.
climat/?lang=en).
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would be to couple it with an urban air circulation model, to study urban shape evolu-
tion on urban pollution.
Another development direction is to take into account diversity in households types,
for instance by dividing households in several income classes. This would for instance
enable to study urban policies differentiated impacts on poor or rich households.
Finally, it would also be interesting to apply in our analysis more complex multi-
criteria decion-making techniques, which might enable to highlight more complex
tradeoffs or more efficient strategies.
As a conclusion, these results represent a first step in a long-term research program
on urban dynamics and environmental policies.
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List of abbreviations
GHG Greenhouse Gases
ICM Integrated City Model
IEA International Energy Agency
LUTI model Land-Use Transport Interaction model
Mtoe Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent
SLR Sea Level Rise
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Abstract
Because they are home to more than half of the world population, and because most
of the world economic activity takes place within them, cities are at the forefront of
global environmental issues. Land use planning, urban transport and housing policies
are now recognized as major tools for the reduction of both greenhouse gases emis-
sions and vulnerability to climate change impacts. So far, however, how to use these
tools efficiently remains unclear. At least three main difficulties explain this, and play
a key role in urban climate policies analysis. First, urban climate policies are also not
developed or implemented in a vacuum; they interact with other policy goals, such as
economic competitiveness or social issues, giving rise to both synergies and conflicts.
Second, inertia is a key factor when designing optimal climate policies: structural mod-
ifications in cities occur slowly over a long time horizon. Some immediate actions are
required if cities are to be adapted to a different climate or to help reduce greenhouse
gases emissions within a few decades. Third, the evolution of a city depends on several
external factors, on which local policy-makers do not generally have much influence:
demographic, socio-economic, cultural, political and technological changes will play
a major role. This uncertainty has to be taken into account, and climate policies have
to be robust against future possible global evolutions is important. These three diffi-
culties are not, however, impossible to overcome, and we will illustrate how integrated
city modelling can help address these issues.
Résumé
Parce qu’elles concentrent plus de la moitié de la population et l’essentiel de l’activité
économique mondiales, les villes sont des acteurs majeurs des problématiques envi-
ronnementales globales. Les politiques de transport, d’urbanisme et de logement sont
ainsi reconnus comme des moyens nécessaires et efficaces d’action pour réduire les
émissions ainsi que pour réduire la vulnérabilité aux impacts du changement clima-
tique. Jusqu’à présent, malheureusement, il n’y a pas de consensus sur ce qui doit
être fait, et encore moins sur comment le faire. Trois difficultés, au moins, expliquent
cela. Tout d’abord, les politiques climatiques interagissent avec les autres objectifs des
politiques urbaines, comme la compétitivité économique ou les problèmes sociaux, en-
trainant des synergies et des conflits. Ensuite, les inerties sont un facteur-clef à prendre
en compte : les modifications structurelles des villes s’opèrent très lentement. Si l’on
veut que les villes soient adaptées au climat de la fin du XXIème siècle, il est indis-
pensable de commencer à agir dès maintenant. Enfin, les effets des politiques urbaines
dépendent de nombreux facteurs exogènes, et inconnus au moment où la décision doit
être prise : les changements démographiques, socio-économiques culturels politiques
et technologiques vont jouer un rôle majeur. Ces trois difficultés ne sont cependant pas
insurmontables, et nous illustrerons comment une modélisation intégrée peut permettre
de répondre à une partie de ces problèmes.
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